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ABSTRACT
Essays in Empirical Corporate Finance and Banking
Zoi Melina Papoutsi
This dissertation studies topics in the areas of empirical corporate finance, banking, and
financial intermediation. In the first chapter, entitled Personal Relationships in Loan Rene-
gotiation: Evidence from Corporate Loans, I estimate the effect of personal relationships
between a loan officer and a firm on the probability to renegotiate a loan and the outcomes
of the renegotiation. To identify this effect, I exploit a bank reorganization in Greece in
the mid-2010s, which allows me to identify two types of firms: one, those whose personal
relationships with loan officers were discontinued and those whose relationships were not.
This paper’s main conclusion is that personal relationships mitigate the cost of distress for
the firm in a loan renegotiation. The firm is worse off following the interruption of its loan
officer relationship, as it is less able to renegotiate, and the firm also receives tougher loan
terms on renegotiated loans.
The insights from the second chapter, entitled Lending Relationships and Moral Haz-
ard in Loan Renegotiation, can have important policy implications related to the rise of
nonperforming loans (NPLs). Many banks operating in countries that were hit by the 2010
European debt crisis, faced a significant rise in NPLs. This rise became one of the main
challenges that banks face, as high levels of NPLs tie up bank capital and thus reduce prof-
itability and increase funding costs. In the second chapter, I provide empirical evidence
that banks, through efficient renegotiation and strong relationships with firms, can prevent
loan defaults. This analysis suggests that firms with more distant lending relatioships are
more likely to strategically delay a loan payment in order to efficiently trigger a loan rene-
gotiation. This strategic behavior gives rise to the moral hazard phenomenon.
In the third chapter, entitled Securing the Unsecured: Do stronger creditor rights affect
firms’ access to credit?, I seek to understand whether stronger creditor rights influence
firms’ capital structure and access to finance. To answer this question, I use the passage
of an enforcement on cash assets reform in Croatia that aimed to increase the collection
of the unsecured debt. To identify exogenous variation across firms affected more by the
reform versus those that were not, I use a novel dataset on courts’ efficiency in dealing with
the specific type of cases affected by the reform. The conclusion of the paper is that firms
maintain higher leverage and have easier access to credit when creditor rights are stronger.
The firms that benefit the most are medium size and have limited access to tangible assets.
When firms are able to borrow more, they invest more in fixed assets.
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Chapter 1
Personal Relations in Loan Renegotiation:
Evidence from Corporate Loans 1
1.1 Introduction
Are personal relationships with bank loan officers consequential for corporate borrowers?
Could stronger relationships help a firm secure better loan terms in a renegotiation? Do
stronger lending relationships impact the firm’s capital structure? These are the key ques-
tions that I address in this paper. Financial intermediation theory suggests that relationships
can be beneficial because they reduce information asymmetries and alleviate moral hazard
(through monitoring, screening, repeated interaction etc.).2 At the same time, strong rela-
tionships between borrowers and lenders may give rise to other problems, e.g., soft-budget-
constraint problems, hold-up problems, or nepotistic behavior.3 Whether the benefits of
these relationships offset the costs is a challenging empirical question.
1I am extremely grateful to my advisors Charles Calomiris, Olivier Darmouni, Wei Jiang, and Daniel
Wolfenzon for their support. I would like also to thank Simona Abis, Geert Bekaert, Patrick Bolton, Emily
Breza, Xavier Giroud, Matthieu Gomez, Kinda Hachem, Andrew Hertzberg, Gur Huberman, Elias Papaioan-
nou, Giorgia Piacentino, Tano Santos, Suresh Sundaresan, and Kairong Xiao for their helpful comments and
discussions. Additionally, I am grateful to participants at Columbia Business School, Columbia Economics
Department, Washington University in St. Louis WFA-CFAR, and the Fordham PhD Student Colloquium
for comments.
2Classic references: Leland and Pyle 1977 Diamond 1984 Ramakrishnan and Thakor 1984 Fama 1985
Allen 1990
3Boot 2000;Bolton and Scharfstein 1996, Dewatripont and Maskin 1995;Sharpe 1990, Rajan 1992
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Classic contract theory states that debt contracts are not complete contingent contracts,
and for that reason in unanticipated states of the world, renegotiation is Pareto improving.4
The renegotiation optimality arises due to the debt-overhang problem or due to a covenant
violation. Thus, a hypothesis that arises from contract theory is that in a recession period
both the bank and the firm will benefit from a successful loan renegotiation. By offering
more flexible loan terms, a firm is expected to be less financially constrained, and a bank
will prevent defaults on loan repayments. In this paper, I study the impact of personal rela-
tionships between loan officers and firms on loan renegotiations and I investigate whether
personal relationships have significant effects on both the probability of successful renego-
tiation and on the terms of the renewed loans. Moreover, I provide evidence that lending
relationships impact the capital structure and investment decisions of a firm.
There are two main challenges for accurately estimating the impact of personal rela-
tionships on loan renegotiation. The first is the difficulty of quantifying the value of a
personal relationship. No direct measure of relationship intensity exists. The length of a
given relationship may seem like a straightforward measure, but the endogeneity of the
decision to sever an existing relationship will complicate the interpretation of the time span
measure. The endogeneity factor creates the second challenge. A bank’s decision to break
an existing relationship may reflect its perception of the declining creditworthiness of the
borrower. Under some circumstances a successful firm may seek to broaden its access to
external finance by weakening its relationship with the particular bank. Such decisions are
endogenous and would bias any results estimated by treating relationships as exogenous in
4Hart and Moore 1988, Rajan 1992, Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey 1994, Bolton and Scharfstein 1996,
Hart and Moore 1998, Maskin and Moore 1999, Gorton and Kahn 2000, Garleanu and Zwiebel 2008
2
a simple OLS framework.
To overcome these challenges, I use a 2013 bank reorganization in Greece. This exper-
iment provides exogenous variation in the length of the relationships between loan officers
and firms. Moreover, detailed confidential data on corporate loans allow me to quantify
accurately the effect of interrupted personal relationships, by controlling for region, bank
unit, and firm-specific effects. My central finding is that personal relationships between
loan officers and firms have a significant positive impact on loan renegotiation. Firms with
interrupted relationships are less likely to renegotiate a loan compared to firms experi-
encing continuous relationships. In addition, firms with interrupted relationships receive
tougher loan terms on the loans that are renegotiated.
The empirical setting is based on the consolidation of a major commercial bank in
Greece with business activity throughout the country. Bank network consolidation is a
common response of banks to financial distress, as consolidation reduces operating costs
and centralizes lending decisions.5 During consolidation, some bank units are closed and
the loan accounts from those units are merged with accounts in other surviving units. A
bank unit closure interrupts personal relationships between loan officers and firms because
merged accounts obtain new loan officers. Thus, after consolidation, two types of firms
are identified: one, those whose loans were transferred to another unit and whose personal
relationships were consequently discontinued, and two, those that remained at the same
unit for the entire period.
The criterion for bank units’ consolidation was geographic location. My identifying
5Several banks in Italy, Spain, Portugal have consolidated their network during the recent crisis as well
as banks in the United States.
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assumption is that the decision to close a bank unit is orthogonal to firms’ characteristics. I
find support for that assumption in the data by testing for differences in observable charac-
teristics. First, I compare the loan terms and performance, and firm financial variables of
borrowers in closed and open units in the pre-unit closure period and I find no statistically
significant differences. Second, I provide out-of-sample evidence that the identifying as-
sumption holds by using the Amadeus Bureau van Dijk dataset to test for differences based
on the zip codes of bank units.
I apply a difference-in-difference methodology to estimate the effect of relationship
interruption. I define as treated the firms with exogenously discontinued personal relation-
ships and as control those with continuing relationships. Hard information passed from
one loan officer to another because the transfer happened within the same bank. Observed
differences between the two groups in the post-consolidation period should be driven by
the consequences of interrupted personal relationships.
I find strong evidence for the significant effect of personal relationships on loan renego-
tiations at both extensive and intensive margins. Firms with interrupted relationships have
a 26% lower probability of renegotiating at least one of their old loans upon their trans-
fer to another unit, compared to firms that remained at the same unit. The unconditional
probability of renegotiating a loan is 59% and the estimated effect corresponds to a 15%
lower probability of renegotiation. Moreover, conditional on renegotiating a loan, affected
firms received tougher loan terms on their renegotiated loans. The affected loan terms for
firms whose accounts were transferred to another unit include higher interest rates, ap-
proximately 50% shorter maturities, and requirements that these firms pledge 70% more
collateral per loan amount compared to firms that remained with their original bank unit for
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the entire period. The economic magnitudes of the impact on loan maturity and collateral
are significant as they correspond, on average, to approximately a year’s shorter maturity
and an additional e 0.88 of collateral for each euro of loan amount.
I also observe that firms alter their capital structure after their relationship with the bank
is interrupted. The change in capital structure indicates that firms cannot substitute lending
from other banks without cost when the relationship with one bank is exogenously inter-
rupted. In particular, we observe that, when the relationship with the bank is interrupted,
firms raise more equity and decrease their leverage. Firms only partially substitute loans
from other banks to make up for the borrowing reduction from the bank whose relationship
was severed, resulting in lower total debt. This change in a firm’s sources of financing is
likely to have important implications for the firm’s business model and investment deci-
sions.
A possible selection bias on renegotiation could change the interpretation of the re-
sults for loan term and performance differences between interrupted- and continuing-
relationship loans. If the loan officer chooses to renegotiate with firms based on their
performance, the intensive margin results will be biased. To address the concern of poten-
tial selection bias on renegotiation, I conduct two tests. First, I compare the pre-unit-closure
period characteristics of the treated and control firms that renegotiated a loan in the post-
unit-closure period and I find no statistically significant difference in pre-period measures
of firm performance. Second, I consider all the hard information available to both the loan
officer and the econometrician to identify the variables that can trigger a renegotiation. This
test demonstrates that the loan officer who remained at the same unit for the entire period
chose to renegotiate with treated firms with higher profitability prospects. Loan officer
5
behavior, therefore, biases estimated coefficients towards zero, implying that my intensive
margin results are conservative.
To further investigate the explanatory mechanism for the value of a relationship be-
tween a loan officer and a firm, I examine closer and more distant relationships separately.
In most cases, a closer relationship entails fewer outside financing options, and when this
closer relationship is interrupted, the expected effect is a significant informational loss. In
contrast, firms with more distant relationships and, hence, greater outside financing options
are expected to have stronger bargaining power. To test for the value of a stronger rela-
tionship, I construct two measures of relationship strength. The results from this analysis
confirm the value of personal relationships, as a firm with a stronger previous loan-officer
relationship displays a significant negative effect on its renegotiated loan terms when this
relationship ends.
In the next section, I describe the paper’s contributions to the literature. In section
1.3, I provide an overview of the institutional background and the dataset structure. In
section 1.4, I present the empirical specification and a detailed comparison of the treated
and control groups. The regression results are presented in section 1.5. In section 1.6, I
conclude.
1.2 Related Literature
This paper contributes to the literature by being the first to combine two classic research
streams—relationship banking and contract renegotiation—and by estimating the conse-
quences of personal relationships between loan officers and firms for loan renegotiations.
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The broader literature to which this study contributes addresses the role of relationships
in credit markets. A rich theoretical literature on bank debt highlights the importance of
informational asymmetry and moral hazard for financial intermediation.6 Several empir-
ical papers have examined the relationship between banks and borrowers for evidence to
determine whether asymmetric information affects lending. Petersen and Rajan 1994 and
Berger and Udell 1995 used the repeated interaction between a borrower and a financial
institution as a measure of relationship. Mian 2006, Agarwal and Hauswald 2010, Canales
and Nanda 2012, and Bolton et al. 2016 define relationship lending as a function of ge-
ographic distance. Ongena and Smith 2001 analyze the duration of a bank relationship
with a firm. Sufi 2007 and Ivashina 2009 explore informational asymmetries in a lending
syndicate. 7
The empirical literature to which this paper is most closely related identifies the effects
of personal relationships between bank employees and borrowers. These studies focus on
how loan approvals or performance can be influenced by different factors such as cultural
proximity (Fisman, Paravisini, and Vig 2017), social connections (Haselmann, Schoenherr,
and Vig 2016), hierarchical and geographical distance (Liberti and Mian 2009), or the loan
officer being on leave (Drexler and Schoar 2014). Several papers examine the effect on
interest rates of strong interpersonal connections between a banker and a firm (Engelberg,
Gao, and Parsons 2012), or the effect of a strong relationship as measured by the number of
interactions (Herpfer 2017), or the effect of an interruption of a relationship caused by an
6Jaffee and Russell 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Myers and Majluf 1984; Diamond 1984; Ra-
makrishnan and Thakor 1984;Sharpe 1990;Diamond 1991; Besanko and Kanatas 1993; Rajan and Winton
1995;Bolton and Freixas 2000
7Extensive surveys of this literature are provided by Ongenah and Smith 2000, Boot 2000, Srinivasan
2014, Kysucky and Norden 2015
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executive’s death or retirement (Karolyi 2017). Lastly, Hertzberg, Liberti, and Paravisini
2010 and Cole, Kanz, and Klapper 2015 provide insights on the effects of bank-specific
governance policies on the moral hazard behavior of a loan officer.
Within the field of literature on relationship banking, this paper is the first to demon-
strate how exogenous interruptions in bank-borrower relationships affect loan renegotia-
tion. One important difference between new and renegotiated loans is the bank’s prior
exposure to the risk of default on pre-existing loans, which gives the borrower a stronger
negotiation position. The risk of a higher probability of default is magnified in a crisis pe-
riod, such as in Greece in 2010-2015, when banks faced very high delinquency ratios that
drove their overall risk assessment. In such periods, the value of a successful renegotiation
surges. This paper not only shows the effect of relationships on the probability of renegoti-
ation, but also on the attributes of the loans that are renegotiated. Further, whereas existing
literature focuses on estimating relationship effects on lending either at the extensive mar-
gin or on the interest rate only, this paper examines the impact on the three main variables
characterizing the loan structure (i.e., interest rate, maturity, and collateral).
Given that the main focus of this paper is loan renegotiations, the analysis also con-
tributes to the literature on contract renegotiation. Several influential papers have examined
renegotiation in incomplete contracts as an out-of-equilibrium phenomenon.8 Although the
existing theory of contact renegotiation has evolved significantly, the empirical evidence on
this topic is limited due to data restrictions. This paper investigates renegotiation indepen-
dent of previous defaults on a loan payment, and for that reason is also related to the work
8Hart and Moore 1988, Rajan 1992, Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey 1994, Von Thadden 1995, Bolton
and Scharfstein 1996, Hart and Moore 1998, Maskin and Moore 1999, Gorton and Kahn 2000, Garleanu and
Zwiebel 2008, Tirole 2010
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of Roberts and Sufi 2009, who analyze in detail the factors triggering a renegotiation, and
those determining its outcomes. Roberts 2015 is the closest to my paper, as he shows that
a corporate loan renegotiation happens frequently, modifies significantly the initial loan
terms, and is affected significantly by the duration of the lending relationship. Although
similar conclusions to those found in these two papers arise in my analysis regarding the
frequency and the outcomes of a renegotiation, my paper advances beyond these to esti-
mate the effect of the relationship between a loan officer and a borrower on the probability
of renegotiation and the nature of its outcomes.
A few empirical papers have considered other factors affecting loan renegotiation. The
importance of the liquidation value of collateral (Benmelech and Bergman 2008) and of
the mortgage securitization (Piskorski, Seru, and Vig 2010) on loan renegotiation are high-
lighted. James 1995 focuses on debt restructurings and shows that the financial condition
of the firm determines the bank’s incentives to make concessions. Lastly, Chodorow-Reich
and Falato 2017 show the importance of the financial institution’s health on contracting
credit using covenant violations.
This paper also complements literature examining the impact of bank branch consol-
idation. In this area, the most relevant paper is by Nguyen 2016, as she examines how
branch closures in the United States affect local access to credit. Lastly, this paper is linked
to the strain of European debt crisis literature that employing micro–level data to identify
the impact on bank lending.9
9Acharya et al. 2016, Bentolila, Jansen, and Jime´nez 2016, Cingano, Manaresi, and Sette 2016, Popov
and Van Horen 2015, De Marco 2016
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1.3 Institutional Background & Data
Institutional Background
The identification setting and the data that I use in this paper come from a Greek bank
and cover the period 2012–2015.10 Several important facts characterize the economy and
the banking sector of that period. From 2008 and until the end of 2016, the Greek GDP
contracted by approximately 25%; unemployment rose to approximately 26% of the labor
force, the highest level in the European Union; and investment declined by 75%. The
collapse in investment was partially caused by a decreased access to credit. Access to
finance was the most pressing concern for small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs)
operating in Greece, as 33% of SME owners consider this their most important problem.11
This issue is critical given that SMEs account for more than 90% of private companies and
87% of total employment.
The Greek banking sector suffered during this period from a lack of access to inter-
national capital markets, deposit flight, and losses from the sovereign debt restructuring.
Several banks were resolved and their deposits as well as a number of their loan portfolios
were transferred to the four largest banks, thus causing a significant centralization of the
sector. The four largest banks went through three large-scale recapitalizations (July 2013,
May 2014, and December 2015) during this period. However, availability of long-term
finance remained limited, and cost of credit was very high compared to EU standards. One
of the main reasons for the limited credit supply was the deterioration of banking asset
10Gourinchas, Philippon, and Vayanos 2017 provide a detailed empirical and theoretical analysis of the
Greek crisis.
11OECD, 2016 Financing SMEs Report
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quality. In 2016, the nonperforming loans (NPLs) reached 45% of the loan portfolio, and
provisions stood at 50% of total NPLs. In particular, in the corporate sector, about 60% of
loans to small- and medium-size businesses were nonperforming. The rise of the NPLs ties
up bank capital, thereby reducing profitability and increasing funding costs.
In this paper, I exploit a major internal reorganization that was implemented in one
of Greece’s largest banks, and led to the closure of bank units. It is important to clarify
what a bank unit is and distinguish bank units from branch closures discussed in prior
literature. In this case, a bank unit entails a center that manages corporate loans, and more
centralized centers managing specific loan types. For the analysis that follows, a bank unit
can be considered a type of branch, because, as in distinct branches, personal relationships
develop between loan officers and the firm whose loans they manage.
The main goal of this internal reorganization was increased efficiency regarding NPL
management. In response to the significant rise in the NPL ratio for corporate loans, the
bank established specialized NPL workout units at the end of 2013. The new units were
separate from the units responsible for loan origination and were responsible for monitor-
ing, managing, or liquidating the nonperforming exposures. Approximately half of total
loans to small- and medium-size corporations were transferred to these specialized NPL
units.
This transfer of loans to the NPL units caused a significantly reduced workload for the
original units assigned to manage corporate loans. Consequently, it became cost effective
for the bank to consolidate the original units, by closing several and relocating the man-
agement of corporate loans to the closest unit that remained open. Originally there were
112 units that managed corporate loans, and after the mergers, there were 37. The bank in-
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tended to retain its network across the country, thereby ensuring clients would remain. For
that reason, the main criterion for mergers was geographic location, and, further, mergers
would only take place in areas already served by two or more units. The unit remaining
open in a given area, would be the unit managing the largest volume of loans. An impor-
tant feature of the consolidation was the relocation of the loan officers. Loan officers who
had worked in units that closed were transferred to the newly established NPL units. Loan
officers who worked in units that remained open continued to manage their old loans and
became additionally responsible for the loans transferred from closed units. Because firms
whose loans were transferred to the closest unit lost the relation with the loan officer who
had managed their loans, the feature of unit mergers, provides a good setting for testing the
effect of personal relationships on loan renegotiation.
Dataset structure
The main data used in this study come from one of the largest commercial banks in Greece.
The dataset contains detailed annual information on corporate loans for approximately
8,000 small and medium nonretail enterprises (SME) covering four years (2012–2015).
The construction of the sample is based on the ECB supervision guidelines for the Asset
Quality Review (AQR). Under these guidelines, an SME is defined as a corporation that
has annual turnover up to e 50 million and employs fewer than 250 persons.
For several reasons, a restricted sample of nonretail SMEs is the most appropriate sam-
ple for the proposed analysis. First, it is necessary to exclude large corporations as they
have access to other sources of financing, such as international banks and the stock market.
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Moreover, credit for large corporations is approved at a centralized, and higher level at the
bank, and for that reason, personal relations with loan officers are expected to be irrelevant.
Second, the retail sector is also excluded from the dataset, as a different department at the
bank manages this sector, and further approvals were required to obtain that dataset. By
focusing on nonretail SMEs, I gained access to credible firm financial information, since
the majority of the firms in the sample have audited financial statements, which they are
required to submit to the bank. Moreover, by excluding very small firms, we can expect
sample firms to be unaffected by the narrow local economic environment. Firms in the sam-
ple operate either regionally or nationally and their performance is expected to be affected
by the economic conditions at the region and industry level.
The dataset includes detailed information on the loan terms and performance as well
as basic firm financial information. Each firm has multiple loans at this bank, and the loan
types vary from the more secure, such as leasing, to the less secure, such as factoring,
letters of credit, revolving credit, and corporate bond loans. Moreover, an indicator of the
bank unit responsible for each loan is included, which allows for tracking transfers across
units. Personal relationships develop between loan officers and firms at the bank unit and
changes in the bank unit indicator reflect interruptions of such relations.
Descriptive Statistics
As I focus on the merger of the original bank units, I exclude the loans that were transferred
to the specialized NPL workout units. For that reason, the sample included is not repre-
sentative of the Greek economy during this period, but rather represent the set of firms that
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performed relatively well during the crisis.
The final sample consists of loans to 3,984 firms located across the 13 geographic
regions of the country. Following the merger, a single bank unit managed on average
340 loans to 107 firms. The original dataset includes loan-level information, but the main
unit of analysis in this paper is at the firm level. The reason for this aggregation is to avoid
duplication within firms, which could bias the results. To aggregate the dataset at the firm
level, a simple summation is used for the exposure and the collateral value. For the interest
rate, the maturity, and all performance-related variables, a weighted average is estimated,
using as weights the ratio of the specific loan exposure over the total exposure of the firm.
Table 1.1 presents the summary statistics for the main variables in the pre-period (2012,
2013). A median firm in the sample has two loans with a total balance of approximately
e 536,000 and total collateral cover of e 187,630. The average interest rate is 5.97%,
and the average remaining maturity of the loans is approximately one and a half years
(528.34 days). The median firm performs well, with no nonperforming exposures, and
has not delayed a payment. Regarding the firm’s financial information, the median firm
was medium-size with approximately e 6 million in total assets and e 4.25 million in total
debt. It has a positive EBITDA of approximately e 270,000, and a high leverage equal to
0.69. The summary statistics confirm the fact that the sample is comprised of firms that
performed relatively well during the crisis.
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1.4 Empirical Methodology
Identification Strategy
The identification of relationship interruption is based on a bank’s internal reorganization
and the closure of bank units. I employ this exogenous variation, define appropriate treat-
ment and control groups, and apply the difference-in-difference methodology to accurately
estimate the effect of interrupted personal relationships between loan officers and firms on
loan repayments.
The first step is to exclude loans were transferred to the specialized NPL units. The
sample is thus constrained to relatively “good” firms. The next step is to identify the firms
whose accounts were transferred to another unit because their original unit closed. By
looking at the transfers across bank units, we observe a set of firms whose accounts were
transferred to other bank units without their original unit closing. (This set of observations
accounts for approximately 11% of the original sample.) It is necessary to exclude these
firms from the analysis, due to the endogeneity of their transfer.
By using the closure of the original bank unit as the source of exogenous variation, I
overcome the selection bias that may arise at the firm level. In particular, treated firms are
defined as those whose loan accounts were transferred to another bank unit because their
original unit closed. Control firms are defined as those whose loan accounts remained at
the same unit during the whole period of the sample. This specification of treatment and
control groups ensures that the variation comes only from the bank unit level and not from
the firm level. Loans transferred from one unit to another as a result of a cause other than
unit closure are excluded from the sample.
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The feature that allows me to identify an interruption in personal relationships between
loan officers and firms is the relocation of loan officers. Loan officers who worked in units
that closed were transferred to the new NPL units. Loan officers who worked in the units
that remained open continued to manage their old loans and became responsible for the
loans that were transferred from the closed units. For that reason, firms that remained at
the same unit continued to interact with the same loan officers, while firms whose accounts
were transferred had to establish a new relationship with a different loan officer.
The baseline specification is a difference-in-difference, which allows me to compare
the difference on the outcome variables between the firms in the treated group and those in
the control group in the post-unit closure period (2014, 2015) relative to the difference that
the two groups had in the pre-unit closure period (2012, 2013). The baseline regression is:
yiurt = αi + αu + αrt + δ(Postt ∗ Treatiur) + εiurt (1.1)
where yiurt stands for the outcome variable for firm i obtaining a loan from bank unit u
and located in region r in year t. Treatiur is a dummy variable equal to one for treated
firms and zero for control firms. Postt is a dummy variable equal to zero for the period
before the bank units’ closure (from 2012 to 2013) and one after the closures (from 2014
to 2015). The baseline specification includes firm fixed effects (αi) to capture any time-
invariant characteristics of the firm. Bank unit fixed effects (αu) as well as region ∗ year
fixed effects (αrt) are included to capture any time-invariant characteristics of the bank unit
(e.g., a specific bank unit may have a higher lending limit) and any region and time-varying
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shocks respectively. For the treated firms, the bank-unit fixed effect is based on the unit to
which their loans were transferred. The coefficient of interest is δ, which measures the
difference in the outcome variable for the firms that experienced an interruption in their
personal relationship with the loan officers, relative to the firms that did not, controlling for
the pre-period difference.
The outcome variables of interest belong to four groups: (i) the probability of renego-
tiating a loan (extensive margin); (ii) renegotiated loan terms (intensive margin); and (iii),
firm level effects. Regarding the loan terms of the renegotiated loans, I use as outcome
variables the interest rate, the remaining maturity of the loan, and the collateral value rela-
tive to the loan balance. I also construct two additional variables to help capture the effect
of collateral. The first is an unsecured loan dummy and the second is a type-of-collateral
dummy. To capture firm outcomes from an interrupted relationship, I examine the firm’s
total assets, total debt, total equity, the ratio of equity over assets, and the firm’s leverage
estimated by the ratio of total debt over total assets.
Comparison of treated and control groups in the pre-unit closure
period
The most important threat to identification is a possible selection bias that arises from the
decision to close a bank unit. It is necessary to assume that the bank did not close units
where debtors performed, or were expected to perform, worse. The main criterion for unit
closure is geographic location: in areas where there were two or more units, the bank kept
only one, while in areas with only one unit, it was optimal for the bank to keep it open to
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serve the main priority of client retention.
A comparison between the two groups in the pre-unit-closure period (2012–2013) pro-
vides evidence that there are no statistically significant differences across the two groups.
Table 1.2 presents this comparison and includes variables related to loan terms, perfor-
mance, and firms’ financials. Column 1 shows the mean value and the standard deviation
for the control firms, Column 2 for the treated firms, and Column 3 shows the p-value for
the difference, with regional fixed effects included. The only variable significantly different
across the two groups is the ratio of loans transferred to the NPL units from the originals:
this variable is higher for the bank units that remained open. This difference indicates
that, to the extent that units were selected for closure based on loan performance, the bank
units that closed had better performing loans. For that reason, if a selection bias exists on
which units closed, it will bias the results downwards. The fact that we do not observe any
statistically significant difference for the loan terms, performance, and firms’ financial in-
formation supports the assumption that the two groups shared similar characteristics. The
probability is therefore high that the two groups would have continued to look similar if
the personal relationships with loan officers had not been interrupted.
Out-of-sample comparison of firms located in exposed and control
geographic areas
In this section, I perform an out-of-sample comparison of firms located in geographic areas
where a bank unit closed (exposed areas), and firms located in areas where a unit remained
open (control areas). This test provides further evidence that the local economic condi-
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tions, and the firms operating in exposed and control areas, are similar. The data for this
comparison come from the Amadeus Bureau van Dijk dataset and cover the same period
of the experiment (2012–2015). The Amadeus dataset provides information on firms’ bal-
ance sheets and income statements. In addition, I use the bank units’ zip codes to identify
exposed and control areas. I match the firms’ zip code with the bank units’ zip code, and
construct a subsample of the Amadeus dataset appropriate for the out-of-sample compari-
son.
Table 1.3 presents the results comparing firms located in exposed and control areas
for the same period of the experiment (2012–2015). The first column shows the mean
value and the standard deviation of firms located in the zip code areas where a bank unit
remained open, and the second column for firms located in areas where a unit closed.
The third column shows the p-value of the difference. The two groups are similar across
most of the variables. There is a small and significant in total assets and the number of
employees between the two groups, which suggests that firms in control areas are larger.
To account for this difference, I include the firm’s total assets as a control variable in the
baseline results in section 1.5. Moreover, in subsection 1.5, I restrict the sample to areas
in which firms have similar characteristics to provide further evidence that local economic
conditions do not explain differences between control and treated groups.
The main variables of interest in Table 1.3 are those related to firms’ financial per-
formance. Any difference in these variables would suggest that the economic conditions
differ between exposed and control areas. No statistically significant differences in these
variables are observable (EBIT, EBITDA, net income, sales, gross profit, etc.).
Lastly, to capture the potential differences associated with unobserved economic indica-
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tors, I use the firms’ financial characteristics as dependent variables and apply the baseline
regression 1.1 to examine whether there is an out-of-sample effect of a bank unit closure.
Column 4 of Table 1.3 shows the estimated coefficients from the difference-in-difference
regressions on firms’ variables. No coefficient is statistically significant. The fact that
there is no statistically significant difference across any specification for the observable
characteristics of firms’ financial characteristics supports the assumption that economic
conditions in the exposed and control areas are similar.
1.5 Results
First, I report the baseline results on loan renegotiation. I examine the impact of personal
relationships between loan officers and firms on the probability of renegotiating a loan and,
conditional on renegotiating a loan, I estimate the impact on the loan terms. Firm-level
effects are included. Lastly, I examine how the strength of the relationship affects the
results by using three different measures of relationship strength.
Baseline Results
Effect on Probability of Renegotiation
First, I analyze the extensive margin and the probability of renegotiating a loan after a firm’s
loans are transferred to another bank unit. I compare firms that experienced an exogenous
interruption in the personal relationship with their loan officer with those that did not. The
outcome variable of interest is the probability that a firm renegotiates at least one of its pre-
existing loans. The data in this section are constructed at the firm level. More formally, the
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dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm renegotiated at least one of
its old loans and zero if the firm did not renegotiate any loan. Table 1.4 presents the results
with different specifications regarding fixed effects and control variables. It can be seen that
firms whose relationship with a loan officer is interrupted have a 26% lower probability of
renegotiating at least one of their pre-existing loans, compared to firms with uninterrupted
relationships, when firm, bank unit, and region-year fixed effects are included.
A loan renegotiation can be initiated either by the bank or by the firm and does not
require a delayed loan payment. A renegotiation is expected to be mutually advantageous,
as otherwise one of the parties would not agree to the new terms. The firm benefits by
renegotiating a loan, because one or more of the initial loan terms is relaxed. At the same
time, the bank prevents a default or improves its covenants. Since renegotiation benefits
the firms, firms with interrupted relationships receive worse treatment as the result of the
transfer of their loans to another bank unit.
The results from four different specifications are presented in Table 1.4, and the results
are robust. In all four specifications, bank unit fixed effects are included to capture any
unit-level time-invariant variation, and the standard errors are clustered at the unit level.
Even though bank lending policies in general are similar across units, a larger unit or a unit
that is higher in the organizational hierarchy may have different limits on loan amounts and
the terms it is allowed to approve.
Moreover, I control for the regional differences by adding region or region-year fixed
effects. In the first column, region and year fixed effects are included, while in the second
column region-year fixed effects are included. When constructing the region-year fixed ef-
fects, I define the region more broadly than strict geography to ensure that at least two bank
21
units are open per region in the post-unit closure period and I combine only neighboring
regions that have similar industry composition. No adjustment is done on regions that have
two or more bank units in the post-period. The specification defined in Column 2 is the
baseline specification of the paper.
To control for firm level differences, in Columns 1 and 2 firm fixed effects are in-
cluded to capture any time-invariant characteristics of the firm such as size, industry, etc.
In Columns 3 and 4, I add different types of firm-level time-varying control variables. In
Column 3, as control variables, the firm’s lagged log of EBITDA and the lagged log of total
loans at this bank are included. In Column 4, the lagged log of total assets is included as
a control variable to control for changes in the size of the firm. The results remain robust
when we control for time-varying firm characteristics, and this confirms that variations at
the firm level during the years of the experiment are not driving the estimated coefficients.
Effect on Possible Renegotiation Outcomes
After a renegotiation, both the loan terms and loan amount can be altered, depending on
the firm’s needs and the bank’s constraints. A renegotiation can have one or more of the
following outcomes: an increase in the loan amount (in particular, in the case of a credit
line), a decrease in the interest rate, an extension of the loan maturity, and either an increase
or a decrease in collateral value. An increase in collateral is in most cases necessary if the
loan amount is increased, but can be a requirement under other renegotiation outcomes as
well. A decrease in collateral is possible, as it may be optimal for the bank to free up part
of the assets previously pledged as collateral to let the firm use them for new loans.
Table 1.5 shows the possible renegotiation outcomes and the unconditional probability
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for a firm receiving each of these. By renegotiating a loan, more than one of the loan terms
can change, and for that reason, the unconditional probabilities do not sum to 100. The
most common outcome is an increase in collateral pledged, as this often is a requirement
for other changes, and the least common change is an extension in loan maturity.
I estimate the effect of an interruption in the personal relationship with a loan officer
on the probability of receiving each of the possible outcomes. Table 1.5 presents these re-
sults using the baseline regression specification. Firms with interrupted relationships have
a lower probability compared to the control firms to receive any renegotiation outcome,
except for a decrease in the interest rate. In particular, they have approximately 20% lower
probability of increasing the loan amount, of increasing the loan’s collateral, and of de-
creasing the collateral. Treated firms have also approximately 5% lower probability of
extending the loan’s maturity.
Effect on Loan Terms Conditional on a Renegotiation
Tables 1.6–1.9 present the results for the newly agreed loan terms after renegotiating a loan
under different specifications. Overall, we observe that firms with interrupted loan officer
relationships receive worse terms. Specifically, they receive 1% higher interest rates, 50%
shorter maturities, and they have to pledge a 70% higher value of collateral relative to
the total loan balance. Even though the estimated effect on the interest rate is statistically
significant, the economic magnitude is small. In contrast, the estimated effects on maturity
and collateral are both statistically and economically significant. This difference may be
related to the fact that a range for the interest rate is generated by an automated program,
while the maturity and the collateral are determined by the negotiation with the loan officer.
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Interest Rate: Table 1.6 presents the results on the log of the interest rate for different
empirical specifications. From the baseline regression, we observe that firms with inter-
rupted loan officer relationships receive a 1% higher interest rate on renegotiated loans,
compared to firms that remained at the same bank unit. The economic magnitude of this
difference is small as it corresponds to only 0.07 basis points (likely due to the automated
program-generated interest rate).
Maturity: Firms whose relationships with their loan officers are interrupted appear to
receive significantly shorter maturities on their renegotiated loans. Table 1.7 includes the
results for the remaining maturity, as measured by the log of remaining days. Based on the
baseline specification, treated firms receive approximately 50% fewer days remaining on
their renegotiated loans, which corresponds to approximately one-year-shorter maturities.
Collateral: The outcome variable that is used to estimate the effect on the collateral is
the ratio of collateral value relative to the total loan balance. An absolute effect on collateral
value would not be informative, as it could be driven by an increase in the loan amount.
Table 1.8 shows the results on the log of collateral value relative to the total balance for
renegotiated loans. Firms with interrupted loan officer relationships pledge a significantly
higher value of collateral. The baseline specification shows that treated firms have to pledge
71.6% more collateral relative to the loan balance after their loans are transferred, which
corresponds to and additional e 0.88 of collateral for each euro of loan amount.
Loan amount: There is mixed evidence regarding the loan amount. Table 1.9 presents
the results on the log of the total balance of the firm’s renegotiated loans that performed
well. This is a subset of the renegotiated loans, as nonperforming loans are excluded.
This restriction is necessary because the loan balance can increase or remain the same,
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due to either the loan amount increased or the debtor delayed the loan payments. For that
reason, the results presented in Table 1.9 should be seen as suggestive. The estimated result
varies under different specifications. In particular, under the baseline specification, firms
with interrupted relationships do not receive any statistically different loan amounts in the
renegotiated loans relative to firms in the control group. When we control for lagged firm
characteristics in Columns 3 and 4, however, firms with an interrupted relationships present
higher loan balances on their renegotiated loans.
Effect on Renegotiated Loans’ Collateral Type
In Table 1.8, the effect of sustained personal relationships on relaxing collateral require-
ments is presented, and the economic magnitude of this effect is large. In this section, I
focus on the qualitative information regarding collateral types to further investigate the ef-
fect of continuing personal relationships on collateral. The value and the type of collateral
are determined by the loan officer, not by an automated program (as is the case with interest
rates), and for that reason, a measurable impact of personal relationships is expected on the
collateral-related variables.
I construct two dummy variables that explore the impact of renegotiation on collateral
pledged. The first is an Unsecured Loan dummy, which is one if the loan does not have any
collateral pledged and is considered unsecured, and zero otherwise. Approximately 50%
of the loans included in the analysis were unsecured in the pre unit closure period, and no
statistically significant difference occurs between the treated and the control groups.
In addition, I construct a second dummy variable that quantifies the effect on the type
of collateral. This is potentially important because the enforceability of collateral depends
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on its type. I construct a Secure Type of Collateral dummy that is equal to one if the col-
lateral is considered highly secure and zero otherwise. I define real estate (commercial and
residential), ships, deposits, and debt securities as highly secure. As less secure collateral
types, I define accounts receivable, equities or convertible bonds, and other types of guar-
antees. Both the treated and control groups have pledged highly secure types of collateral
in approximately 50% of their collateralized loans. In 2012 and 2013, approximately 36%
of the secured loans employ receivables as collateral, 30% use real estate, and 20% use
deposits.
Table 1.10 presents the results for the two collateral variables. Column 1, shows that
firms in the treated group have an 18% lower probability of having an unsecured loan
after a renegotiation. Column 2, shows that an interruption in the personal loan officer
relationship induces firms to pledge more highly secure collateral on their renegotiated
loans. In particular, treated firms are 31.3% more likely to pledge highly secure collateral
compared to control firms.
Addressing possible threats to identification
Identifying Possible Selection Bias on Renegotiation
One concern regarding the validity of the estimated effects of an interrupted relationship is
a possible selection bias concerning whether a loan is renegotiated. In subsections 1.4 and
1.4, I demonstrated that firms in the treated and control groups share similar pre-unit clo-
sure characteristics. Two of my main findings are that firms with interrupted personal rela-
tionships have a lower probability of renegotiating a loan (subsection 1.5), and conditional
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on a renegotiation, these firms receive worse loan terms (subsection 1.5). If loan officers
choose to renegotiate with interrupted-relationship firms based on different criteria than
those used for the continuous-relationship firms, then the intensive margin results would
be biased. If loan officers for interrupted-relationship loans granted renegotiation more fre-
quently for firms with relatively inferior performance, while loan officers for continuing-
relationship firms did not do so, then the estimated effect of continuing relationships on
the probability of renegotiation would exaggerate the true effect of the continuing relation-
ship. In fact however, I find the opposite, implying that my estimated effect of continuing
relationships on renegotiation terms is conservative.
I conduct two tests, which are presented in Tables 1.11 and 1.12. The first test compares
the two types of firms that renegotiated a loan in the post-period. In Table 1.11, a similar
analysis as in Table 1.2 is conducted, but for this test, I include only firms that renegotiated a
loan in the post-unit closure period, and compare the pre-unit closure period characteristics
between the treated and control groups. We observe no statistically significant difference
in any of the variables between firms with interrupted and continuing relationships that
renegotiated a loan in the post-unit closure period. Firms in the two groups that renegotiated
loans in the post-unit closure period shared similar characteristics in the pre-period, which
suggests no selection bias exists regarding whether a loan is renegotiated.
Table 1.12 presents a second test, which considers observable variables that can prompt
a renegotiation. I rank firms within each bank unit based on the year-before-the-transfer
value for each variable. The decision to renegotiate a loan is made by the loan officer at the
bank unit, and, for that reason, any correlation outside the unit would not be informative for
the criteria used to renegotiate a loan at the bank unit. The rank within the bank unit allows
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me to control for the variation at the bank unit and any criterion based on hard information
used by the loan officer. I regress a dummy variable for renegotiating a loan on the firm’s
within-bank-unit rank separately for each variable and include bank-unit and region-year
fixed effects. This test provides us with correlations that show which firms have a higher
probability of renegotiating a loan, based on the previous year’s hard information available
to the loan officer and to the econometrician. Table 1.12, Column 1 presents the result for
the whole sample (pre- and post-unit closure period for treated and control firms), Column
2 for control firms in the post-period, and Column 3 for treated firms in the post-period.
The most interesting observation comes from the estimations of the year-before-the-
transfer EBITDA growth rate. We observe that, for the whole sample and for the control
group in the post-period, there is no statistically significant effect, while for the treated
group in the post-period there is a positive statistically significant correlation. As noted
above, this finding indicates my estimates are conservative.
Table 1.12 implies a common rule with respect to the firm’s leverage, total loans at the
subject bank, and total loan-loss provision is applied for all firms, independent of whether
they belong to the treated or control group. Moreover, firms in the whole sample and in the
control group appear to be selected similarly for renegotiation based on their total assets,
total debt, debt over EBITDA, and payments’ days past due. In contrast, we do not observe
a correlation between these variables and renegotiation for the treated group. Again, this
finding indicates conservative estimates.
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Controlling for firms’ differences in zip codes locations
Subsection 1.4 discussed the observed differences between firms located in areas where a
bank unit closed (exposed) and in areas where a bank unit remained open (control). Based
on the zip code comparison using the Amadeus dataset presented in Table 1.3, firms located
in the exposed areas are smaller in size. Even though I control for the log of total assets
in the estimated results, in this section, I provide further evidence that firms’ differences
across geographic locations are not driving the results.
To accurately control for potential differences in the geographic location of the exposed
and the control areas, I restrict the sample to areas in which firms across the two areas have
no statistically significant difference in financial variables. In particular, I exclude firms
located in Attica, the region where Athens is located, and I repeat the analysis. Table
1.13 presents the results of the subsample on the comparison of exposed and control areas
using the Amadeus dataset. This finding confirms that no significant difference in financial
variables obtains between the two groups in the subsample.
The next step is to show that, when I restrict the sample to areas where firms across
the two groups are similar, the estimated results on the outcome variables hold. Table 1.14
present these results. The estimated coefficients for both the probability to renegotiate a
loan and the intensive margin results on loan terms are similar in economic significance to
the baseline results. This confirms that the baseline results are not driven by the differences
on the firm’s characteristics nor by the economic conditions at the zip-code level.
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Controlling for bank unit size
If more than one unit operated in the same geographic area, the bank decided to keep the
larger units open and close the smaller ones. For that reason, a possible concern regarding
the identification strategy would be whether the difference in the size of the bank unit where
the accounts were transferred can explain the results. To address this concern, I perform an
analysis controlling for the size of the bank unit to which the loans were transferred.
I rank the units based on the number of corporate borrowers they manage in 2013.
Figure 1.1, I plot an increasing series of the number of borrowers per bank unit versus the
rank of the bank unit. From this plot, it is obvious that the larger units remained open and
the smaller ones closed.
To test for an effect from the relative size of the bank unit, I construct first a measure of
the unit’s size based on the number of accounts managed per unit in 2013, the year before
the reorganization. The relative rank of the units’ size, for those that remained open, did
not change after the reorganization. Second, I filter the observations based on the size of
the unit where the treated firms were transferred. In particular, I restrict the sample of
the treated firms to those transferred to a bank unit that was at most 20% larger than their
original unit. Moreover, I restrict the control group and include only these firms managed
at the unit receiving firms from units that were at most 20% smaller (from the “filtered”
treated group).
After I construct the subsample that allows me to control for unit size, I repeat the
analysis of the outcome variables of interest. The results are presented in Table 1.15. The
results on the probability of renegotiating a loan and on the intensive margins of loan terms
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bear similar magnitude and significance to the baseline results. These findings show that
the baseline results in all three groups of outcome variables are not driven by differences in
unit size.
Other Firm-Level Effects
This section considers other effects on firms of a bank unit closure. Table 1.3 Column 4
shows no average real effect and, in particular, no effect following a bank unit closure on
the firms located at the same zip-code area. In this section, I examine whether the bank unit
closure and the interruption in the loan officer relationship is associated with any effects on
the capital structure of the firms that borrowed from the closed units.
To test for firm-level effects, I apply the baseline specification 1.1 to the firms’ financial
variables provided by the bank. By using the bank data, I restrict the sample only to the
bank clients. Table 1.16 presents these results. The main conclusion is that firms with
interrupted loan officer relationships change their capital structure and their main sources
of financing. In particular, relative to control firms, treated firms raise three times more
equity, decrease their total debt by 78%, and decrease their total assets by 61%. These
changes in the firms’ capital structure cause a 6.4% decrease in the treated firms’ leverage
(measured by the ratio of total debt over total assets) and a 9% increase in their level
of equity over assets. Moreover, I examine the effect of an interrupted relationship on
a substitution of lending from other banks. I measure substitution by constructing a new
variable, the dependence ratio, that is equal to the ratio of the amount of debt that a firm has
at this bank relative to the total amount of its debt. The dependence ratio decreased 10%
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for treated firms relative to control firms, suggesting that treated firms partially substituted
loans from the subject bank with new bank loans.
The results show that the main sources of external financing are altered in the case
of firms with interrupted relationships. The negative effect on both total debt and the de-
pendence ratio shows that firms increase their relative lending from other banks, but they
substitute only partially their total debt from other banks when their relationship with the
subject bank is interrupted. These results, combined with a significant increase in equity,
suggest that, when firms experience an interrupted relationship, they cover their financing
needs with new sources of funds, including funds from other banks. These effects may ex-
plain observed changes in investment decisions, as implied by the decrease in total assets.
Results by Relationship Strength
In this section, I further investigate the value of a relationship between a loan officer and
a firm. I construct two different measures of relationship strength and compare the impact
of an interrupted relationship on firms with stronger relationships and those with weaker
relationships. The main result of this section is that the interruption of a strong relationship
with a loan officer has a more significant negative effect on the renegotiated loan terms.
This conclusion is consistent across the three measures of relationship strength.
Relationship Strength Measured by the Dependence Ratio
The first measure of relationship strength is the ratio of a firm’s total amount of loans at
this bank over its total debt to other banks. This measure shows whether a firm had an
established relationship with other banks or whether it borrowed predominantly from the
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bank featured in this study. One of the main assumptions for a mutually advantageous
renegotiation is that the firm has outside options for financing, as those options would
increase the firm’s bargaining power. For small-and medium-size corporations,, the outside
options for financing are either other local banks, or raising inside or outside private equity,
as these relatively smaller firms do not have access to the stock market or from foreign
banks.
It follows that if a firm borrows from other banks in the pre-period, and has an estab-
lished relationship with them, it is easier for the firm to seek financing from other banks
once the relationship with the subject bank is interrupted. On the other hand, if the firm de-
pends mostly on the subject bank to satisfy its financing needs, then its negotiation power
is limited. This section provides a comparison of these two groups, i.e., firms with closer
relationships and fewer outside options versus firms with weaker relationships and more
outside options.
As a measure of how close the relationship is, I estimate an indicator variable which
I label the Dependence Ratio. The Dependence Ratio is defined as the ratio of the total
balance at this bank over the total debt that a firm had to other banks in 2013, the year
before the bank units’ closure. First, I estimate the correlation between the Dependence
Ratio and the probability of renegotiating a loan. Table 1.17 presents the correlation results.
The first two columns show the results for the whole sample in the pre- and the post-unit
closure period, where Columns 3 and 4 report results for the control firms, and Columns
5 and 6 for the treated firms. There is a positive and significant correlation between the
dependence ratio and the probability of renegotiating a loan, suggesting that firms with
closer relationships have a higher probability of renegotiating. Note that this correlation
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is not significant for the treated group in the post-period, although it was significant in the
pre-period. This suggests a loss in the value of close relationships between the firm and the
bank once the relationship with the loan officer is interrupted. Treated firms that borrowed
predominantly from the subject bank in the pre-unit-closure period do not have a higher
probability of renegotiating in the post-unit-closure period.
Figure 1.2 presents the density distribution of the Dependence Ratio in 2013. The
higher the value of the ratio, the more dependent the firm is on this bank. The lower the
value of the ratio, the less important this bank is to the firm, since it borrowed frommultiple
sources. As shown in Figure 1.2, the majority of firms borrow from multiple banks, while
a smaller number borrows mostly from the subject bank. In the following analysis, I test
separately the effect of interrupted relationships for firms with closer relations, and for
those with more distant ones.
Tables 1.18–1.19 present the results for these two subsamples. Firms with a closer re-
lationship are defined as those with a dependence ratio above 50%. Firms with a less close
relationship are defined as those with a dependence ratio below 20%.12 The results are es-
timated using the baseline empirical specification 1.1. Table 1.18 shows that, independent
of whether the firm had a close relationship with the subject bank in the pre-unit closure
period, the firm has a 28% lower probability of renegotiating a loan after the relationship is
interrupted. Table 1.19 includes the results of the loan terms. Firms with a closer relation-
ship pay a higher cost from interruption by receiving tougher loan terms on the renegotiated
loans. In particular, firms with a close relationship that was interrupted receive higher in-
12The cutoffs were chosen to secure enough statistical power to the tests. The results remain robust under
different cutoff thresholds, and tables are available upon request.
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terest rates and shorter maturities, and have to pledge more collateral per loan balance,
compared to firms with closer and uninterrupted relationships. On the other hand, firms
with a weak relationship and more outside options for financing from other banks receive
better loan terms on their renegotiated loans if the relationship with the subject bank is
interrupted. In particular, they receive a lower interest rate and longer maturities, and have
to pledge less collateral per total balance compared to firms with weak and uninterrupted
relations.
The effect on firms with weaker relationships can be driven by two different channels.
First, concerning firms for which only a small part of their total debt originated at this
bank, the value of a personal relationship with a loan officer is very small. In that case,
an interrupted relationship has little effect. A second channel explaining the results is that
firms with established relationships with other banks have a stronger bargaining position
with the subject bank. These firms with outside options can walk away more easily from
the subject bank and negotiate better loan terms elsewhere. In these cases, we should see
the continuing relationship with a loan officer at the subject bank as an incentive to retain
the clients at the subject bank. Better bargaining position and a willingness to exercise it
would also translate into better loan terms, as we observe in Table 1.19.
Relationship Strength Measured by the Relative Size of the Firm
In this section, I use as a third measure of relationship strength the relative size of the firm
as a corporate client within a bank unit. I estimate this measure as the ratio of the total
balance of the firm over the total amount of loans that each bank unit manages in 2014,
which captures the exposure of that bank unit to each corporate borrower: The larger the
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ratio, the larger the exposure of the bank unit to this client. The relative size of the firm
is potentially correlated with two effects. Although, for larger firms, the potential profit
margin for the bank is higher, the bank is also exposed to a higher risk. As both the profit
margin and the risk are higher for larger firms, it is expected that loan officers will have a
stronger incentive to establish closer relationships with larger clients.
Figure 1.3 shows the density distribution of the relative size of the firm within the bank
unit. As expected, the distribution is highly skewed, and the majority of the firms are small
clients for the bank unit. The indicator of relative firm size is estimated based on 2014 data,
the first year after the transfer occurred. I use the relative size after the transfer to control
for different behaviors towards the large clients in the post-period independent of whether
a firm was in the treated or control group. In the following tests, I look separately at larger
and smaller firms. I define as larger firms those whose balance at the specific bank unit
accounts for at least 1% of the total amount of corporate loans the unit manages. The rest
of the sample is defined as relatively small firms.13
Tables 1.20–1.21 present the results for larger and smaller firms separately. From the
results on the extensive margin, we observe that firms with smaller balances and an inter-
rupted relationship have a lower probability of renegotiating a loan following the transfer
to another bank unit. On the other hand, for firms with larger balances, no statistically
significant difference obtains between the treated and control groups. Regarding the results
on the intensive margin, firms with larger balances are affected the most when their rela-
tionship with a loan officer is interrupted. In particular, treated firms with a large balance
13The cutoffs were chosen to secure enough statistical power to the tests. The results remain robust under
different cutoff thresholds, and tables are available upon request.
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receive a higher interest rate and shorter maturities, and they have to pledge a higher value
of collateral. For treated firms with smaller balances, there is no statistically significant
difference from the control group on the renegotiated loan terms.
From the analysis based on the relative size of the firm, I identify important heterogene-
ity. Firms with smaller balances, once their relationship with the loan officer is interrupted,
have a lower probability to renegotiate a loan; however, conditional on a renegotiation, they
receive loan terms similar to those of the firms with continuous relationships. This find-
ing suggests that the value of a relationship for small firms affects the extensive margin to
renegotiate a loan. Larger firms with interrupted relationships have the same probability of
renegotiating a loan as larger firms with uninterrupted relationships; however, conditional
on a renegotiation, they receive tougher loan terms. This effect suggests that, when a loan
officer manages a client with whom he or she does not have an established relationship, the
officer compensates for the higher risk by requiring tougher loan terms.
Results by Firms Pre-Unit-Closure Period Performance
In this section, I analyze whether the firm’s pre-unit-closure period loan performance in-
fluences the estimated results. I separate the sample between firms that delayed a loan
payment in 2013, the year before the transfer, and firms that paid their loans on time. Ta-
bles 1.22–1.23 present the results of the main outcomes of interest separately for the two
groups. A common conclusion is that the results are consistent independent of the previous
behavior of the firm. We observe that both firms with good repayment behavior and those
with delays in loan payments have a lower probability of renegotiating a loan when their
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loan officer relationships are interrupted. The results on the intensive margin are similar:
Independent of the previous repayment behavior of the firm, treated firms receive tougher
terms on their renegotiated loans.
Overall, the results indicate that the impact of an interrupted relationship on the prob-
ability of renegotiating a loan, and on the renegotiated loan’s terms, is the same for firms
with good repayment histories and for those with delays in their loan payments. These find-
ings therefore support the hypothesis that firm characteristics are not driving the estimated
results.
Results on New Loans
Although this paper’s central goal is the analysis of the impact of personal relationships on
corporate loan renegotiations, this section presents the results for new loans to ensure that a
firm is not substituting a loan renegotiation with a loan origination. I use the same variation
of a bank unit closure to define the treatment indicator, but in this case, I look only at the
post-period new lending (years 2014, 2015). The regression that is used is the following:
yiurt = α + αu + αrt + δ ∗ Treatiur + εiurt (1.2)
where yiurt stands for the outcome variable of interest for the firm i located in region r
in year t getting a loan from the bank unit u. Treatiur is a dummy variable equal to one
if the firm belongs in the treatment group (if the firm’s loan accounts were transferred to
another pre-existing bank unit because the original unit closed) and is equal to zero if the
firm belongs to the control group (if the firm’s loan accounts remained at the same unit
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for the whole period of the sample). The specification includes bank-unit fixed effects (αu)
as well as region-year fixed effects (αrt). The coefficient of interest is δ, which measures
the difference in the outcome variable for the firms that experienced an interruption in the
personal relationship with the loan officer responsible for managing their loan accounts,
relative to the firms that did not.
Table 1.24 presents the results on the new lending both at the extensive margin and at
the intensive margin. Firms with interrupted relationships received 30% fewer new loans in
the post-period than firms with continuous relations. A significant difference between the
two groups is observed also on the new loans’ terms. Treated firms received almost 90%
lower volume of lending, with higher interest rates and shorter maturities.
The results on the new loans’ extensive and intensive margins confirm further the value
of personal relationships in corporate banking. Firms that lost their personal relationship
with the responsible loan officer conclusively receive less lending and tougher loan terms
both on new and renegotiated loans. Moreover, Table 1.16 illustrates that a firm with an
interrupted relationship partially substitutes its total debt through other banks, as both the
dependence ratio and the total debt decreases at the same time.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper’s main conclusion is that personal relationships between a loan officer and firm
mitigate the cost of distress for the firm in a loan renegotiation. Relationships help elimi-
nate frictions that arise in loan renegotiation and when these relationships are interrupted,
the renegotiation outcome is less likely to be the optimal contract. Using the consolidation
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of bank units as a source of exogenous variation, I analyze a proprietary dataset on corpo-
rate loans. The main finding is that the firm is worse off following the interruption of its
loan officer relationship, as it is less able to renegotiate, and the firm also receives tougher
loan terms on renegotiated loans. Moreover, I observe that firms alter their capital structure
after their relationship with the bank is interrupted. The change in the capital structure
suggests that firms cannot substitute lending from other banks without cost when the re-
lationship with one bank is exogenously interrupted. Lastly, I examine closer and more
distant lending relationships separately and I find that firms with stronger previous loan-
officer relationships display a significant negative effect on their renegotiated loan terms
when the relationship ends.
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1.7 Figures and Tables
Table 1.1: Summary statistics based on the 2012–2013 values
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Median
Loan-Related Variables:
Total Balance 2,611,645 10,057,676.6 535,934.5
Interest Rate .0597 .034 .0621
Total Collateral Value 3,234,279 20,128,240 187,630
Days Remaining (Maturity) 528.34 995.16 52.35
Unsecured loan (Dummy) .35 .45 0
Secure type of collateral (Dummy) .50 .45 .51
Number of loans per year 4.72 29.31 2
Performance-Related Variables :
Nonperforming (Dummy) .11 .31 0
Days Past Due 29.8 82.32 0
Days Past Due over Remaining Days 10.1 52.03 0
Total Provision 1,438,472 30,789,946 0
Debtor Renegotiated a Loan (Dummy) .59 .49 0
At Least One Forborne (Dummy) .05 .21 0
Firm’s Financial Information :
Total Assets 35,710,880 204,072,593 6,124,094
Total Debt 24,219,150 140,099,180 4,253,020
Total Equity 12,862,210 90,149,735 1,644,740
EBITDA 1,384,210 26,161,717 271,487
Total Debt over EBITDA ratio -26.7 3,325.4 7.5
Leverage (Debt over Assets) .72 .72 .69
This table displays summary statistics of the main variables. The variables are con-
structed at the firm level. A simple sum of all loans a firm holds each year is used
for the total balance, total collateral value, number of loans, and total provision. A
weighted average with weights equal to the ratio of the specific loan exposure over
the total balance of the firm is used for the interest rate, days remaining, nonper-
forming (dummy), and days past due. All variables are based on the 2012–2013
values.
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Table 1.2: Comparison of pre-period mean values for treated and control groups
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Control Treated p - value
on Difference
Loan-Related Variables:
Total Balance 934,255.3 791,929.6 (0.571)
(1,497,483.4) (1,232,984.1)
Interest Rate 0.0618 0.0657 (0.323)
(0.0325) (0.0334)
Days Remaining (Maturity) 516.9 723.4 (0.198)
(985.4) (1,207.4)
Total Collateral Value 737,344.5 811,042.0 (0.831)
(1,342,033.5) (1,362,189.0)
Unsecured Loan (Dummy) 0.548 0.478 (0.348)
(0.498) (0.501)
Secure Type of Collateral 0.473 0.539 (0.483)
(0.450) (0.460)
Performance-Related Variables:
Nonperforming (Dummy) 0.106 0.124 (0.735)
(0.308) (0.330)
Days Delayed over Remaining Days 11.20 17.98 (0.201)
(63.98) (65.67)
Total Provision per Total Exposure 0.114 0.143 (0.467)
(1.828) (0.655)
Ratio of Loans Transferred 0.462 0.434 (0.000)
to NPL specialized unit (0.00107) (0.00126)
Debtor’s Financial Information:
Total Assets 10,712,500.0 7,983,826.1 (0.632)
(15,995,732.5) (12,173,003.3)
Total Debt 7,473,765.0 6,565,431.2 (0.884)
(11,426,411.1) (10,640,303.1)
Total Equity 3,543,320.3 2,207,924.3 (0.273)
(6,546,923.7) (3,996,019.6)
EBITDA 1,413,431.1 596,890.4 (0.208)
(26,589,773.0) (2,541,047.6)
Leverage (Debt over Assets) 0.704 0.717 (0.879)
(0.316) (0.240)
This table displays the mean values and standard deviations separately for the treated and
control groups. Column 3 reports the p-value for the difference between Columns 1 and 2.
p-values are obtained from a regression of the main variable on a treatment indicator and
region fixed effects. All variables and estimations are based on the 2012–2013 values.
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Table 1.3: Summary statistics and Difference-in-Difference coefficients for firms in ex-
posed and control areas - Match on the zip code
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean values for Mean values for p - value Coefficient
Control areas Exposed areas on Difference from DiD
Total Assets 2,046,750.4 1,825,612.9 (0.053) -1,198.2
(2,213,766.2) (2,042,689.0) (42,739.4)
Total Debt 498,087.1 458,946.9 (0.273) 12,978.2
(1,031,146.5) (974,348.2) (13,685.6)
Shareholders Funds 906,964.1 780,377.7 (0.015) -18,101.5
(1,336,612.6) (1,086,455.0) (21,782.0)
Number of Employees 13.33 11.86 (0.034) -0.131
(15.84) (12.78) (0.317)
EBIT 95,948.5 70,551.1 (0.138) -2,360.2
(215,807.3) (186,164.2) (6,868.1)
EBIT (Growth Rate) -0.450 -0.0356 (0.368) 2.070
(29.85) (8.002) (3.758)
Net Income 35,171.8 20,397.8 (0.396) -2,071.4
(162,093.6) (146,359.9) (5,756.2)
Net Income -0.482 -1.015 (0.252) -0.632
(Growth Rate) (11.70) (25.73) (0.976)
Operating Revenue 1,640,175.0 1,430,693.6 (0.205) 27,648.1
(2,496,198.6) (2,291,917.3) (30,733.6)
Sales 1,609,808.0 1,401,415.3 (0.205) 25,852.7
(2,476,738.2) (2,267,099.8) (30,432.5)
Gross Profit 440,155.2 374,192.1 (0.102) -1,232.8
(584,430.4) (528,494.3) (16,640.0)
Cash Flow 95,235.7 79,114.4 (0.094) -1,455.9
(194,803.9) (171,806.5) (7,490.2)
Return on Shareholders 12.50 5.947 (0.259) -1.996
Funds (%) (78.81) (72.12) (4.009)
Return on Total 3.153 2.784 (0.298) -0.161
Assets (%) (13.62) (13.74) (0.652)
Profit Margin (%) 2.185 1.091 (0.527) 0.0524
(20.73) (21.09) (0.652)
The data source for this table is the Amadeus Bureau van Dijk database. This table in columns
1 and 2 displays the mean values and standard deviations for firms located in zip-code ar-
eas where a bank unit closed (exposed areas) and firms located in zip-code areas where a
unit remained open (control areas). Column 3 reports the p-value for the difference between
Columns 1 and 2. p-values are obtained from a regression of the main variable on an indicator
of whether the firm is located at the zip-code area where a bank unit closed, and region fixed
effects. Column 4 presents the estimate coefficients from difference-in-difference regressions
on the firms’ variables. All variables and estimations are based on 2012–2015 values.
43
Table 1.4: Effect on renegotiating a loan (extensive margin)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post ∗ Treat -0.231∗∗ -0.262∗∗∗ -0.236∗∗ -0.308∗∗∗
(0.0879) (0.0783) (0.114) (0.0744)
Observations 12,540 12,540 7,220 11,023
R2 0.284 0.287 0.042 0.302
Firm F.E. X X
Bank Unit F.E. X X X X
Region F.E. X
Year F.E. X
Region ∗ Year F.E. X X X
Lagged log of EBITDA X
Lagged log of Total Balance X
Lagged log of Total Assets X
Cluster Level Bank Unit
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table displays the results from estimating equation 1.1. The dependent
variable is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm i renegotiated a
loan at time t and zero otherwise. The dummy variable Treat is equal to one
if the firm experienced an interruption in its relationship with the loan offi-
cer due to the bank unit closure, and zero otherwise. The dummy variable
Post is equal to one if the year of the observation is after the reorganization
(either 2014 or 2015) and zero if it is before the reorganization (either 2012
or 2013). The bottom of the table depicts information on the fixed effects
and the control variables included. Standard errors are corrected for cluster-
ing at the bank-unit level.
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Table 1.6: Effect on log of Interest Rate - Only renegotiated loans
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post ∗ Treat 0.00468 0.00982∗∗ 0.0162∗ 0.00946∗∗
(0.00375) (0.00380) (0.00856) (0.00374)
Observations 5,368 5,368 4,191 4,875
R2 0.022 0.028 0.021 0.027
Firm F.E. X X
Bank Unit F.E. X X X X
Region F.E. X
Year F.E. X
Region ∗ Year F.E. X X X
Lagged log of EBITDA X
Lagged log of Total Balance X
Lagged log of Total Assets X
Cluster Level Bank Unit
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table displays the results from estimating equation 1.1 only for firms that
renegotiated a loan over the sample period. The observations included in the
analysis are the loans that were renegotiated at least once during the sample pe-
riod. The dependent variable is the log of interest rate of the renegotiated loans
that firm i had. The dummy variable Treat is equal to one if the firm experienced
an interruption on its relationship with the loan officer due to the bank-unit clo-
sure, and zero otherwise. The dummy variable Post is equal to one if the year of
the observation is after the reorganization (either 2014 or 2015) and zero if it is
before the reorganization (either 2012 or 2013). The bottom of the table depicts
information on the fixed effects and the control variables included. Standard er-
rors are corrected for clustering at the bank-unit level.
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Table 1.7: Effect on log of Remaining Days (Maturity) - Only renegotiated loans
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post ∗ Treat -0.775∗∗ -0.489∗∗ -0.874∗∗ -0.429
(0.363) (0.210) (0.337) (0.282)
Observations 5,368 5,368 4,191 4,875
R2 0.032 0.016 0.042 0.020
Firm F.E. X X
Bank Unit F.E. X X X X
Region F.E. X
Year F.E. X
Region ∗ Year F.E. X X X
Lagged log of EBITDA X
Lagged log of Total Balance X
Lagged log of Total Assets X
Cluster Level Bank Unit
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table displays the results from estimating equation 1.1 only for firms
that renegotiated a loan over the sample period. The observations in-
cluded in the analysis are the loans that were renegotiated at least once
during the sample period. The dependent variable is the log of days re-
maining of the renegotiated loans that firm i had. This variable is a mea-
sure of loan maturity. The dummy variable Treat is equal to one if the
firm experienced an interruption on its relationship with the loan officer
due to the bank-unit closure, and zero otherwise. The dummy variable
Post is equal to one if the year of the observation is after the reorganiza-
tion (either 2014 or 2015) and zero if it is before the reorganization (ei-
ther 2012 or 2013). The bottom of the table depicts information on the
fixed effects and the control variables included. Standard errors are cor-
rected for clustering at the bank-unit level.
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Table 1.8: Effect on log of Collateral per Total Balance - Only renegotiated loans
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post ∗ Treat 1.268∗∗∗ 0.716∗∗∗ 0.815∗∗∗ 0.790∗∗∗
(0.355) (0.249) (0.184) (0.270)
Observations 5,367 5,367 4,191 4,874
R2 0.028 0.016 0.035 0.025
Firm F.E. X X
Bank Unit F.E. X X X X
Region F.E. X
Year F.E. X
Region ∗ Year F.E. X X X
Lagged log of EBITDA X
Lagged log of Total Balance X
Lagged log of Total Assets X
Cluster Level Bank Unit
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table displays the results from estimating equation 1.1 only for firms
that renegotiated a loan over the sample period. The observations included
in the analysis are the loans that were renegotiated at least once during the
sample period. The dependent variable is the log of collateral value per
total balance of the renegotiated loans that firm i had. The dummy vari-
able Treat is equal to one if the firm experienced an interruption on its
relationship with the loan officer due to the bank-unit closure, and zero
otherwise. The dummy variable Post is equal to one if the year of the ob-
servation is after the reorganization (either 2014 or 2015) and zero if it is
before the reorganization (either 2012 or 2013). The bottom of the table
depicts information on the fixed effects and the control variables included.
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the bank-unit level.
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Table 1.9: Effect on log of Total Balance (exclude nonperforming loans) - Only renegoti-
ated loans
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post ∗ Treat 0.136 0.342 1.013∗∗∗ 0.516∗∗
(0.205) (0.225) (0.330) (0.247)
Observations 4,068 4,068 3,274 3,766
R2 0.031 0.043 0.040 0.045
Firm F.E. X X
Bank Unit F.E. X X X X
Region F.E. X
Year F.E. X
Region ∗ Year F.E. X X X
Lagged log of EBITDA X
Lagged log of Total Balance X
Lagged log of Total Assets X
Cluster Level Bank Unit
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table displays the results from estimating equation 1.1 only for
firms that renegotiated a loan over the sample period. The observations
included in the analysis are the loans that were renegotiated at least
once during the sample period and that were not in default. The depen-
dent variable is the log of total balance of the renegotiated loans that
firm i had. The nonperforming loans are excluded from this analysis as
an increase in the total balance for these loans could be driven by the
delayed payment. The dummy variable Treat is equal to one if the firm
experienced an interruption on its relationship with the loan officer due
to the bank-unit closure, and zero otherwise. The dummy variable Post
is equal to one if the year of the observation is after the reorganization
(either 2014 or 2015) and zero if it is before the reorganization (either
2012 or 2013). The bottom of the table depicts information on the fixed
effects and the control variables included. Standard errors are corrected
for clustering at the bank-unit level.
49
Table 1.10: Effect on variables related to collateral type - Only renegotiated loans
(1) (2)
Unsecured Loan Secure Type of Collateral
Post ∗ Treat -0.180∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗
(0.0773) (0.103)
Observations 5,368 4,779
R2 0.015 0.011
Firm F.E. X X
Bank Unit F.E. X X
Region ∗ Year F.E. X X
Cluster Level Bank Unit
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table displays the results from estimating equation 1.1 only for
firms that renegotiated a loan over the sample period for two variables
related to loan collateral. The observations included in the analysis are
the loans that were renegotiated at least once during the sample period.
Each column shows the estimated results for a different dependent vari-
able. Column 1 presents the result for an unsecured loan dummy vari-
able that is equal to one if firm’s i loan had no collateral at time t and
equal to zero otherwise. Column 2 presents the result for a secure type
of collateral dummy variable that is equal to one if firm’s i loan had
more secure collateral at time t and zero otherwise. As more secure
collateral, real estate (commercial or residential), ships, deposits, and
debt securities are characterized. As less secure collateral, accounts re-
ceivable, equities or convertible bonds, and other types of guarantees
are characterized. The dummy variable Treat is equal to one if the firm
experienced an interruption on its relationship with the loan officer due
to the bank-unit closure, and zero otherwise. The dummy variable Post
is equal to one if the year of the observation is after the reorganiza-
tion (either 2014 or 2015) and zero if it is before the reorganization
(either 2012 or 2013). In the baseline regressions, firm, bank-unit, and
region∗year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are corrected for
clustering at the bank-unit level.
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Table 1.11: Comparison of pre-period mean values for treated and control groups - Only
firms that renegotiated a loan
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Control Treated p - value
on Difference
Loan-Related Variables:
Total Balance 950,778.6 812,330.8 (0.656)
(1,521,659.9) (1,286,015.7)
Interest Rate 0.0632 0.0665 (0.328)
(0.0339) (0.0335)
Days Remaining (Maturity) 402.8 565.2 (0.561)
(839.2) (1062.5)
Total Collateral Value 790,269.9 797,576.3 (0.749)
(1,387,600.2) (1,356,898.3)
Unsecured Loan (Dummy) 0.340 0.339 (0.942)
(0.443) (0.462)
Secure Type of Collateral 0.467 0.510 (0.917)
(0.445) (0.455)
Performance-Related Variables:
Nonperforming (Dummy) 0.122 0.140 (0.254)
(0.327) (0.347)
Days Delayed over Remaining Days 13.10 19.76 (0.266)
(69.75) (68.74)
Total Provision per Total Exposure 0.136 0.156 (0.618)
(2.007) (0.700)
Ratio of Loans Transferred 0.462 0.434 (0.000)
to NPL specialized unit (0.00107) (0.00126)
Debtor’s Financial Information:
Total Assets 10,413,859.5 6,882,262.0 (0.187)
(15,273,643.4) (7,440,389.4)
Total Debt 7,333,025.7 5,330,367.5 (0.134)
(11,067,786.7) (4,948,417.3)
Total Equity 3,402,715.3 2,163,741.2 (0.459)
(6,372,251.9) (3,981,664.0)
EBITDA 1,044,784.6 601,476.2 (0.479)
(26,063,090.9) (2,663,656.7)
Leverage (Debt over Assets) 0.714 0.719 (0.521)
(0.321) (0.241)
This table displays the mean values and standard deviations for the treated and control
groups only for firms that renegotiated at least one loan. Column 3 reports the p-value
for the difference between Columns 1 and 2. p-values are obtained from a regression of
the main variable on a treatment indicator and region fixed effects. All variables and es-
timations are based on the 2012–2013 values.
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Table 1.12: Identify possible selection on renegotiation
(1) (2) (3)
Whole Sample Only control group Only treated group
pre- & post-period post-period post-period
Renegotiation Renegotiation Renegotiation
All variables are in lagged logs:
Firm Variables:
EBITDA growth rate 0.000147 -0.0000467 0.00102∗∗∗
(0.000145) (0.000300) (0.000328)
Total Assets 0.000613∗∗ 0.000570∗∗ 0.000574
(0.000229) (0.000228) (0.000685)
Total Debt 0.000853∗∗∗ 0.000802∗∗∗ 0.00141
(0.000191) (0.000192) (0.000976)
Leverage 0.000635∗∗∗ 0.000602∗∗ 0.00132∗
(0.000205) (0.000221) (0.000763)
Debt over EBITDA 0.000653∗∗∗ 0.000706∗∗∗ 0.000849
(0.000134) (0.000119) (0.000715)
Loan Variables:
Total Balance 0.00136∗∗∗ 0.00169∗∗∗ 0.00229∗∗∗
(0.000186) (0.000190) (0.000638)
Total Provision 0.00166∗∗∗ 0.00186∗∗∗ 0.00172∗∗∗
(0.000148) (0.000190) (0.000572)
Days Past Due 0.00118∗∗∗ 0.00121∗∗∗ 0.000122
(0.000120) (0.000135) (0.000337)
Bank Unit F.E. X X X
Region ∗ Year F.E. X X X
Cluster Level Bank Unit
This table displays the estimated coefficients from separate regressions of the renegotiation
dummy variable on firm and loan variables. The independent variables are constructed as the
firm’s rank within bank unit based on each variable’s value at the year before the transfer.
Bank-unit and region∗year fixed effects are included, and standard errors are clustered at the
bank-unit level. Column 1 reports the estimated coefficients for the whole sample (treated and
control groups over the whole period). Column 2 reports the coefficients for the control group
in the post-period. Column 3 reports the coefficients for the treated group in the post-period.
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Table 1.13: Summary statistics and Difference-in-Difference coefficients for firms in ex-
posed and control areas - Exclude Attica and match on the zip code
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean values for Mean values for p - value Coefficient
Control areas Exposed areas on Difference from DiD
Total Assets 1,626,610.8 2,014,598.6 (0.399) 87,059.6
(1,743,132.7) (2,138,976.2) (71,485.0)
Total Debt 355,360.0 549,881.4 (0.110) -19,373.3
(790,474.9) (1,038,056.8) (17,135.4)
Shareholders funds 785,544.4 907,094.8 (0.814) 33,374.6
(1,189,319.0) (1,129,909.4) (25,500.5)
Number of Employees 11.37 12.33 (0.459) 0.0734
(12.07) (13.80) (0.588)
EBIT 83,964.2 60,042.6 (0.114) 14,415.8
(172,477.7) (169,693.1) (12,099.1)
EBIT -3.783 -0.167 (0.161) 26.74
(Growth Rate) (79.72) (9.234) (26.61)
Net Income 32,158.8 9,409.9 (0.558) 9,655.2
(137,600.4) (138,692.2) (8,291.5)
Net Income -1.283 -0.942 (0.782) 1.042
(Growth Rate) (16.41) (20.60) (0.975)
Operating revenue 1,219,683.1 1,503,067.8 (0.597) 70,398.0
(1,796,479.7) (2,435,916.8) (49,835.7)
Sales 1,189,756.5 1,474,594.3 (0.576) 63,702.5
(1,794,288.1) (2,414,726.8) (50,256.1)
Gross Profit 374,294.3 334,154.7 (0.436) -4,988.0
(454,295.2) (475,334.0) (37,769.4)
Cash Flow 88,236.9 81,123.2 (0.192) 5,758.8
(175,649.1) (168,534.7) (14,592.4)
Return on Shareholders 6.544 -0.434 (0.146) 0.869
Funds (%) (74.48) (61.08) (13.30)
Return on Total 3.821 1.522 (0.180) 0.744
Assets (%) (14.44) (11.76) (1.113)
Profit Margin (%) 3.447 -0.876 (0.143) 0.906
(21.71) (20.89) (0.814)
The data source for this table is the Amadeus Bureau van Dijk database, and it excludes the
Attica region. The sample is restricted to areas where firms are similar. Columns 1 and 2 show
the mean values and standard deviations for firms located in the zip code areas where a bank-
unit closed (exposed areas) and firms located in the zip code areas where a unit remained open
(control areas). Column 3 reports the p-value for the difference between Columns 1 and 2. p-
values are obtained from a regression of the main variable on an indicator of whether the firm
is located at the zip code area where a bank-unit closed and region fixed effects. Column 4
presents the estimate coefficients from difference-in-difference regressions on the firms’ vari-
ables. All variables and estimations are based on 2012–2015 values.
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Figure 1.1: Rank bank units based on the number of corporate borrowers per unit in 2013
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Figure 1.1 plots the number of corporate borrowers per bank unit in 2013 as a measure of relative size of the
units. The red diamonds represent bank units that closed and the blue dots units that remained open.
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Figure 1.2: Density distribution of the dependence ratio
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Figure 2.10 plots the density distribution of the dependence ratio as measured in 2013.
The dependence ratio is defined as the ratio of the total balance that a firm has at this bank over the total bank
debt of the firm.
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Table 1.18: Effect on renegotiating a loan (extensive margin) - Based on relationship
strength
Closer Relationship Less Close Relationship
(1) (2)
Renegotiation Renegotiation
Post ∗ Treat -0.280∗∗ -0.289∗∗
(0.105) (0.132)
Observations 2,106 6,991
R2 0.296 0.259
Firm F.E. X X
Bank Unit F.E. X X
Region ∗ Year F.E. X X
Cluster Level Bank Unit
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table displays the results from estimating equation 1.1 separately for
firms with a closer relationship with the bank and for firms with a less
close relationship. Firms with a closer relationship are defined those with
dependence ratio above 50% in 2013. As firms with a less close relation-
ship, are defined those with dependence ratio below 20% in 2013. The
dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to one if firm i renegotiated
a loan at time t and zero otherwise. The dummy variable Treat is equal
to one if the firm experienced an interruption in its relationship with the
loan officer due to the bank-unit closure, and zero otherwise. The dummy
variable Post is equal to one if the year of the observation is after the reor-
ganization (either 2014 or 2015) and zero if it is before the reorganization
(either 2012 or 2013). The bottom of the table depicts information on the
fixed effects and the control variables included. Standard errors are cor-
rected for clustering at the bank-unit level.
60
Ta
bl
e
1.
19
:E
ff
ec
to
n
re
ne
go
tia
te
d
lo
an
s’
te
rm
s
-B
as
ed
on
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p
st
re
ng
th
C
lo
se
r
R
el
at
io
ns
hi
p
Le
ss
C
lo
se
R
el
at
io
ns
hi
p
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
In
te
re
st
D
ay
s
C
ol
la
te
ra
lV
al
ue
In
te
re
st
D
ay
s
C
ol
la
te
ra
lV
al
ue
A
ll
in
lo
gs
R
at
e
R
em
ai
ni
ng
ov
er
B
al
an
ce
R
at
e
R
em
ai
ni
ng
ov
er
B
al
an
ce
Po
st
∗T
re
at
0.
02
12
∗∗
∗
-3
.3
60
∗∗
∗
1.
68
6∗
∗∗
-0
.0
12
9∗
∗∗
2.
34
9∗
∗∗
-0
.5
87
∗∗
(0
.0
04
77
)
(0
.9
96
)
(0
.2
61
)
(0
.0
04
12
)
(0
.5
66
)
(0
.2
63
)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
98
5
98
5
98
5
3,
10
7
3,
10
7
3,
10
6
R
2
0.
01
1
0.
03
1
0.
03
7
0.
00
7
0.
03
1
0.
01
9
Fi
rm
F.
E
.
X
X
X
X
X
X
B
an
k
U
ni
tF
.E
.
X
X
X
X
X
X
R
eg
io
n
∗Y
ea
rF
.E
.
X
X
X
X
X
X
C
lu
st
er
L
ev
el
B
an
k
U
ni
t
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
∗
p
<
0.
10
,∗
∗
p
<
0.
05
,∗
∗∗
p
<
0.
01
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
di
sp
la
ys
th
e
re
su
lts
fr
om
es
tim
at
in
g
eq
ua
tio
n
1.
1
se
pa
ra
te
ly
fo
rfi
rm
s
w
ith
a
cl
os
er
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p
w
ith
th
e
ba
nk
an
d
fo
rfi
rm
s
w
ith
a
le
ss
cl
os
e
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p.
Fi
rm
s
w
ith
a
cl
os
er
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p
ar
e
de
fin
ed
as
th
os
e
w
ith
de
pe
n-
de
nc
e
ra
tio
ab
ov
e
50
%
in
20
13
.F
ir
m
s
w
ith
a
le
ss
cl
os
e
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p
ar
e
de
fin
ed
th
os
e
w
ith
de
pe
nd
en
ce
ra
tio
be
lo
w
20
%
in
20
13
.
Fo
rt
he
se
es
tim
at
io
ns
,t
he
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
in
cl
ud
ed
in
th
e
an
al
ys
is
ar
e
th
e
lo
an
s
th
at
w
er
e
re
ne
go
tia
te
d
at
le
as
to
nc
e
du
ri
ng
th
e
sa
m
pl
e
pe
ri
od
.
R
es
ul
ts
ar
e
es
tim
at
ed
fo
r
th
re
e
lo
an
te
rm
s.
C
ol
um
n
1
pr
es
en
ts
th
e
re
su
lt
fo
rt
he
lo
g
of
in
te
re
st
ra
te
of
th
e
re
ne
go
tia
te
d
lo
an
s
th
at
fir
m
ih
ad
.
C
ol
um
n
2
is
th
e
es
tim
at
ed
re
su
lt
fo
rt
he
lo
g
of
da
ys
re
m
ai
ni
ng
of
th
e
re
ne
go
tia
te
d
lo
an
s.
C
ol
um
n
3
pr
es
en
ts
th
e
re
su
lt
on
th
e
lo
g
of
co
lla
te
ra
lv
al
ue
pe
rt
ot
al
ba
l-
an
ce
of
th
e
re
ne
go
tia
te
d
lo
an
s.
T
he
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
Tr
ea
ti
s
eq
ua
lt
o
on
e
if
th
e
fir
m
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
d
an
in
te
rr
up
tio
n
in
its
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p
w
ith
th
e
lo
an
offi
ce
rd
ue
to
th
e
ba
nk
-u
ni
tc
lo
su
re
,a
nd
ze
ro
ot
he
rw
is
e.
T
he
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
Po
st
is
eq
ua
lt
o
on
e
if
th
e
ye
ar
of
th
e
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
is
af
te
r
th
e
re
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n
(e
ith
er
20
14
or
20
15
)
an
d
ze
ro
if
it
is
be
fo
re
th
e
re
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n
(e
ith
er
20
12
or
20
13
).
In
th
e
ba
se
lin
e
re
gr
es
si
on
s,
fir
m
,b
an
k-
un
it,
an
d
re
gi
on
∗y
ea
rfi
xe
d
eff
ec
ts
ar
e
in
cl
ud
ed
.S
ta
nd
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
co
rr
ec
te
d
fo
rc
lu
st
er
in
g
at
th
e
ba
nk
-u
ni
tl
ev
el
.
61
Figure 1.3: Density distribution of the firm’s relative size
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Figure 2.12 plots the density distribution of the firm’s relative size as a corporate client within bank unit. The
measure of firm’s relative size is the ratio of the firm’s total balance at the bank unit over the total amount of
loans that each bank unit manages in 2014.
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Table 1.20: Effect on renegotiating a loan (extensive margin) - By firm’s relative size as
bank’s corporate client within unit in 2014
Smaller balance Larger balance
(1) (2)
Renegotiation Renegotiation
Post ∗ Treat -0.385∗∗∗ -0.102
(0.0540) (0.116)
Observations 10,296 2,937
R2 0.264 0.389
Firm F.E. X X
Bank Unit F.E. X X
Region ∗ Year F.E. X X
Cluster Level Bank Unit
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table displays the results from estimating equation 1.1
separately for firms that had a smaller balance at the bank
unit in 2014 and for firms that had a larger balance. Larger
firms are defined as those whose balance at the specific bank
unit accounts for at least 1% of the total amount of corporate
loans that the unit manages. The rest of the sample is de-
fined as relatively smaller firms. The dependent variable is a
dummy variable that is equal to one if firm i renegotiated a
loan at time t and zero otherwise. The dummy variable Treat
is equal to one if the firm experienced an interruption in its
relationship with the loan officer due to the bank-unit closure,
and zero otherwise. The dummy variable Post is equal to one
if the year of the observation is after the reorganization (ei-
ther 2014 or 2015) and zero if it is before the reorganization
(either 2012 or 2013). The bottom of the table depicts infor-
mation on the fixed effects and the control variables included.
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the bank-unit
level.
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Table 1.22: Effect on renegotiating a loan (extensive margin) - By firm’s pre-period perfor-
mance
Delayed loan payment On time loan payment
(1) (2)
Renegotiation Renegotiation
Post ∗ Treat -0.301∗∗∗ -0.189∗
(0.0883) (0.107)
Observations 3,764 9,469
R2 0.420 0.245
Firm F.E. X X
Bank Unit F.E. X X
Region ∗ Year F.E. X X
Cluster Level Bank Unit
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table displays the results from estimating equation 1.1 separately for
firms that delayed a loan payment in 2013 and for firms that paid their
loans on time in 2013. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that is
equal to one if firm i renegotiated a loan at time t and zero otherwise. The
dummy variable Treat is equal to one if the firm experienced an interrup-
tion in its relationship with the loan officer due to the bank-unit closure,
and zero otherwise. The dummy variable Post is equal to one if the year of
the observation is after the reorganization (either 2014 or 2015) and zero
if it is before the reorganization (either 2012 or 2013). The bottom of the
table depicts information on the fixed effects and the control variables in-
cluded. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the bank-unit level.
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Table 1.25: Effect on new loans’ performance
(1) (2) (3)
Log of Days Past Due Nonperforming Log of Total Provision
per Remaining Days (Dummy) per Total Balance
Treat 0.192 0.0627 -0.0469
(0.138) (0.0510) (0.0379)
Observations 4,254 4,254 4,217
R2 0.002 0.004 0.013
Bank Unit F.E. X X X
Region ∗ Year F.E. X X X
Cluster Level Bank Unit
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table displays the results from estimating equation 1.2 for the new loans performance that
a firm i received in the post-period (2014–2015). The results are estimated for three variables
related to loans’ performance. The dependent variables are the log of a loan’s payment days
past due over remaining days, a nonperforming dummy variable, and the log of total loan-loss
provision over total balance. The dummy variable Treat is equal to one if the firm experienced
an interruption in its relationship with the loan officer due to the bank-unit closure, and zero
otherwise. Bank-unit, and region∗year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are corrected
for clustering at the bank-unit level.
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Chapter 2
Lending Relationships and Moral Hazard in Loan
Renegotiation
2.1 Introduction
Most corporate credit is mediated by a personal relationship between a firm and a loan offi-
cer, as this connection helps to mitigate agency problems. Financial intermediation theory
suggests that relationships can be beneficial because they reduce information asymmetries
and alleviate moral hazard (through monitoring, screening, repeated interaction etc.).1 In
this paper, I study the impact of personal relationships between loan officers and firms on
loan renegotiations and I investigate whether personal relationships could prevent a moral
hazard behavior to trigger a loan renegotiation. A renegotiation can be initiated by either
the creditor or the borrower prior to or coincident with default on a loan. Classic contract
theory suggests that in unanticipated states of the world, renegotiation is Pareto improving.2
Especially when financial distress results from a macroeconomic shock, it is probable that
both the bank and the borrower will benefit from a successful renegotiation. Renegotia-
1Classic references: Leland and Pyle 1977 Diamond 1984 Ramakrishnan and Thakor 1984 Fama 1985
Allen 1990
2Hart and Moore 1988, Rajan 1992, Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey 1994, Bolton and Scharfstein 1996,
Hart and Moore 1998, Maskin and Moore 1999, Gorton and Kahn 2000, Garleanu and Zwiebel 2008
69
tion relaxes inefficient constraints on the borrowers as well as the bank and can increase
expected loan repayments.
There are two main challenges for accurately estimating the impact of personal rela-
tionships on loan renegotiation. The first is the difficulty of quantifying the value of a
personal relationship. No direct measure of relationship intensity exists. The length of a
given relationship may seem like a straightforward measure, but the endogeneity of the
decision to sever an existing relationship will complicate the interpretation of the time span
measure. The endogeneity factor creates the second challenge. A bank’s decision to break
an existing relationship may reflect its perception of the declining creditworthiness of the
borrower. Under some circumstances a successful firm may seek to broaden its access to
external finance by weakening its relationship with the particular bank. Such decisions are
endogenous and would bias any results estimated by treating relationships as exogenous in
a simple OLS framework.
To overcome these challenges, I use a 2013 bank reorganization in Greece. This exper-
iment provides exogenous variation in the length of the relationships between loan officers
and firms. Moreover, detailed confidential data on corporate loans allow me to quantify
accurately the effect of interrupted personal relationships, by controlling for region, bank
unit, and firm-specific effects. My central finding is that personal relationships between
loan officers and firms have a significant positive impact on loan renegotiation. Firms with
interrupted relationships are less likely to renegotiate a loan compared to firms experienc-
ing continuous relationships. In addition, firms with interrupted relationships default more
frequently on the loans that they want to trigger a renegotiation.
The empirical setting is based on the consolidation of a major commercial bank in
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Greece with business activity throughout the country. Bank network consolidation is a
common response of banks to financial distress, as consolidation reduces operating costs
and centralizes lending decisions.3 During consolidation, some bank units are closed and
the loan accounts from those units are merged with accounts in other surviving units. A
bank unit closure interrupts personal relationships between loan officers and firms because
merged accounts obtain new loan officers. Thus, after consolidation, two types of firms
are identified: one, those whose loans were transferred to another unit and whose personal
relationships were consequently discontinued, and two, those that remained at the same
unit for the entire period.
The criterion for bank units’ consolidation was geographic location. My identifying
assumption is that the decision to close a bank unit is orthogonal to firms’ characteristics. I
find support for that assumption in the data by testing for differences in observable charac-
teristics. First, I compare the loan terms and performance, and firm financial variables of
borrowers in closed and open units in the pre-unit closure period and I find no statistically
significant differences. Second, I provide out-of-sample evidence that the identifying as-
sumption holds by using the Amadeus Bureau van Dijk dataset to test for differences based
on the zip codes of bank units.
I apply a difference-in-difference methodology to estimate the effect of relationship
interruption. I define as treated the firms with exogenously discontinued personal relation-
ships and as control those with continuing relationships. Hard information passed from
one loan officer to another because the transfer happened within the same bank. Observed
3Several banks in Italy, Spain, Portugal have consolidated their network during the recent crisis as well
as banks in the United States.
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differences between the two groups in the post-consolidation period should be driven by
the consequences of interrupted personal relationships.
I find strong evidence for the significant effect of personal relationships on loan renego-
tiations at both extensive and intensive margins. Firms with interrupted relationships have
a 26% lower probability of renegotiating at least one of their old loans upon their transfer
to another unit, compared to firms that remained at the same unit. The unconditional prob-
ability of renegotiating a loan is 59% and the estimated effect corresponds to a 15% lower
probability of renegotiation.
Moreover, contingent on successful renegotiation in the post-unit-closure period, I iden-
tify a positive effect of continuing personal relationships on the delinquency of renegoti-
ated loans. Greek banks, like most of the banks operating in countries hit by the 2010
European debt crisis and the preceding financial crisis, faced a significant increase in their
nonperforming loan (NPL) ratios. In contrast to firms with continuous relationships, those
whose relationships were interrupted are found to delay payments on their renegotiated
loans by additional days, and their renegotiated loans have a 15.4% higher probability of
becoming nonperforming. In response to the worse average performance of the interrupted-
relationship loans, the bank increases the level of loan-loss provisions, and we observe an
approximately 70% increase, which corresponds to additional e 0.10 of loan-loss provi-
sions for each euro of loan balance.
A possible selection bias on renegotiation could change the interpretation of the results
for loan performance differences between interrupted- and continuing-relationship loans.
If the loan officer chooses to renegotiate with firms based on their performance, the inten-
sive margin results will be biased. To address the concern of potential selection bias on
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renegotiation, I conduct two tests. First, I compare the pre-unit-closure period characteris-
tics of the treated and control firms that renegotiated a loan in the post-unit-closure period
and I find no statistically significant difference in pre-period measures of firm performance.
Second, I consider all the hard information available to both the loan officer and the econo-
metrician to identify the variables that can trigger a renegotiation. This test demonstrates
that the loan officer who remained at the same unit for the entire period chose to renegoti-
ate with treated firms with higher profitability prospects. Loan officer behavior, therefore,
biases estimated coefficients towards zero, implying that my intensive margin results are
conservative.
To further investigate the explanatory mechanism for the value of a relationship be-
tween a loan officer and a firm, I examine closer and more distant relationships separately.
In most cases, a closer relationship entails fewer outside financing options, and when this
closer relationship is interrupted, the expected effect is a significant informational loss. In
contrast, firms with more distant relationships and, hence, greater outside financing op-
tions are expected to have stronger bargaining power. To test for the value of a stronger
relationship, I construct three different measures of relationship strength. The results from
this analysis allow us to identify two different mechanisms that could drive the repayment
behavior of the firm; a moral hazard behavior when the firm has access to outside sources
of financing and the expectation of repeated interaction with the subject bank in the future
when the firm has no outside option to seek financing and lower bargaining power.
This paper’s main conclusion is that personal relationships mitigate the cost of distress
for both the firm and the bank in a loan renegotiation. The firm is worse off following
the interruption of its loan officer relationship, as it is less able to renegotiate. The bank
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experiences higher default ratios and makes higher loan-loss provisions for the renegotiated
loans of interrupted relationship firms, as firms in order to trigger a renegotiation delay the
loan repayments.
In the next section, I describe the paper’s contributions to the literature. In section
2.3, I provide an overview of the institutional background and the dataset structure. In
section 2.4, I present the empirical specification and a detailed comparison of the treated
and control groups. The regression results are presented in section 2.5. In section 2.6, I
conclude.
2.2 Related Literature
This paper contributes to the literature by being the first to combine two classic research
streams—relationship banking and contract renegotiation—and by providing evidence that
a moral hazard behavior is more likely to arise when the relationship between the borrower
and the bank is interrupted.
The broader literature to which this study contributes addresses the role of relationships
in credit markets. A rich theoretical literature on bank debt highlights the importance of
informational asymmetry and moral hazard for financial intermediation.4 Several empir-
ical papers have examined the relationship between banks and borrowers for evidence to
determine whether asymmetric information affects lending. Petersen and Rajan 1994 and
Berger and Udell 1995 used the repeated interaction between a borrower and a financial
4Jaffee and Russell 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Myers and Majluf 1984; Diamond 1984; Ra-
makrishnan and Thakor 1984;Sharpe 1990;Diamond 1991; Besanko and Kanatas 1993; Rajan and Winton
1995;Bolton and Freixas 2000
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institution as a measure of relationship. Mian 2006, Agarwal and Hauswald 2010, Canales
and Nanda 2012, and Bolton et al. 2016 define relationship lending as a function of ge-
ographic distance. Ongena and Smith 2001 analyze the duration of a bank relationship
with a firm. Sufi 2007 and Ivashina 2009 explore informational asymmetries in a lending
syndicate. 5
The empirical literature to which this paper is most closely related identifies the effects
of personal relationships between bank employees and borrowers. These studies focus on
how loan approvals or performance can be influenced by different factors such as cultural
proximity (Fisman, Paravisini, and Vig 2017), social connections (Haselmann, Schoenherr,
and Vig 2016), hierarchical and geographical distance (Liberti and Mian 2009), or the loan
officer being on leave (Drexler and Schoar 2014). Several papers examine the effect on
interest rates of strong interpersonal connections between a banker and a firm (Engelberg,
Gao, and Parsons 2012), or the effect of a strong relationship as measured by the number of
interactions (Herpfer 2017), or the effect of an interruption of a relationship caused by an
executive’s death or retirement (Karolyi 2017). Lastly, Hertzberg, Liberti, and Paravisini
2010 and Cole, Kanz, and Klapper 2015 provide insights on the effects of bank-specific
governance policies on the moral hazard behavior of a loan officer.
Within the field of literature on relationship banking, this paper is the first to demon-
strate how exogenous interruptions in bank-borrower relationships affect the likelihood to
renegotiate a loan and the factors that will trigger the renegotiation. One important dif-
ference between new and renegotiated loans is the bank’s prior exposure to the risk of
5Extensive surveys of this literature are provided by Ongenah and Smith 2000, Boot 2000, Srinivasan
2014, Kysucky and Norden 2015
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default on pre-existing loans, which gives the borrower a stronger negotiation position.
The risk of a higher probability of default is magnified in a crisis period, such as in Greece
in 2010-2015, when banks faced very high delinquency ratios that drove their overall risk
assessment. In such periods, the value of a successful renegotiation surges. This paper not
only shows the effect of relationships on the probability of renegotiation, but also on the
variables related to loan performance. Further, the overall effect on the loans performance,
the duration of the estimated effects, and an analysis based on measures of relationship
strength allow me to provide suggestive evidence of a moral hazard behavior to trigger a
loan renegotiation.
Given that the main focus of this paper is loan renegotiations, the analysis also con-
tributes to the literature on contract renegotiation. Several influential papers have examined
renegotiation in incomplete contracts as an out-of-equilibrium phenomenon.6 Although the
existing theory of contact renegotiation has evolved significantly, the empirical evidence on
this topic is limited due to data restrictions. This paper investigates renegotiation indepen-
dent of previous defaults on a loan payment, and for that reason is also related to the work
of Roberts and Sufi 2009, who analyze in detail the factors triggering a renegotiation, and
those determining its outcomes. Roberts 2015 is the closest to my paper, as he shows that
a corporate loan renegotiation happens frequently, modifies significantly the initial loan
terms, and is affected significantly by the duration of the lending relationship. Although
similar conclusions to those found in these two papers arise in my analysis regarding the
frequency and the outcomes of a renegotiation, my paper advances beyond these to esti-
6Hart and Moore 1988, Rajan 1992, Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey 1994, Von Thadden 1995, Bolton
and Scharfstein 1996, Hart and Moore 1998, Maskin and Moore 1999, Gorton and Kahn 2000, Garleanu and
Zwiebel 2008, Tirole 2010
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mate the effect of the relationship between a loan officer and a borrower on the probability
of renegotiation and the performance of the renegotiated loans.
A few empirical papers have considered other factors affecting loan renegotiation. The
importance of the liquidation value of collateral (Benmelech and Bergman 2008) and of
the mortgage securitization (Piskorski, Seru, and Vig 2010) on loan renegotiation are high-
lighted. James 1995 focuses on debt restructurings and shows that the financial condition
of the firm determines the bank’s incentives to make concessions. Lastly, Chodorow-Reich
and Falato 2017 show the importance of the financial institution’s health on contracting
credit using covenant violations.
This paper also complements literature examining the impact of bank branch consol-
idation. In this area, the most relevant paper is by Nguyen 2016, as she examines how
branch closures in the United States affect local access to credit. Lastly, this paper is linked
to the strain of European debt crisis literature that employing micro–level data to identify
the impact on bank lending.7
2.3 Institutional Background & Data
The institutional setting and the data used in this paper are the same as in Chapter 1. For
more details refer to the corresponding section of the first chapter.
The identification setting and the data that I use in this paper come from a Greek bank
and cover the period 2012–2015. I exploit a major internal reorganization that was imple-
mented in one of Greece’s largest banks, and led to the closure of bank units. In response
7Acharya et al. 2016, Bentolila, Jansen, and Jime´nez 2016, Cingano, Manaresi, and Sette 2016, Popov
and Van Horen 2015, De Marco 2016
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to the significant rise in the NPL ratio for corporate loans, the bank established specialized
NPL workout units at the end of 2013. This transfer of loans to the NPL units caused a
significantly reduced workload for the original units assigned to manage corporate loans.
Consequently, it became cost effective for the bank to consolidate the original units, by
closing several and relocating the management of corporate loans to the closest unit that
remained open. An important feature of the consolidation was the relocation of the loan
officers. Loan officers who had worked in units that closed were transferred to the newly
established NPL units. Loan officers who worked in units that remained open continued to
manage their old loans and became additionally responsible for the loans transferred from
closed units. Because firms whose loans were transferred to the closest unit lost the relation
with the loan officer who had managed their loans, the feature of unit mergers, provides a
good setting for testing the effect of personal relationships on loan renegotiation.
The dataset contains detailed annual information on corporate loans for approximately
8,000 small and medium nonretail enterprises (SME) covering four years (2012–2015).
It includes detailed information on the loan terms and performance as well as basic firm
financial information. Moreover, an indicator of the bank unit responsible for each loan is
included, which allows for tracking transfers across units. Personal relationships develop
between loan officers and firms at the bank unit and changes in the bank unit indicator
reflect interruptions of such relations.
As I focus on the merger of the original bank units, I exclude the loans that were trans-
ferred to the specialized NPL workout units. The final sample consists of loans to 3,984
firms located across the 13 geographic regions of the country. Table 2.1 presents the sum-
mary statistics for the main variables in the pre-period (2012, 2013). A median firm in the
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sample has two loans with a total balance of approximately e 536,000 and total collateral
cover of e 187,630. The average interest rate is 5.97%, and the average remaining matu-
rity of the loans is approximately one and a half years (528.34 days). The median firm
performs well, with no nonperforming exposures, and has not delayed a payment. Regard-
ing the firm’s financial information, the median firm was medium-size with approximately
e 6 million in total assets and e 4.25 million in total debt. It has a positive EBITDA of
approximately e 270,000, and a high leverage equal to 0.69. The summary statistics con-
firm the fact that the sample is comprised of firms that performed relatively well during the
crisis.
2.4 Empirical Methodology
Identification Strategy
The identification of relationship interruption is based on a bank’s internal reorganization
and the closure of bank units. I employ this exogenous variation, define appropriate treat-
ment and control groups, and apply the difference-in-difference methodology to accurately
estimate the effect of interrupted personal relationships between loan officers and firms on
loan repayments.
The first step is to exclude loans were transferred to the specialized NPL units. The
sample is thus constrained to relatively “good” firms. The next step is to identify the firms
whose accounts were transferred to another unit because their original unit closed. By
looking at the transfers across bank units, we observe a set of firms whose accounts were
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transferred to other bank units without their original unit closing. (This set of observations
accounts for approximately 11% of the original sample.) It is necessary to exclude these
firms from the analysis, due to the endogeneity of their transfer.
By using the closure of the original bank unit as the source of exogenous variation, I
overcome the selection bias that may arise at the firm level. In particular, treated firms are
defined as those whose loan accounts were transferred to another bank unit because their
original unit closed. Control firms are defined as those whose loan accounts remained at
the same unit during the whole period of the sample. This specification of treatment and
control groups ensures that the variation comes only from the bank unit level and not from
the firm level. Loans transferred from one unit to another as a result of a cause other than
unit closure are excluded from the sample.
The feature that allows me to identify an interruption in personal relationships between
loan officers and firms is the relocation of loan officers. Loan officers who worked in units
that closed were transferred to the new NPL units. Loan officers who worked in the units
that remained open continued to manage their old loans and became responsible for the
loans that were transferred from the closed units. For that reason, firms that remained at
the same unit continued to interact with the same loan officers, while firms whose accounts
were transferred had to establish a new relationship with a different loan officer.
The baseline specification is a difference-in-difference, which allows me to compare
the difference on the outcome variables between the firms in the treated group and those in
the control group in the post-unit closure period (2014, 2015) relative to the difference that
the two groups had in the pre-unit closure period (2012, 2013). The baseline regression is:
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yiurt = αi + αu + αrt + δ(Postt ∗ Treatiur) + εiurt (2.1)
where yiurt stands for the outcome variable for firm i obtaining a loan from bank unit u
and located in region r in year t. Treatiur is a dummy variable equal to one for treated
firms and zero for control firms. Postt is a dummy variable equal to zero for the period
before the bank units’ closure (from 2012 to 2013) and one after the closures (from 2014
to 2015). The baseline specification includes firm fixed effects (αi) to capture any time-
invariant characteristics of the firm. Bank unit fixed effects (αu) as well as region ∗ year
fixed effects (αrt) are included to capture any time-invariant characteristics of the bank unit
(e.g., a specific bank unit may have a higher lending limit) and any region and time-varying
shocks respectively. For the treated firms, the bank-unit fixed effect is based on the unit to
which their loans were transferred. The coefficient of interest is δ, which measures the
difference in the outcome variable for the firms that experienced an interruption in their
personal relationship with the loan officers, relative to the firms that did not, controlling for
the pre-period difference.
The outcome variables of interest belong to three groups: (i) the performance of all
loans that a firm has; (ii) the probability of renegotiating a loan (extensive margin); and
(iii), loan performance of the renegotiated loans. Regarding the effect on loan performance,
I examine three different outcome variables: (i) the ratio of a loan’s payment days past due
over the number of remaining days; (ii) a nonperforming dummy variable; and (iii), the
ratio of total provisions over total loan balance.
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Comparison of treated and control groups in the pre-unit closure
period
The most important threat to identification is a possible selection bias that arises from the
decision to close a bank unit. It is necessary to assume that the bank did not close units
where debtors performed, or were expected to perform, worse. The main criterion for unit
closure is geographic location: in areas where there were two or more units, the bank kept
only one, while in areas with only one unit, it was optimal for the bank to keep it open to
serve the main priority of client retention.
A comparison between the two groups in the pre-unit-closure period (2012–2013) pro-
vides evidence that there are no statistically significant differences across the two groups.
Table 2.2 presents this comparison and includes variables related to loan terms, perfor-
mance, and firms’ financials. Column 1 shows the mean value and the standard deviation
for the control firms, Column 2 for the treated firms, and Column 3 shows the p-value for
the difference, with regional fixed effects included. The only variable significantly different
across the two groups is the ratio of loans transferred to the NPL units from the originals:
this variable is higher for the bank units that remained open. This difference indicates
that, to the extent that units were selected for closure based on loan performance, the bank
units that closed had better performing loans. For that reason, if a selection bias exists on
which units closed, it will bias the results downwards. The fact that we do not observe any
statistically significant difference for the loan terms, performance, and firms’ financial in-
formation supports the assumption that the two groups shared similar characteristics. The
probability is therefore high that the two groups would have continued to look similar if
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the personal relationships with loan officers had not been interrupted.
I report also parallel trend graphs in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, which show the results for
the total balance. Figure 2.1a plots the mean values for the treated and the control groups,
and Figure 2.1b plots the mean value of the residuals from a regression of total balance
on region fixed effects. Figure 2.2 plots the regression coefficients and the confidence
intervals from a regression of the log of total balance on region and bank unit fixed effects.
Another important variable for which the parallel trends hypothesis should be tested is the
nonperforming dummy, as higher default ratios could predict the bank unit closure. A
similar analysis providing evidence against this hypothesis is conducted in Figures 2.3 and
2.4. These graphs support the hypothesis that no pre-trend difference regarding the loan
amount or performance existed to predict bank unit closure.
Out-of-sample comparison of firms located in exposed and control
geographic areas
In this section, I perform an out-of-sample comparison of firms located in geographic areas
where a bank unit closed (exposed areas), and firms located in areas where a unit remained
open (control areas). This test provides further evidence that the local economic condi-
tions, and the firms operating in exposed and control areas, are similar. The data for this
comparison come from the Amadeus Bureau van Dijk dataset and cover the same period
of the experiment (2012–2015). The Amadeus dataset provides information on firms’ bal-
ance sheets and income statements. In addition, I use the bank units’ zip codes to identify
exposed and control areas. I match the firms’ zip code with the bank units’ zip code, and
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construct a subsample of the Amadeus dataset appropriate for the out-of-sample compari-
son.
Table 2.3 presents the results comparing firms located in exposed and control areas
for the same period of the experiment (2012–2015). The first column shows the mean
value and the standard deviation of firms located in the zip code areas where a bank unit
remained open, and the second column for firms located in areas where a unit closed. The
third column shows the p-value of the difference. The two groups are similar across most of
the variables. There is a small and significant in total assets and the number of employees
between the two groups, which suggests that firms in control areas are larger. In subsection
2.5, I restrict the sample to areas in which firms have similar characteristics to provide
further evidence that local economic conditions do not explain differences between control
and treated groups.
The main variables of interest in Table 2.3 are those related to firms’ financial per-
formance. Any difference in these variables would suggest that the economic conditions
differ between exposed and control areas. No statistically significant differences in these
variables are observable (EBIT, EBITDA, net income, sales, gross profit, etc.).
Lastly, to capture the potential differences associated with unobserved economic indica-
tors, I use the firms’ financial characteristics as dependent variables and apply the baseline
regression 2.1 to examine whether there is an out-of-sample effect of a bank unit closure.
Column 4 of Table 2.3 shows the estimated coefficients from the difference-in-difference
regressions on firms’ variables. No coefficient is statistically significant. The fact that
there is no statistically significant difference across any specification for the observable
characteristics of firms’ financial characteristics supports the assumption that economic
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conditions in the exposed and control areas are similar.
2.5 Results
First, I report the baseline results on on loan renegotiation and on loan performance. I
examine the impact of personal relationships between loan officers and firms on the prob-
ability of renegotiating a loan and on the loan repayment. In the second part of the paper,
I examine how the strength of the relationship affects the results by using three different
measures of relationship strength.
Baseline Results
Effect on Probability of Renegotiation
First, I analyze the extensive margin and the probability of renegotiating a loan after a firm’s
loans are transferred to another bank unit. I compare firms that experienced an exogenous
interruption in the personal relationship with their loan officer with those that did not. The
outcome variable of interest is the probability that a firm renegotiates at least one of its pre-
existing loans. The data in this section are constructed at the firm level. More formally, the
dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm renegotiated at least one of
its old loans and zero if the firm did not renegotiate any loan. Table 2.4 presents the results
with different specifications regarding fixed effects and control variables. It can be seen that
firms whose relationship with a loan officer is interrupted have a 26% lower probability of
renegotiating at least one of their pre-existing loans, compared to firms with uninterrupted
relationships, when firm, bank unit, and region-year fixed effects are included.
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A loan renegotiation can be initiated either by the bank or by the firm and does not
require a delayed loan payment. A renegotiation is expected to be mutually advantageous,
as otherwise one of the parties would not agree to the new terms. The firm benefits by
renegotiating a loan, because one or more of the initial loan terms is relaxed. At the same
time, the bank prevents a default or improves its covenants. Since renegotiation benefits
the firms, firms with interrupted relationships receive worse treatment as the result of the
transfer of their loans to another bank unit.
The results from four different specifications are presented in Table 2.4, and the results
are robust. In all four specifications, bank unit fixed effects are included to capture any
unit-level time-invariant variation, and the standard errors are clustered at the unit level.
Even though bank lending policies in general are similar across units, a larger unit or a unit
that is higher in the organizational hierarchy may have different limits on loan amounts and
the terms it is allowed to approve.
Moreover, I control for the regional differences by adding region or region-year fixed
effects. In the first column, region and year fixed effects are included, while in the second
column region-year fixed effects are included. When constructing the region-year fixed ef-
fects, I define the region more broadly than strict geography to ensure that at least two bank
units are open per region in the post-unit closure period and I combine only neighboring
regions that have similar industry composition. No adjustment is done on regions that have
two or more bank units in the post-period. The specification defined in Column 2 is the
baseline specification of the paper.
To control for firm level differences, in Columns 1 and 2 firm fixed effects are in-
cluded to capture any time-invariant characteristics of the firm such as size, industry, etc.
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In Columns 3 and 4, I add different types of firm-level time-varying control variables. In
Column 3, as control variables, the firm’s lagged log of EBITDA and the lagged log of total
loans at this bank are included. In Column 4, the lagged log of total assets is included as
a control variable to control for changes in the size of the firm. The results remain robust
when we control for time-varying firm characteristics, and this confirms that variations at
the firm level during the years of the experiment are not driving the estimated coefficients.
Effect on Loan Performance Conditional on a Renegotiation
In this subsection, I estimate the effect of an interruption in the relationship between a firm
and a loan officer on the renegotiated loan’s performance. Identifying such an effect on
delinquency is of crucial importance for gauging the effect of renegotiation for the bank.
A crucial challenge that banks face during a recession is a steep increase in nonperforming
loans (NPLs). Even though the “bad” firms that drive the high rise in the NPLs are excluded
from this analysis, identifying the impact of personal relationships in the “good” firms is
also significant. The “good” firms compose the most relevant group of firms for which
the bank can prevent delays on loan repayments. For that reason, the value of personal
relationships surges in a loan renegotiation during a recession period because they help
restrict delinquencies.
Table 2.5 presents the results for the baseline empirical specification (2.1) for three
variables related to loan performance ((i) log of a loan’s payment days past due over the
remaining days of the loan; (ii) nonperforming dummy variable; and (iii), log of total
provisions over total balance). The firm outcome variables in this section are analyzed
only for the loans renegotiated in the post-unit-closure period. We observe that firms with
87
an interrupted relationship perform worse on the renegotiated loans compared to firms with
an uninterrupted relationship. Treated firms have a 15.4% higher probability of defaulting
on a renegotiated loan, and the bank makes a 70% higher level of provisions on renegotiated
loans with interrupted relationships.
Days Past Due a Payment: Firms whose accounts were exogenously transferred to
another bank unit delay their payments by more than double the number of days than those
that remained at the same unit. The outcome variable is the log of a loan payment’s days
past due over the remaining days of the loan. In the first column of Table 2.5 we see that
the number of days delayed per remaining days is 1.5 times higher for the treated group,
which corresponds to approximately 27 additional days of delay.
Nonperforming: The second column reports the result for a nonperforming dummy
equal to one if the loan is characterized as nonperforming and zero otherwise. An exposure
is characterized as nonperforming if it is 90 days or more past due, or if it is impaired. A
firm with an interrupted relationship has a 15.4% higher probability of its loan becoming
nonperforming after renegotiation, compared to a firm with an uninterrupted relationship,
which corresponds to an approximately 2% higher probability to default.
Loan Provisions: The last outcome variable examined here is the log of the ratio of total
loan-loss provisions that the bank needs to make for the renegotiated loans relative to the
total balance of the renegotiated loan. For the renegotiated loans of firms with interrupted
relations, the level of provisions per total loan balance is approximately 70% higher, which
corresponds to an additional e 0.10 of loan-loss provisions for each euro of loan balance.
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Unconditional Results on All Loans
The results on loan performance presented in the previous subsection were estimated con-
ditional on the firm renegotiating a loan. In this subsection, I estimate the effect of an
interruption in the loan officer relationship on all loans that a firm has at the subject bank.
The results on all loans reveal whether significant differences between the two groups on
the loan performance exist. I include in the set of all loans old loans that were not renego-
tiated, old loans that were renegotiated, and new loans. For this analysis, I use the baseline
specification with firm, bank unit, and region-year fixed effects, and Table 2.6 presents the
results.
In Table 2.6, the unconditional effect on the loan performance is presented. We do not
observe a statistically significant difference in the number of days that a loan is delayed,
or in the level of provisions between the firms whose relationship was interrupted and
those with continuous relationships. However, we observe a higher probability of a loan
becoming nonperforming if the firm experiences an interruption in the relationship with the
loan officer. In particular, firms with interrupted relationships have a 9% higher probability
of their loans’ becoming nonperforming than do firms with continuous relationships.
By comparing the unconditional results on all loans with the results on the renegotiated
loans from the previous subsection, an interesting insight arises. Based on the previous sub-
section, firms with interrupted relationships default more on the renegotiated loans com-
pared to firms with continuous relationships. At the same time, firms with interrupted rela-
tionships have, on average, the same performance on all the loans they have been granted.
The fact that the treated firms delay their payments by more days than the control firms
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only on the renegotiated loans is an indication of a moral hazard behavior. Treated firms
have a stronger incentive to strategically default on a loan in order to trigger a renegotiation
compared to the control firms. When the relationship with the loan officer is interrupted and
a firm continues to repay its loan on time, the loan officer may be less willing to renegotiate
a loan agreement as there is no credible threat that the firm will default on its loan. At the
same time, when the relationship with the loan officer has been interrupted, the firm faces
a significantly lower goodwill and reputation loss by strategically defaulting on a loan.
These two dynamics - the unwillingness of the loan officer to renegotiate a loan unless a
credible threat to default exists and the low cost if it strategically default on a payment -
cause an increase in the likelihood that the firm with interrupted loan officer relationships
will behave under moral hazard in order to trigger a loan renegotiation.
Sequence of Events
This subsection provides an analysis of the sequence of the events and the duration of
the effect using the figures 2.5 - 2.8. Figures 2.5 - 2.8 plot the effect of an interruption
in the relationship between a loan officer and a firm on the outcome variables of interest.
The coefficients are obtained from a regression of the outcome variable on the treatment
indicator and on region and bank-unit fixed effects.
Figure 2.5 shows that the negative effect on renegotiation appears in 2014, the first
year after the interruption in the relationship between the loan officer and the firm, while in
2015 there is no statistically significant difference on the extensive margin for renegotiation
between the treated and the control group. Figure 2.6 plots the effect on the log of days
past due over remaining days for the loans that were renegotiated in the post-period, figure
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2.7 for the nonperforming dummy variable, and figure 2.8 for the log of the total provision
per total balance. The statistically significant increase at the days past due and at the total
provisions lasts for two years in the post-period, while the increase in the nonperforming
dummy lasts only for one year after the interruption in the relationship.
The duration of the effects indicates that treated firms delay a loan repayment in order to
trigger a renegotiation that occurs in 2015, the year after the interruption in the loan officer
relationship. The observation that the level of provisions increases for two years at the post-
period suggests that the bank will carry the cost of the strategic delay in a loan repayment
for a longer period, as firms with nonperforming loans and delays in loan repayments are
characterized as riskier clients for the bank.
Addressing possible threats to identification
Identifying Possible Selection Bias on Renegotiation
One concern regarding the validity of the estimated effects of an interrupted relationship
is a possible selection bias concerning whether a loan is renegotiated. In subsections 2.4
and 2.4, I demonstrated that firms in the treated and control groups share similar pre-unit
closure characteristics. Two of my main findings are that firms with interrupted personal
relationships have a lower probability of renegotiating a loan (subsection 2.5), and condi-
tional on a renegotiation, these firms performworse (subsection 2.5). If loan officers choose
to renegotiate with interrupted-relationship firms based on different criteria than those used
for the continuous-relationship firms, then the intensive margin results would be biased.
If loan officers for interrupted-relationship loans granted renegotiation more frequently for
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firms with relatively inferior performance, while loan officers for continuing-relationship
firms did not do so, then the estimated effect of continuing relationships on the probability
of renegotiation would exaggerate the true effect of the continuing relationship. In fact
however, I find the opposite, implying that my estimated effect of continuing relationships
on renegotiated loans performance is conservative.
I conduct two tests, which are presented in Tables 2.7 and 2.8. The first test compares
the two types of firms that renegotiated a loan in the post-period. In Table 2.7, a similar
analysis as in Table 2.2 is conducted, but for this test, I include only firms that renegotiated a
loan in the post-unit closure period, and compare the pre-unit closure period characteristics
between the treated and control groups. We observe no statistically significant difference
in any of the variables between firms with interrupted and continuing relationships that
renegotiated a loan in the post-unit closure period. Firms in the two groups that renegotiated
loans in the post-unit closure period shared similar characteristics in the pre-period, which
suggests no selection bias exists regarding whether a loan is renegotiated.
Table 2.8 presents a second test, which considers observable variables that can prompt
a renegotiation. I rank firms within each bank unit based on the year-before-the-transfer
value for each variable. The decision to renegotiate a loan is made by the loan officer at the
bank unit, and, for that reason, any correlation outside the unit would not be informative for
the criteria used to renegotiate a loan at the bank unit. The rank within the bank unit allows
me to control for the variation at the bank unit and any criterion based on hard information
used by the loan officer. I regress a dummy variable for renegotiating a loan on the firm’s
within-bank-unit rank separately for each variable and include bank-unit and region-year
fixed effects. This test provides us with correlations that show which firms have a higher
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probability of renegotiating a loan, based on the previous year’s hard information available
to the loan officer and to the econometrician. Table 2.8, Column 1 presents the result for
the whole sample (pre- and post-unit closure period for treated and control firms), Column
2 for control firms in the post-period, and Column 3 for treated firms in the post-period.
The most interesting observation comes from the estimations of the year-before-the-
transfer EBITDA growth rate. We observe that, for the whole sample and for the control
group in the post-period, there is no statistically significant effect, while for the treated
group in the post-period there is a positive statistically significant correlation. As noted
above, this finding indicates my estimates are conservative.
The same observation rises also from the density distribution graphs. In figure 2.9 I
plot the density distributions of the firm’s rank within bank-unit based on the year-before-
the-transfer log of EBITDA separately for the treated and the control group. The blue line
presents the density of all firms in the group and the red line presents the density of the
firms that renegotiated a loan in the post-period. It becomes apparent from the plots that
there is no selection on renegotiation based on the lag EBITDA for the control group. On
the other hand, for the treated group the density distribution of those that renegotiated a
loan in the post-period shifts to the right, representing that there is a positive correlation
between last year’s EBITDA and renegotiation. This finding is consistent with the result
from table 2.8 and indicates that the estimated results are conservative.
Table 2.8 implies a common rule with respect to the firm’s leverage, total loans at the
subject bank, and total loan-loss provision is applied for all firms, independent of whether
they belong to the treated or control group. Moreover, firms in the whole sample and in the
control group appear to be selected similarly for renegotiation based on their total assets,
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total debt, debt over EBITDA, and payments’ days past due. In contrast, we do not observe
a correlation between these variables and renegotiation for the treated group. Again, this
finding indicates conservative estimates.
Controlling for firms’ differences in zip codes locations
Subsection 2.4 discussed the observed differences between firms located in areas where a
bank unit closed (exposed) and in areas where a bank unit remained open (control). Based
on the zip code comparison using the Amadeus dataset presented in Table 2.3, firms located
in the exposed areas are smaller in size. Even though I control for the log of total assets
in the estimated results, in this section, I provide further evidence that firms’ differences
across geographic locations are not driving the results.
To accurately control for potential differences in the geographic location of the exposed
and the control areas, I restrict the sample to areas in which firms across the two areas have
no statistically significant difference in financial variables. In particular, I exclude firms
located in Attica, the region where Athens is located, and I repeat the analysis. Table
2.9 presents the results of the subsample on the comparison of exposed and control areas
using the Amadeus dataset. This finding confirms that no significant difference in financial
variables obtains between the two groups in the subsample.
The next step is to show that, when I restrict the sample to areas where firms across
the two groups are similar, the estimated results on the outcome variables hold. Table 2.10
presents these results. The estimated coefficients for both the probability to renegotiate
a loan and the intensive margin results on loan performance are similar in economic sig-
nificance to the baseline results. This confirms that the baseline results are not driven by
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the differences on the firm’s characteristics nor by the economic conditions at the zip-code
level.
Results by Relationship Strength
In this section, I further investigate the value of a relationship between a loan officer and a
firm. I construct three different measures of relationship strength and compare the impact
of an interrupted relationship on firms with stronger relationships and those with weaker
relationships. This section sheds light on two different mechanisms that could drive the
repayment behavior of a firm; a moral hazard behavior when the firm has access to outside
sources of financing and the expectation of repeated interaction with the subject bank in the
future when the firm has no outside option to seek financing and lower bargaining power.
Relationship Strength Measured by the Dependence Ratio
The first measure of relationship strength is the ratio of a firm’s total amount of loans at
this bank over its total debt to other banks. This measure shows whether a firm had an
established relationship with other banks or whether it borrowed predominantly from the
bank featured in this study. One of the main assumptions for a mutually advantageous
renegotiation is that the firm has outside options for financing, as those options would
increase the firm’s bargaining power. For small-and medium-size corporations, the outside
options for financing are either other local banks, or raising inside or outside private equity,
as these relatively smaller firms do not have access to the stock market or from foreign
banks.
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It follows that if a firm borrows from other banks in the pre-period, and has an estab-
lished relationship with them, it is easier for the firm to seek financing from other banks
once the relationship with the subject bank is interrupted. On the other hand, if the firm de-
pends mostly on the subject bank to satisfy its financing needs, then its negotiation power
is limited. This section provides a comparison of these two groups, i.e., firms with closer
relationships and fewer outside options versus firms with weaker relationships and more
outside options.
As a measure of how close the relationship is, I estimate an indicator variable which
I label the Dependence Ratio. The Dependence Ratio is defined as the ratio of the total
balance at this bank over the total debt that a firm had to other banks in 2013, the year
before the bank units’ closure. First, I estimate the correlation between the Dependence
Ratio and the probability of renegotiating a loan. Table 2.11 presents the correlation results.
The first two columns show the results for the whole sample in the pre- and the post-unit
closure period, where Columns 3 and 4 report results for the control firms, and Columns
5 and 6 for the treated firms. There is a positive and significant correlation between the
dependence ratio and the probability of renegotiating a loan, suggesting that firms with
closer relationships have a higher probability of renegotiating. Note that this correlation
is not significant for the treated group in the post-period, although it was significant in the
pre-period. This suggests a loss in the value of close relationships between the firm and the
bank once the relationship with the loan officer is interrupted. Treated firms that borrowed
predominantly from the subject bank in the pre-unit-closure period do not have a higher
probability of renegotiating in the post-unit-closure period.
Figure 2.10 presents the density distribution of the Dependence Ratio in 2013. The
96
higher the value of the ratio, the more dependent the firm is on this bank. The lower the
value of the ratio, the less important this bank is to the firm, since it borrowed frommultiple
sources. As shown in Figure 2.10, the majority of firms borrow from multiple banks, while
a smaller number borrows mostly from the subject bank. In the following analysis, I test
separately the effect of interrupted relationships for firms with closer relationships, and for
those with more distant ones.
Tables 2.12–2.13 present the results for these two subsamples. Firms with a closer re-
lationship are defined as those with a dependence ratio above 50%. Firms with a less close
relationship are defined as those with a dependence ratio below 20%.8 The results are es-
timated using the baseline empirical specification 2.1. Table 2.12 shows that, independent
of whether the firm had a close relationship with the subject bank in the pre-unit closure
period, the firm has a 28% lower probability of renegotiating a loan after the relationship
is interrupted.
Based on the estimations in Table 2.13, treated firms whose relationship with the sub-
ject bank is close perform better, and their loans have a lower probability of becoming
nonperforming, compared to the control firms. Despite receiving worse loan terms on their
renegotiated loans, firms with close and interrupted relationships perform better, compared
to firms with close and continuing relationships. These results suggest that firms with lim-
ited or no outside options may have lower bargaining power and may try to gain the trust
of the new loan officer by performing better.
On the other hand, firms that have outside financing options and whose relationships
8The cutoffs were chosen to secure enough statistical power to the tests. The results remain robust under
different cutoff thresholds, and tables are available upon request.
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with the subject bank were interrupted, ceteris paribus, default more on renegotiated loans.
These firms have less to lose if they negotiate harder by threatening default to gain better
terms. That creates a higher incentive for them than for the control firms to default on their
loans at the subject bank. Overall, the fact that the bank unit closure causes an improvement
in loan terms and an increase in defaults for firms with outside financing options, posits
moral hazard behavior as a possibility for gaining better terms on renegotiated loans.
Relationship Strength Measured by the Number of Interactions
The second measure of relationship strength I use is the number of interactions each firm
had with the bank in 2013. I identify interaction as either the issuance of a new loan or
a renegotiation of an old loan. The number of interactions in 2013 shows the minimum
number of contact events that a firm had with the loan officer the year before the bank
units’ closure, and this number indicates their relationship strength.
Table 2.14 shows the summary statistics of the number of loans, new loans, and rene-
gotiations per year. The mean number of interactions per year is 3.6, and the median is 2,
which is the same as the number of loans. Figure 2.11 presents the density distributions
of the number of loans, interactions, new loans, and renegotiations. We observe that the
distributions are highly skewed, as is indicated by the summary statistics.
In the following analysis, I separate the sample between those firms with more than two
interactions in 2013 and those with two or fewer. The number two is selected as this is the
median of the total number of interactions in 2013.9 Firms with more than two interactions
are expected to have a closer relationship with the loan officers who negotiated two or more
9The results remain robust under different cutoff thresholds and tables are available upon request.
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loan contracts in the previous year. On the other hand, firms with two or fewer interactions
are expected to have a weaker relationship. More frequent interactions with a loan officer
in the pre-period suggests that frictions arising in loan contracts were overcome in the past,
and therefore, the parties would be more likely to reach an optimal contract in the future.
Once the relationship is interrupted, the benefit of the previous history is lost.
The results of this analysis are presented in tables 2.15–2.16. Table 2.15 presents the
results for the probability of renegotiating a loan for the two groups. Firms with more
than two interactions in the pre-unit closure period and an interrupted relationship have a
higher probability of renegotiating a loan than firms with more than two interactions and
uninterrupted relations. On the other hand, among the firms with two or fewer interactions,
those with interrupted relationships have a 37% lower probability of renegotiating than
those with uninterrupted relationships. With respect to the effect on renegotiated loans’
performance, an increase occurs both in defaults and in provisions among firms with two
or fewer interactions. Table 2.16 presents the results on renegotiated loans’ performances.
On the other hand, among firms with more than two interactions, we do not observe any
statistically significant effect for delays on loan repayments or defaults, and we observe a
decrease in the level of provisions.
The results discussed in this subsection confirm the hypothesis that personal relation-
ships have an additional value for loan renegotiation. This added value is more important
for firms with closer relationships with the bank (i.e., firms with more than two interac-
tions), as these firms, despite receiving tougher loan terms, continue to perform well. This
behavior could be explained as a signal for future expected interactions. On the other hand,
firms with two or fewer interactions in the pre-period appear to default more on their rene-
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gotiated loans, and this result suggests a less valuable relationship for them. Overall, the
results from this subsection suggest that the expectation of future regular interactions with
the bank affects the behavior of the firm, as we do not observe a significant effect in defaults
among the firms with frequent interaction.
Relationship Strength Measured by the Relative Size of the Firm
In this section, I use as a third measure of relationship strength the relative size of the firm
as a corporate client within a bank unit. I estimate this measure as the ratio of the total
balance of the firm over the total amount of loans that each bank unit manages in 2014,
which captures the exposure of that bank unit to each corporate borrower: The larger the
ratio, the larger the exposure of the bank unit to this client. The relative size of the firm
is potentially correlated with two effects. Although, for larger firms, the potential profit
margin for the bank is higher, the bank is also exposed to a higher risk. As both the profit
margin and the risk are higher for larger firms, it is expected that loan officers will have a
stronger incentive to establish closer relationships with larger clients.
Figure 2.12 shows the density distribution of the relative size of the firm within the
bank unit. As expected, the distribution is highly skewed, and the majority of the firms are
small clients for the bank unit. The indicator of relative firm size is estimated based on
2014 data, the first year after the transfer occurred. I use the relative size after the transfer
to control for different behaviors towards the large clients in the post-period independent of
whether a firm was in the treated or control group. In the following tests, I look separately
at larger and smaller firms. I define as larger firms those whose balance at the specific bank
unit accounts for at least 1% of the total amount of corporate loans the unit manages. The
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rest of the sample is defined as relatively small firms.10
Tables 2.17–2.18 present the results for larger and smaller firms separately. From the
results on the extensive margin, we observe that firms with smaller balances and an inter-
rupted relationship have a lower probability of renegotiating a loan following the transfer
to another bank unit. On the other hand, for firms with larger balances, no statistically sig-
nificant difference obtains between the treated and control groups. Regarding renegotiated
loans’ performance, firms with smaller balances and interrupted relations evidently delay
longer in their loan repayments, default more on their loans, and have an increased level of
provision for these loans. In particular, among firms with smaller balances, treated firms
have a 50% higher probability of becoming nonperforming. On the other hand, among
firms with larger balances, even though the treated firms delay their payments by addi-
tional days, these firms have an 87% lower probability of becoming nonperforming.
Results by Firms Pre-Unit-Closure Period Performance
In this section, I analyze whether the firm’s pre-unit-closure period loan performance in-
fluences the estimated results. I separate the sample between firms that delayed a loan
payment in 2013, the year before the transfer, and firms that paid their loans on time. Ta-
bles 2.19–2.20 present the results of the main outcomes of interest separately for the two
groups. We observe that both firms with good repayment behavior and those with delays
in loan payments have a lower probability of renegotiating a loan when their loan officer
relationships are interrupted.
10The cutoffs were chosen to secure enough statistical power to the tests. The results remain robust under
different cutoff thresholds, and tables are available upon request.
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With respect to the renegotiated loans’ performance, we observe a difference between
the two groups. In particular, among the firms that delayed a loan payment in the past,
treated firms have a lower probability of becoming nonperforming (or a higher probability
to perform well in the post-period if the loan was delinquent in the pre-period) and a lower
level of provisions is recorded after the relationship with the loan officer is interrupted. In
contrast, treated firms with on time loan payments in the past have a higher probability of
becoming nonperforming in the post-period, and a higher level of provisions is offered.
Overall, the results indicate that the impact of an interrupted relationship on the prob-
ability of renegotiating a loan is the same for firms with good repayment histories and for
those with delays in their loan payments. The results on the renegotiated loans’ perfor-
mance suggest a moral hazard behavior from firms with previously on-time loan payments,
as these firms appear to default more on their loans in the post-unit-closure period.
Moral Hazard or Anticipated Repeated Interaction
Arguably, the superior outcomes of continuing-relationship firms reflect, in part, endoge-
nous decisions made by those firms, and not merely soft information about their condition.
The loan repayment behavior of the treated firms may be driven by two distinct underlying
mechanisms. In the first mechanism, the repayment behavior is driven by moral hazard,
and in the second, it is driven by the expectation of repeated interaction with the subject
bank. These two behaviors have opposite predictions for firms’ performance. According
to the moral hazard hypothesis, a treated firm has an incentive to strategically default on its
loan payments, to exercise its negotiation power, and to gain better loan terms. Under this
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hypothesis, we would observe an increase in loan defaults. However, under the repeated
interaction hypothesis, a firm would highly value the relationship with the bank and, in
anticipation of repeated interactions, would perform well in the present, despite possibly
unfavorable loan terms.
We observe that firms whose personal relationships with a loan officer have been in-
terrupted perform worse on their renegotiated loans. The results from two tests suggest
that this difference in renegotiated loan performance may reflect moral hazard. First, in
subsection 2.5, we discussed that there is a positive statistically significant correlation be-
tween renegotiating a loan and the EBITDA growth rate only for the treated group in the
post-period. Given this positive correlation, we cannot conclude that the estimated increase
on loan defaults is driven by the firms’ profitability. Moreover, the unconditional results
discussed in section 2.5 reveal no significant effect on payment delays, and on the level
of provisions for all loans that firms had. This result indicates that firms with interrupted
relationships continued to repay on time the loans that were not renegotiated.
The analysis based on relationship strength in section 2.5 allows us to examine sepa-
rately different groups of firms whose behavior may be driven by the anticipated repeated
interaction with the bank. Specifically, firms with a higher dependence ratio (subsection
2.5), and firms with a greater number of interactions with the bank in the pre-unit consoli-
dation period (subsection 2.5), perform better on the renegotiated loans, despite receiving
tougher loan terms in the post-period, compared to the control group. This result points to
behavior driven by an anticipated repeated interaction with the bank. Namely, firms with
a close pre-period relationship with the bank, despite the interrupted relationship with the
loan officer, perform well on their loans in anticipation of future interactions with the new
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loan officer. On the other hand, firms that do not place a high value on the relationship with
this bank (either firms with low dependence ratios and outside options to seek financing
or firms with a low number of interactions) have a stronger incentive to exercise their bar-
gaining position, and default strategically on their loans to gain better loan terms. Overall,
the analysis on the two groups of firms based on relationship strength allows us to identify
two opposite plausible mechanisms driving the behavior of a firm: repeated interaction and
moral hazard.
2.6 Conclusion
Personal relationships have a significant positive effect in corporate loan renegotiation, mit-
igating the costs of distress for both firms and banks. A relationship between a loan officer
and a firm helps eliminate frictions that arise in loan renegotiation. When a relationship is
interrupted, the renegotiation outcome is less likely to be beneficial and the efficient con-
tract is less likely to be achieved. Using the consolidation of bank units as a source of
exogenous variation, I analyze a proprietary dataset on corporate loans. I find strong evi-
dence that a personal relationship with a loan officer significantly affects loan renegotiation
outcomes both at the extensive and intensive margins. Notably, I observe that firms with
interrupted relationships have a lower probability of renegotiating a loan upon their trans-
fer to another bank unit. The value of maintaining relationships is also visible in measures
of loan delinquency. Strong personal relationships between the bank officer and the firm
prevent defaults. Firms with interrupted relationships perform worse on their renegotiated
loans than those with stable relationships. This paper also analyzes the repayments of the
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firms with interrupted relationships: Their behavior could be driven, in part, either by moral
hazard or by the expectation of future regular interaction with the bank. A detailed analysis
based on relationship strength allows us to examine separately different firms with closer
and weaker relationships and find suggestive evidence of these two opposite mechanisms.
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2.7 Figures and Tables
Table 2.1: Summary statistics based on the 2012–2013 values
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Median
Loan-Related Variables:
Total Balance 2,611,645 10,057,676.6 535,934.5
Interest Rate .0597 .034 .0621
Total Collateral Value 3,234,279 20,128,240 187,630
Days Remaining (Maturity) 528.34 995.16 52.35
Unsecured loan (Dummy) .35 .45 0
Secure type of collateral (Dummy) .50 .45 .51
Number of loans per year 4.72 29.31 2
Performance-Related Variables :
Nonperforming (Dummy) .11 .31 0
Days Past Due 29.8 82.32 0
Days Past Due over Remaining Days 10.1 52.03 0
Total Provision 1,438,472 30,789,946 0
Debtor Renegotiated a Loan (Dummy) .59 .49 0
At Least One Forborne (Dummy) .05 .21 0
Firm’s Financial Information :
Total Assets 35,710,880 204,072,593 6,124,094
Total Debt 24,219,150 140,099,180 4,253,020
Total Equity 12,862,210 90,149,735 1,644,740
EBITDA 1,384,210 26,161,717 271,487
Total Debt over EBITDA ratio -26.7 3,325.4 7.5
Leverage (Debt over Assets) .72 .72 .69
This table displays summary statistics of the main variables. The variables are con-
structed at the firm level. A simple sum of all loans a firm holds each year is used
for the total balance, total collateral value, number of loans, and total provision. A
weighted average with weights equal to the ratio of the specific loan exposure over
the total balance of the firm is used for the interest rate, days remaining, nonper-
forming (dummy), and days past due. All variables are based on the 2012–2013
values.
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Table 2.2: Comparison of pre-period mean values for treated and control groups
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Control Treated p - value
on Difference
Loan-Related Variables:
Total Balance 934,255.3 791,929.6 (0.571)
(1,497,483.4) (1,232,984.1)
Interest Rate 0.0618 0.0657 (0.323)
(0.0325) (0.0334)
Days Remaining (Maturity) 516.9 723.4 (0.198)
(985.4) (1,207.4)
Total Collateral Value 737,344.5 811,042.0 (0.831)
(1,342,033.5) (1,362,189.0)
Unsecured Loan (Dummy) 0.548 0.478 (0.348)
(0.498) (0.501)
Secure Type of Collateral 0.473 0.539 (0.483)
(0.450) (0.460)
Performance-Related Variables:
Nonperforming (Dummy) 0.106 0.124 (0.735)
(0.308) (0.330)
Days Delayed over Remaining Days 11.20 17.98 (0.201)
(63.98) (65.67)
Total Provision per Total Exposure 0.114 0.143 (0.467)
(1.828) (0.655)
Ratio of Loans Transferred 0.462 0.434 (0.000)
to NPL specialized unit (0.00107) (0.00126)
Debtor’s Financial Information:
Total Assets 10,712,500.0 7,983,826.1 (0.632)
(15,995,732.5) (12,173,003.3)
Total Debt 7,473,765.0 6,565,431.2 (0.884)
(11,426,411.1) (10,640,303.1)
Total Equity 3,543,320.3 2,207,924.3 (0.273)
(6,546,923.7) (3,996,019.6)
EBITDA 1,413,431.1 596,890.4 (0.208)
(26,589,773.0) (2,541,047.6)
Leverage (Debt over Assets) 0.704 0.717 (0.879)
(0.316) (0.240)
This table displays the mean values and standard deviations separately for the treated and
control groups. Column 3 reports the p-value for the difference between Columns 1 and 2.
p-values are obtained from a regression of the main variable on a treatment indicator and
region fixed effects. All variables and estimations are based on the 2012–2013 values.
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Figure 2.1: Trends of the total exposure for the treatment and control groups (mean values
and residuals)
(a) mean values
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Figure 2.1a plots the mean values of the total exposure for the treated and control groups over the period
from 2012 until 2015. Figure 2.1b plots the residuals from a regression of the total exposure on region fixed
effects for the treated and control groups for the same period.
Figure 2.2: Regression coefficients and confidence intervals after controlling for region and
bank unit fixed effects
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Figure 2.2 plots the effect of an interruption in the relationship between a loan officer and a firm on the log of
total exposure. The coefficients are obtained from a regression of the log on total exposure on the treatment
indicator and on region and bank-unit fixed effects. Bars show 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 2.3: Trends for the nonperforming dummy for the treatment and control groups
(mean values and residuals)
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Figure 2.3a plots the mean values of the nonperforming dummy variable for the treated and the control groups
from 2012 until 2015. Figure 2.3b plots the residuals from a regression of the nonperforming dummy variable
on region fixed effects for the treated and control groups over the same period.
Figure 2.4: Regression coefficients and confidence intervals after controlling for region and
bank-unit fixed effects
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Figure 2.4 plots the effect of an interruption in the relationship between a loan officer and a firm on the non-
performing dummy variable. The coefficients are obtained from a regression of the nonperforming dummy
on the treatment indicator and on region and bank-unit fixed effects. Bars show 95% confidence intervals.
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Table 2.3: Summary statistics and Difference-in-Difference coefficients for firms in ex-
posed and control areas - Match on the zip code
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean values for Mean values for p - value Coefficient
Control areas Exposed areas on Difference from DiD
Total Assets 2,046,750.4 1,825,612.9 (0.053) -1,198.2
(2,213,766.2) (2,042,689.0) (42,739.4)
Total Debt 498,087.1 458,946.9 (0.273) 12,978.2
(1,031,146.5) (974,348.2) (13,685.6)
Shareholders Funds 906,964.1 780,377.7 (0.015) -18,101.5
(1,336,612.6) (1,086,455.0) (21,782.0)
Number of Employees 13.33 11.86 (0.034) -0.131
(15.84) (12.78) (0.317)
EBIT 95,948.5 70,551.1 (0.138) -2,360.2
(215,807.3) (186,164.2) (6,868.1)
EBIT (Growth Rate) -0.450 -0.0356 (0.368) 2.070
(29.85) (8.002) (3.758)
Net Income 35,171.8 20,397.8 (0.396) -2,071.4
(162,093.6) (146,359.9) (5,756.2)
Net Income -0.482 -1.015 (0.252) -0.632
(Growth Rate) (11.70) (25.73) (0.976)
Operating Revenue 1,640,175.0 1,430,693.6 (0.205) 27,648.1
(2,496,198.6) (2,291,917.3) (30,733.6)
Sales 1,609,808.0 1,401,415.3 (0.205) 25,852.7
(2,476,738.2) (2,267,099.8) (30,432.5)
Gross Profit 440,155.2 374,192.1 (0.102) -1,232.8
(584,430.4) (528,494.3) (16,640.0)
Cash Flow 95,235.7 79,114.4 (0.094) -1,455.9
(194,803.9) (171,806.5) (7,490.2)
Return on Shareholders 12.50 5.947 (0.259) -1.996
Funds (%) (78.81) (72.12) (4.009)
Return on Total 3.153 2.784 (0.298) -0.161
Assets (%) (13.62) (13.74) (0.652)
Profit Margin (%) 2.185 1.091 (0.527) 0.0524
(20.73) (21.09) (0.652)
The data source for this table is the Amadeus Bureau van Dijk database. This table in columns
1 and 2 displays the mean values and standard deviations for firms located in zip-code ar-
eas where a bank unit closed (exposed areas) and firms located in zip-code areas where a
unit remained open (control areas). Column 3 reports the p-value for the difference between
Columns 1 and 2. p-values are obtained from a regression of the main variable on an indicator
of whether the firm is located at the zip-code area where a bank unit closed, and region fixed
effects. Column 4 presents the estimate coefficients from difference-in-difference regressions
on the firms’ variables. All variables and estimations are based on 2012–2015 values.
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Table 2.4: Effect on renegotiating a loan (extensive margin)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post ∗ Treat -0.231∗∗ -0.262∗∗∗ -0.236∗∗ -0.308∗∗∗
(0.0879) (0.0783) (0.114) (0.0744)
Observations 12,540 12,540 7,220 11,023
R2 0.284 0.287 0.042 0.302
Firm F.E. X X
Bank Unit F.E. X X X X
Region F.E. X
Year F.E. X
Region ∗ Year F.E. X X X
Lagged log of EBITDA X
Lagged log of Total Balance X
Lagged log of Total Assets X
Cluster Level Bank Unit
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table displays the results from estimating equation 1.1. The dependent
variable is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm i renegotiated a
loan at time t and zero otherwise. The dummy variable Treat is equal to one
if the firm experienced an interruption in its relationship with the loan offi-
cer due to the bank unit closure, and zero otherwise. The dummy variable
Post is equal to one if the year of the observation is after the reorganization
(either 2014 or 2015) and zero if it is before the reorganization (either 2012
or 2013). The bottom of the table depicts information on the fixed effects
and the control variables included. Standard errors are corrected for cluster-
ing at the bank-unit level.
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Table 2.5: Effect on variables related to loan performance - Only renegotiated loans
(1) (2) (3)
Log of Days Past Due Nonperforming Log of Total Provision
over Remaining Days (Dummy) per Total Balance
Post ∗ Treat 1.576∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.696∗∗∗
(0.176) (0.0395) (0.216)
Observations 5,368 5,368 5,368
R2 0.013 0.043 0.123
Firm F.E. X X X
Bank Unit F.E. X X X
Region ∗ Year F.E. X X X
Cluster Level Bank Unit
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table displays the results from estimating equation 1.1 only for firms that renegotiated a
loan over the sample period for three variables related to loan performance. The observations
included in the analysis are the loans that were renegotiated at least once during the sample
period. Each column shows the estimated results for a different dependent variable. Column
1 presents the estimated result for the log of days past due a loan payment over the number of
remaining days. Column 2 is the estimated result for a nonperforming dummy variable that
is equal to one if the loan is characterized as nonperforming and zero otherwise. Column 3
presents the result on the log of total value of loan-loss provision over total loan balance. The
dummy variable Treat is equal to one if the firm experienced an interruption on its relationship
with the loan officer due to the bank-unit closure, and zero otherwise. The dummy variable
Post is equal to one if the year of the observation is after the reorganization (either 2014 or
2015) and zero if it is before the reorganization (either 2012 or 2013). In the baseline regres-
sions, firm, bank-unit, and region∗year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are corrected
for clustering at the bank-unit level.
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Table 2.6: Unconditional effect on loans’ performance
(1) (2) (3)
Log of Days Past Due Nonperforming Log of Total Provision
over Remaining Days (Dummy) per Total Balance
Post ∗ Treat -0.140 0.0951∗∗∗ 0.0198
(0.107) (0.0308) (0.0247)
Observations 14,540 14,540 14,538
R2 0.048 0.164 0.209
Firm F.E. X X X
Bank unit F.E. X X X
Region ∗ Year F.E. X X X
Cluster Level Bank unit
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table displays the results from estimating equation 1.1 for all loans that firms hold over
the sample period. The observations included in the analysis are the new loans, loans that were
renegotiated, and old loans that were not renegotiated. The dependent variables are the log of
days past due over the number of remaining days, a nonperforming dummy variable, and the
log of total provision over total balance for the loans that firm i had at year t. The dummy
variable Treat is equal to one if the firm experienced an interruption in its relationship with
the loan officer due to the bank-unit closure ,and zero otherwise. The dummy variable Post is
equal to one if the year of the observation is after the reorganization (either 2014 or 2015) and
zero if it is before the reorganization (either 2012 or 2013). Firm, bank-unit, and region∗year
fixed effects are included. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the bank-unit level.
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Figure 2.5: Renegotiation Dummy - Regression coefficients and confidence intervals after
controlling for region and bank-unit fixed effects
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Figure 2.5 plots the effect of an interruption in the relationship between a loan officer and a firm on the
renegotiation dummy variable. The coefficients are obtained from a regression of the renegotiation dummy
on the treatment indicator and on region and bank-unit fixed effects. Bars show 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 2.6: Days Past Due over Remaining Days - Regression coefficients and confidence
intervals after controlling for region and bank-unit fixed effects
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Figure 2.6 plots the effect of an interruption in the relationship between a loan officer and a firm on the log of
days past due over remaining days for the loans that were renegotiated in the post-period. The coefficients are
obtained from a regression of the ratio on the treatment indicator and on region and bank-unit fixed effects.
Bars show 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 2.7: Nonperforming Dummy - Regression coefficients and confidence intervals after
controlling for region and bank-unit fixed effects
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Figure 2.7 plots the effect of an interruption in the relationship between a loan officer and a firm on the
nonperforming dummy variable for the loans that were renegotiated in the post-period. The coefficients
are obtained from a regression of the nonperforming dummy on the treatment indicator and on region and
bank-unit fixed effects. Bars show 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 2.8: Total Provision per Total Balance - Regression coefficients and confidence
intervals after controlling for region and bank-unit fixed effects
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Figure 2.8 plots the effect of an interruption in the relationship between a loan officer and a firm on the log of
the total provision per total balance for the loans that were renegotiated in the post-period. The coefficients
are obtained from a regression of ratio on the treatment indicator and on region and bank-unit fixed effects.
Bars show 95% confidence intervals.
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Table 2.7: Comparison of pre-period mean values for treated and control groups - Only
firms that renegotiated a loan
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Control Treated p - value
on Difference
Loan-Related Variables:
Total Balance 950,778.6 812,330.8 (0.656)
(1,521,659.9) (1,286,015.7)
Interest Rate 0.0632 0.0665 (0.328)
(0.0339) (0.0335)
Days Remaining (Maturity) 402.8 565.2 (0.561)
(839.2) (1062.5)
Total Collateral Value 790,269.9 797,576.3 (0.749)
(1,387,600.2) (1,356,898.3)
Unsecured Loan (Dummy) 0.340 0.339 (0.942)
(0.443) (0.462)
Secure Type of Collateral 0.467 0.510 (0.917)
(0.445) (0.455)
Performance-Related Variables:
Nonperforming (Dummy) 0.122 0.140 (0.254)
(0.327) (0.347)
Days Delayed over Remaining Days 13.10 19.76 (0.266)
(69.75) (68.74)
Total Provision per Total Exposure 0.136 0.156 (0.618)
(2.007) (0.700)
Ratio of Loans Transferred 0.462 0.434 (0.000)
to NPL specialized unit (0.00107) (0.00126)
Debtor’s Financial Information:
Total Assets 10,413,859.5 6,882,262.0 (0.187)
(15,273,643.4) (7,440,389.4)
Total Debt 7,333,025.7 5,330,367.5 (0.134)
(11,067,786.7) (4,948,417.3)
Total Equity 3,402,715.3 2,163,741.2 (0.459)
(6,372,251.9) (3,981,664.0)
EBITDA 1,044,784.6 601,476.2 (0.479)
(26,063,090.9) (2,663,656.7)
Leverage (Debt over Assets) 0.714 0.719 (0.521)
(0.321) (0.241)
This table displays the mean values and standard deviations for the treated and control
groups only for firms that renegotiated at least one loan. Column 3 reports the p-value
for the difference between Columns 1 and 2. p-values are obtained from a regression of
the main variable on a treatment indicator and region fixed effects. All variables and es-
timations are based on the 2012–2013 values.
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Table 2.8: Identify possible selection on renegotiation
(1) (2) (3)
Whole Sample Only control group Only treated group
pre- & post-period post-period post-period
Renegotiation Renegotiation Renegotiation
All variables are in lagged logs:
Firm Variables:
EBITDA growth rate 0.000147 -0.0000467 0.00102∗∗∗
(0.000145) (0.000300) (0.000328)
Total Assets 0.000613∗∗ 0.000570∗∗ 0.000574
(0.000229) (0.000228) (0.000685)
Total Debt 0.000853∗∗∗ 0.000802∗∗∗ 0.00141
(0.000191) (0.000192) (0.000976)
Leverage 0.000635∗∗∗ 0.000602∗∗ 0.00132∗
(0.000205) (0.000221) (0.000763)
Debt over EBITDA 0.000653∗∗∗ 0.000706∗∗∗ 0.000849
(0.000134) (0.000119) (0.000715)
Loan Variables:
Total Balance 0.00136∗∗∗ 0.00169∗∗∗ 0.00229∗∗∗
(0.000186) (0.000190) (0.000638)
Total Provision 0.00166∗∗∗ 0.00186∗∗∗ 0.00172∗∗∗
(0.000148) (0.000190) (0.000572)
Days Past Due 0.00118∗∗∗ 0.00121∗∗∗ 0.000122
(0.000120) (0.000135) (0.000337)
Bank Unit F.E. X X X
Region ∗ Year F.E. X X X
Cluster Level Bank Unit
This table displays the estimated coefficients from separate regressions of the renegotiation
dummy variable on firm and loan variables. The independent variables are constructed as the
firm’s rank within bank unit based on each variable’s value at the year before the transfer.
Bank-unit and region∗year fixed effects are included, and standard errors are clustered at the
bank-unit level. Column 1 reports the estimated coefficients for the whole sample (treated and
control groups over the whole period). Column 2 reports the coefficients for the control group
in the post-period. Column 3 reports the coefficients for the treated group in the post-period.
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Figure 2.9: Density of the firm’s rank within bank unit based on profitability
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Density distribution if borrower renegotiated a loan
D
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ty
 
Density of the firm’s rank within bank unit based on the year-before-the-transfer log of
EBITDA separately for treated and control firms as well as for those that renegotiated a
loan in the post-period and those that didn’t.
118
Table 2.9: Summary statistics and Difference-in-Difference coefficients for firms in ex-
posed and control areas - Exclude Attica and match on the zip code
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean values for Mean values for p - value Coefficient
Control areas Exposed areas on Difference from DiD
Total Assets 1,626,610.8 2,014,598.6 (0.399) 87,059.6
(1,743,132.7) (2,138,976.2) (71,485.0)
Total Debt 355,360.0 549,881.4 (0.110) -19,373.3
(790,474.9) (1,038,056.8) (17,135.4)
Shareholders funds 785,544.4 907,094.8 (0.814) 33,374.6
(1,189,319.0) (1,129,909.4) (25,500.5)
Number of Employees 11.37 12.33 (0.459) 0.0734
(12.07) (13.80) (0.588)
EBIT 83,964.2 60,042.6 (0.114) 14,415.8
(172,477.7) (169,693.1) (12,099.1)
EBIT -3.783 -0.167 (0.161) 26.74
(Growth Rate) (79.72) (9.234) (26.61)
Net Income 32,158.8 9,409.9 (0.558) 9,655.2
(137,600.4) (138,692.2) (8,291.5)
Net Income -1.283 -0.942 (0.782) 1.042
(Growth Rate) (16.41) (20.60) (0.975)
Operating revenue 1,219,683.1 1,503,067.8 (0.597) 70,398.0
(1,796,479.7) (2,435,916.8) (49,835.7)
Sales 1,189,756.5 1,474,594.3 (0.576) 63,702.5
(1,794,288.1) (2,414,726.8) (50,256.1)
Gross Profit 374,294.3 334,154.7 (0.436) -4,988.0
(454,295.2) (475,334.0) (37,769.4)
Cash Flow 88,236.9 81,123.2 (0.192) 5,758.8
(175,649.1) (168,534.7) (14,592.4)
Return on Shareholders 6.544 -0.434 (0.146) 0.869
Funds (%) (74.48) (61.08) (13.30)
Return on Total 3.821 1.522 (0.180) 0.744
Assets (%) (14.44) (11.76) (1.113)
Profit Margin (%) 3.447 -0.876 (0.143) 0.906
(21.71) (20.89) (0.814)
The data source for this table is the Amadeus Bureau van Dijk database, and it excludes the
Attica region. The sample is restricted to areas where firms are similar. Columns 1 and 2 show
the mean values and standard deviations for firms located in the zip code areas where a bank-
unit closed (exposed areas) and firms located in the zip code areas where a unit remained open
(control areas). Column 3 reports the p-value for the difference between Columns 1 and 2. p-
values are obtained from a regression of the main variable on an indicator of whether the firm
is located at the zip code area where a bank-unit closed and region fixed effects. Column 4
presents the estimate coefficients from difference-in-difference regressions on the firms’ vari-
ables. All variables and estimations are based on 2012–2015 values.
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Figure 2.10: Density distribution of the dependence ratio
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Figure 2.10 plots the density distribution of the dependence ratio as measured in 2013.
The dependence ratio is defined as the ratio of the total balance that a firm has at this bank over the total bank
debt of the firm.
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Table 2.12: Effect on renegotiating a loan (extensive margin) - Based on relationship
strength
Closer Relationship Less Close Relationship
(1) (2)
Renegotiation Renegotiation
Post ∗ Treat -0.280∗∗ -0.289∗∗
(0.105) (0.132)
Observations 2,106 6,991
R2 0.296 0.259
Firm F.E. X X
Bank Unit F.E. X X
Region ∗ Year F.E. X X
Cluster Level Bank Unit
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table displays the results from estimating equation 1.1 separately for
firms with a closer relationship with the bank and for firms with a less
close relationship. Firms with a closer relationship are defined those with
dependence ratio above 50% in 2013. As firms with a less close relation-
ship, are defined those with dependence ratio below 20% in 2013. The
dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to one if firm i renegotiated
a loan at time t and zero otherwise. The dummy variable Treat is equal
to one if the firm experienced an interruption in its relationship with the
loan officer due to the bank-unit closure, and zero otherwise. The dummy
variable Post is equal to one if the year of the observation is after the reor-
ganization (either 2014 or 2015) and zero if it is before the reorganization
(either 2012 or 2013). The bottom of the table depicts information on the
fixed effects and the control variables included. Standard errors are cor-
rected for clustering at the bank-unit level.
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Table 2.14: Summary statistics for interactions in 2013
mean sd min p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 max
Number of loans 3.624004 3.505157 1 1 1 2 5 11 31
Number of interactions 3.630204 3.524094 0 1 1 2 5 11 29
Number of new loans 1.821081 2.249178 0 0 0 1 3 6 14
Number of renegotiations 1.809123 2.236438 0 0 1 1 2 6 23
This table displays the summary statistics of the number of loans, interactions, new loans, and
renegotiations that a firm has per year. An interaction is defined as either the issuance of a new
loan or a renegotiation of a loan.
Figure 2.11: Density of number of interactions
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Figure 2.11 plots the density distributions of the number of loans, interactions, new loans, and renegotiations
that a firm has per year. An interaction is defined as either the issuance of a new loan or a renegotiation of a
loan.
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Table 2.15: Effect on renegotiating a loan (extensive margin) - By number of interactions
in 2013
More than two interactions Two or less interactions
(1) (2)
Renegotiation Renegotiation
Post ∗ Treat 0.270∗∗∗ -0.373∗∗∗
(0.0946) (0.0517)
Observations 5,141 7,626
R2 0.384 0.164
Firm F.E. X X
Bank Unit F.E. X X
Region ∗ Year F.E. X X
Cluster Level Bank Unit
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table displays the results from estimating equation 1.1 separately for firms
that had more than two interactions with the bank in 2013 and for firms that had
two or fewer interactions in 2013. An interaction is defined as either the issuance
of a new loan or a renegotiation of an existing loan. The dependent variable is
a dummy variable that is equal to one if firm i renegotiated a loan at time t and
zero otherwise. The dummy variable Treat is equal to one if the firm experienced
an interruption in its relationship with the loan officer due to the bank unit clo-
sure, and zero otherwise. The dummy variable Post is equal to one if the year of
the observation is after the reorganization (either 2014 or 2015) and zero if it is
before the reorganization (either 2012 or 2013). The bottom of the table depicts
information on the fixed effects and the control variables included. Standard er-
rors are corrected for clustering at the bank-unit level.
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Figure 2.12: Density distribution of the firm’s relative size
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Figure 2.12 plots the density distribution of the firm’s relative size as a corporate client within bank unit. The
measure of firm’s relative size is the ratio of the firm’s total balance at the bank unit over the total amount of
loans that each bank unit manages in 2014.
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Table 2.17: Effect on renegotiating a loan (extensive margin) - By firm’s relative size as
bank’s corporate client within unit in 2014
Smaller balance Larger balance
(1) (2)
Renegotiation Renegotiation
Post ∗ Treat -0.385∗∗∗ -0.102
(0.0540) (0.116)
Observations 10,296 2,937
R2 0.264 0.389
Firm F.E. X X
Bank Unit F.E. X X
Region ∗ Year F.E. X X
Cluster Level Bank Unit
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table displays the results from estimating equation 1.1
separately for firms that had a smaller balance at the bank
unit in 2014 and for firms that had a larger balance. Larger
firms are defined as those whose balance at the specific bank
unit accounts for at least 1% of the total amount of corporate
loans that the unit manages. The rest of the sample is de-
fined as relatively smaller firms. The dependent variable is a
dummy variable that is equal to one if firm i renegotiated a
loan at time t and zero otherwise. The dummy variable Treat
is equal to one if the firm experienced an interruption in its
relationship with the loan officer due to the bank-unit closure,
and zero otherwise. The dummy variable Post is equal to one
if the year of the observation is after the reorganization (ei-
ther 2014 or 2015) and zero if it is before the reorganization
(either 2012 or 2013). The bottom of the table depicts infor-
mation on the fixed effects and the control variables included.
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the bank-unit
level.
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Table 2.19: Effect on renegotiating a loan (extensive margin) - By firm’s pre-period perfor-
mance
Delayed loan payment On time loan payment
(1) (2)
Renegotiation Renegotiation
Post ∗ Treat -0.301∗∗∗ -0.189∗
(0.0883) (0.107)
Observations 3,764 9,469
R2 0.420 0.245
Firm F.E. X X
Bank Unit F.E. X X
Region ∗ Year F.E. X X
Cluster Level Bank Unit
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table displays the results from estimating equation 1.1 separately for
firms that delayed a loan payment in 2013 and for firms that paid their
loans on time in 2013. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that is
equal to one if firm i renegotiated a loan at time t and zero otherwise. The
dummy variable Treat is equal to one if the firm experienced an interrup-
tion in its relationship with the loan officer due to the bank-unit closure,
and zero otherwise. The dummy variable Post is equal to one if the year of
the observation is after the reorganization (either 2014 or 2015) and zero
if it is before the reorganization (either 2012 or 2013). The bottom of the
table depicts information on the fixed effects and the control variables in-
cluded. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the bank-unit level.
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Chapter 3
Securing the Unsecured:
Do stronger creditor rights affect firms’ access to credit?
3.1 Introduction
In the recent years, policymakers around the world have debated about the importance of
institutions on economic growth and on fostering entrepreneurship. Several academic pa-
pers have also pointed out the significance of institutions, such as efficient and transparent
justice sector, legal investor protection and credit bureaus, in supporting the business en-
vironment and credit supply both from a theoretical and from an empirical point of view.
Porta et al. 1998, with their seminal paper “Law and Finance” and the subsequent litera-
ture examined the link between creditor rights and financial development. Weak protection
of creditors’ rights has been seen by many economists as a significant source of financial
frictions and several papers have focused on bankruptcy law and its effects on financial
markets with controversial findings. In this context, the broad research question that this
paper contributes is what is the impact of a financial reform on the businesses’ capital
structure.
In an attempt to answer this broad research question, I employ the passage of a reform
on “Execution of Cash Assets” in Croatia in 2011 as a quasi-natural experiment to examine
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how a more efficient enforcement mechanism determines a firm’s leverage level, the access
to credit, the total volume of loans per firm, and the investment level. Starting from the
mid-2000s the Croatian authorities embarked on a major reform effort in response to EU
concerns about a weak justice system and enforcement mechanism. Among other adopted
reforms, Croatian policymakers changed the way that judicial decisions on cash assets
were enforced. After the enforcement reform in 2011, the Financial Agency (FINA) under
the Ministry of Finance is responsible for enforcing the collection of monetary judgments
once the creditor obtains a writ of execution through courts. An improved system of cash
collection was expected to improve the business environment and increase credit supply.
FINA, in collaboration with the Croatian National Bank and other banks, uses a database
of banks and other financial institutions (i.e. credit unions) that covers deposits and savings
accounts linked with the personal identification number of the account holders. It has also
the power to electronically enforce payment orders against debtors’ bank accounts and in
favor of creditors once the writ of execution is forwarded to it. Accounts are seized if
holdings are insufficient to pay off the writ of execution. However, certain portions of the
accounts may be protected, such as portions of salaries that are considered essential for
basic living expenses. The importance of this reform is that it affected only unsecured
creditors as it didn’t apply to any collateralized obligation.
Croatia is an appropriate setting to test these research questions since the variation of
the courts’ efficiency is very wide. I employ a unique dataset on courts’ efficiency in 2010,
a year prior the reform, on the specific type of cases that were affected mostly by the reform.
Based on courts efficiency, I define as treated the firms that are located in towns with more
efficient courts as in these courts a possible case will be heard within a year and the change
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on the enforcement mechanism will have a greater impact on them. As control group, I
define the firms that are located in towns with less efficient courts as in these courts it will
take two to three years for a case to be heard and therefore the enforcement reform won’t
have a significant impact. Based on this characterization, I apply a simple Difference-in-
Differences method to estimate the effect of the reform on leverage. Since both groups are
treated by the reform, the estimated results could be seen as a downward biased estimation
of the true results.
The baseline results show that firms operating in towns with more efficient courts have
an increase in their leverage ratios after the reform compared to firms operating in towns
with less efficient courts. Moreover, I estimate the impact of the reform on access to credit.
In order to do that I construct a dummy variable, Non Zero Leverage, that is equal to
one when a firm has positive leverage and zero otherwise. This variable can be seen as a
measure of the extensive margin of the reform and captures the impact of the reform on
firms that prior to the reform had zero leverage. I find that firms that operate in towns with
efficient courts have higher probability to have positive leverage after the reform compared
to firms that operate in towns with inefficient courts. Another variable that is examined is
the log of total debt and I find similar results. Lastly, in an attempt to answer the question
of where do the firms spend the extra funds they raise, I test the impact of the reform on
other firm outcome variables and I find that the reform has a significant impact on the
investment levels. In particular, firms in towns with efficient courts seem to have higher
capital expenditures after the reform compared to firms in towns with inefficient courts.
Overall, the main conclusion is that firms affected more by the reform, borrow more, have
easier access to credit, and invest more.
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The reform is expected to benefit more firms with low intensity on tangible assets. To
test this, I create an industries index based on the ratio of tangible fixed assets over total
assets and I define as treated the firms that belong in industries in the lower end of the rank
and as control the firms that belong in industries in the higher end. Then, a Difference-in-
Difference-in-Differences analysis is applied and similar patterns are found. Moreover, I
assess the potential impact of any regional macroeconomic conditions using two different
approaches; the first is to add lagged unemployment variables as control variables and the
second is to match the regions based on their unemployment level. The results remain
robust on these specifications. Lastly, to identify the size of the firms that are affected more
by the reform, the analysis is repeated for three different categories of sizes. Based on this,
it appears that the medium sized firms are predominantly driving the estimated results.
3.2 Related Literature & Project’s Contribution
This paper contributes to the legal and financial development literature that was pioneered
by Porta et al. 1998. Since then several papers have examined the relationship between
creditor rights protection and credit market development 1. Haselmann, Pistor, and Vig
2009 find that after a legal change, banks increase the supply of credit and that foreign-
owned banks respond more strongly than domestic. The effect of legal institutions on
financial contracts has also been examined in several papers using a cross-country set-
ting. Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998 show that in countries with more efficient
legal systems more firms use long-term external financing while they have lower profit
1Levine 1998, Levine 1999, Djankov et al. 2003, Djankov et al. 2008, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Maksimovic
1998
136
rates. Giannetti 2003 and Qian and Strahan 2007 find that stronger creditor rights promote
leverage and in particular long-term debt. Davydenko and Franks 2008 find that changes in
bankruptcy codes and laws affect contracts by analyzing recovery rates in the U.K., France,
and Germany. Most of these papers focus on cross-country comparisons and use country
level aggregate data. Even though the results and the contribution of these papers is signif-
icant, the results may be biased as they could be correlated with other unobserved country
variables that also affect financial development.
This paper is more closely related to recent research work that has used within-country
firm specific data to analyze the effect of a change in the enforcement quality and in the
contracting environment. Visaria 2009 exploits the introduction of specialized debt recov-
ery tribunals in India that speed up the resolution of debt recovery. Using loan level data
and a cross-state variation, as the program was introduced in different states at different
times, he finds that the introduction of debt recovery tribunals increases the probability of
loan repayment and lowers the cost of bank credit for firms. Overall, Visaria argues that
the speedier the processing of debt recovery, the lower the interest rates charged per unit of
loan.
Lilienfeld-Toal, Mookherjee, and Visaria 2012 argue that when credit supply is inelas-
tic, the existence of specialized courts has an adverse distributive impact by increasing
access to credit for big firms and reducing access to credit for small firms. They docu-
mented this result both theoretically and empirically using Indian firm level data and the
same judicial reform that was studied before by Visaria 2009. On the empirical side, they
show that post the reform new long-term borrowing and fixed assets expanded for large
firms but for small firms it decreased causing a redistribution effect on credit. Moreover, in
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a paper by Gopalan, Mukherjee, and Singh 2016 that used the same setting with Lilienfeld-
Toal, Mookherjee, and Visaria 2012 and Visaria 2009 it is shown that when the debt con-
tract enforcement costs are lower, long-term debt increases while short-term debt and trade
credit increases. The firms that are affected the most are those that borrowed from multiple
lenders, had abnormally short-term debt maturity structures, and are smaller in size.
Vig 2013 examines the effect of law on debt structure. More specifically, he uses a
securitization reform in India that strengthened the rights of secured creditors by allowing
them to bypass the judicial process to liquidate the assets of the debtors. In particular, by
examining a cross-sectional variation based on firms’ asset tangibility and period when the
reform was implemented, he found that the reform caused a decrease in secured debt, total
debt, debt maturity, and asset growth and an increase in liquidity in firms. The observed
changes are larger for firms with a higher proportion of tangible assets, as these firms are
more affected by the secured transactions law. The fact that firms reduced secured debt
relative to other forms of financing suggests that firms may have been worse off. Both
Lilienfeld-Toal, Mookherjee, and Visaria 2012 and Vig 2013 are part of a literature that
argues that strengthening creditors rights makes it more difficult for smaller firms to access
credit.
Ponticelli and Alencar 2016 use micro level data to show the importance of court en-
forcement on the financial reform effectiveness. They examine the effect of a bankruptcy
reform in Brazil that increased secured creditors chances to recover their claims when a firm
is liquidated. Using an instrument to measure potential extra-jurisdiction and variation in
court congestion across Brazilian districts, they find that the access to credit, investment
and productivity are increased in districts with lower court congestion.
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A small but rising literature has analyzed the effect of collateral reforms. Haselmann,
Pistor, and Vig 2009 find that lending increases after bankruptcy and collateral reforms are
implemented in Eastern European countries. They also identify the importance of collateral
and differentiate an effect of a collateral law from a bankruptcy law arguing that collateral
is a very important variable especially for emerging economies.
Campello and Larrain 2015 contribute both to the cross-country and the within-country
literature by examining a recent wave of reforms related to collateral across Eastern Euro-
pean countries. They examine in detail a legal reform in Romania that allowed movable
assets to be pledged as collateral. They document that the reform improved more the busi-
ness environment for firms with more intensive use of movable assets and increased access
to credit. Calomiris et al. 2017 analyze the problem from the creditors’ side using loan-
level data with specific information on the assets that were pledged as collateral. They
find that in countries with weak collateral laws the loan-to-values of loans collateralized
with movable assets are lower and that production shifts towards the immovable-intensive
sectors creating distortions in the allocation of resources. By looking into a collateral law
reform in Slovakia, they confirm their main finding.
The main contribution of this paper is to examine the impact of a reform that affected
mostly the unsecured creditors. This is an important contribution to the literature as the
majority of small and medium enterprises around the world have limited access to tangible
fixed assets that could be pledged as credible collateral. For that reason, it is worth exam-
ining the impact of a reform that made easier the collection of cash assets and by this way
increased the probability to repay an unsecured obligation. In addition, this paper provides
evidence from Croatia, a country that has not been examined in this literature before, and
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uses proprietary data to estimate courts efficiency.
3.3 Institutional Setting
In June 2004, the European Council granted the status of candidate country to Croatia and
negotiations for accession were opened in October 2005. On July 1, 2013 Croatia became
the 28th member of the European Union (EU) having undertaken significant reforms dur-
ing its long EU accession process. In order to achieve this significant national objective
was required for Croatia to fulfill ‘closing benchmarks’ agreed with the EU across all sec-
tors of the state and the economy with justice reforms to be perhaps the most sensitive
and contentious of others that were implemented. In June 2007, the European Commis-
sion issued a screening report covering Chapter 23 (“Judiciary and Fundamental Rights”)
which provided a snapshot of Croatia’s legislation, judicial practices and institutional ar-
rangements, and the reforms necessary to fulfill the closing benchmarks. As a result of the
reforms, many new laws and institutions are now in place in Croatia, yielding a stronger
justice system.
One set of these reforms aimed to improve the enforcement of judicial decisions. Even
though it was not a requirement for the EU accession, the Ministry of Finance took ad-
vantage of the reforms momentum and passed an Act on Execution of Cash Assets which
entered into force on January 1, 2011. Under this new Act the enforcement of judicial
decisions over cash assets was accelerated as it was centralized under one institution, the
Financial Agency (FINA). An improved system of cash collection was expected to improve
the business environment and increase credit supply.
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Before the passage of the Act the enforcement procedure was as follows: When a
debtor defaulted on a liability, the creditor had to initiate a judicial procedure at the debtor’s
competent court. Once the trial was completed and a valid writ of execution was issued
from the courts, the creditor had to request from a financial institution (bank) to transfer
the specified cash amount from the debtor’s specified account number to the creditors by
providing the required documentation including the enforcement writ from the court. The
main issue with the previous enforcement procedure was that the writ obtained from the
courts referred to a unique account number and the debtor had the incentive, if he wanted to
strategically default on an obligation, to open a new account, transfer the cash, and by this
way avoid paying back the creditor. The banks will not agree to provide any information
about the existence of any other account linked to same person or company as these are
considered confidential information. At the end, the creditor will be left with no option to
receive back the payment.
After the passage of the Act on Execution of Cash Assets, the creditor will still need
to initiate a judicial procedure to get a valid writ of execution form the debtor’s competent
court but the main innovation of the reform is observed on the way the decision is enforced.
First, the writ of execution has been generalized and applies to any account that the person
or the company holds in any financial institution (bank or credit union) that operates in
Croatia. The novel difference is that once the creditor has received a valid writ from the
courts, he will have to request from the Financial Agency (FINA) to transfer the specified
amount from any account that the debtor holds to the creditors account. The Act introduced
also a single methodology to estimate the interest rate for the amount owed.
The significant part is that the creditor gets one single order of payment that applies to
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all the accounts that the debtor has. FINA, in collaboration with the Croatian National Bank
and other banks, holds a unified electronic database of deposits and savings accounts linked
with the personal identification number of the account holders, both individuals and cor-
porations. The database includes the accounts on all commercial banks and credit unions
operating in Croatia. FINA is also enabled to electronically enforce payment orders against
debtors’ bank accounts and in favor of creditors once the writ of execution is forwarded to
it. The payment to the creditor is subsequently processed from any of the debtor’s accounts
that has enough cash to cover the debt otherwise the debtor’s accounts will be seized un-
til the overdue liabilities have been repaid. After the repayment has been fulfilled, FINA
informs the banks to unblock the debtor’s accounts.
However, certain portions of accounts may be protected and some transfers are allowed
to be made while the accounts are seized. These exemptions, where the execution is not
carried out, are payments to employees and former employees, operating costs (electricity,
water, etc.), purchase of goods for completed regular operations, tax payments. The pro-
hibited actions include rerouting cash and financial flows to another legal or natural person,
transactions which would be voidable in bankruptcy proceedings, transactions in whichever
form would result in a reduction of the debtor’s assets. Payments of any advances on profit
or dividends, payments of profits to the management or supervisory board or to employees
are also prohibited. Lastly, a debtor who has not settled its due liabilities is not allowed to
lend.
Overall, the implementation of the Act on Execution of Cash Assets had a significant
contribution as it altered the way that judicial decisions were enforced, improved the system
of debt collection and strengthened creditors’ rights. It is worth mentioning that when
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the new enforcement mechanism was adopted approximately 66% of outstanding debts
were over 360 days old and most likely not collectible, 630,021 writs were transferred to
FINA at the initiation of the new enforcement mechanism, while at the end of the first year
of implementation, on December 2011, 971,424 enforcement writs were processed. The
main impact of the reform is to promote trust between creditors and debtors, increase trust
in the judiciary, and harmonize the Croatian legislation with EU standards. By having one
institution responsible for transferring the cash amount owed and one unified database, the
reform aims to the faster collection of receivables and repayment of credit.
3.4 Data and Empirical Methodology
In the following sections, I use a Difference-in-Differences methodology on a firm-level
dataset to examine the effect of the enforcement reform on the firms leverage. Fist, I
describe the data used in the analysis. Next, I explain the institutional features used in
the identification strategy. Then, I present the results. Lastly, some robustness tests are
included.
Data
The firm-level dataset used in this paper comes from Amadeus, a dateset compiled by Bu-
reau van Dijk. In this dataset the financial statements (balance sheet and income statement)
of millions of firms operating in European countries are included. Amadeus data are col-
lected from local information providers, which in most cases are local registries. Croatia
has a very comprehensive and detailed dataset in Amadeus as all private companies reg-
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istered under the Commercial Court, which is necessary for an official settlement, are re-
quired to submit their annual financial information to the Register of Business Entities and
to Chamber of Commerce. The Register of Business Entities holds also a publicly avail-
able database with firm level information. In this paper the dataset used includes 368,430
observations, from 63,844 firms, covering the period from 2008 until 2013.
The data regarding court efficiency measures come from the Croatian Ministry of Jus-
tice. The unique feature of this dataset is that it includes a detailed decomposition based on
the different types of cases as well as between incoming, pending and resolved. Moreover,
the dataset is from 2010, the year prior to the enforcement reform. This fact is very impor-
tant for the identification strategy as if the efficiency data would be from a more recent year,
a selection bias problem may arose. For identification purposes in this paper I look into
enforcement cases, as this is the type of cases that the enforcement reform is applied to,
and I estimate as a measure of efficiency the ratio of resolved over incoming plus previous
year backlog. Lastly, the unemployment data at regional level that are used as controls in
the analysis are taken from the Croatian Bureau of Statistics.
In Croatia there are 65 municipal courts that hear enforcement cases located in different
cities across 21 regions. In the analysis, Zagreb, the capital of Croatia, is excluded in
order to provide more accurate results and eliminate any possible bias that the inclusion
of the dominant city could cause. Table 3.1 shows the number of firms and the number
of observations operating in each city. By using the ratio of resolved over incoming plus
previous year backlog as measure of efficiency, I rank the cities where the municipal courts
are located as “efficient” court towns and “inefficient” court towns. An interesting feature
of this dataset is that the variation of the courts efficiency is relatively large. In particular,
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the “most inefficient” city has clearance ratio equal to 16% and the “most efficient” city has
clearance ratio equal to 84%. The average of the court efficiency measure is equal to 0.62
and the standard deviation is 0.14. To proceed with the analysis I define as “efficient” court
cities those with the top 40% clearance ratio (the measure varies from 84% to 69%) and
as “inefficient” court cities those with the lowest 40% clearance ratio (the measure varies
from 60% to 16%). In total 54 cities are included in the analysis.
The dataset contains a wide variety of industries that are similarly distributed in the
“efficient” court towns and in the “inefficient” ones. In particular, 24 industries are included
in the sample and Table 3.2 presents the number of firms per industry included in the two
categories as well as the total number of observations per industry.
The basic outcome variables are Leverage, Non Zero Leverage, and Log of Total Debt.
Leverage is defined as the ratio between total debt and the book value of total assets. Non
Zero Leverage is a dummy that is equal to 1 when leverage is postive (not zero leverage)
and equal to zero if the firm has no leverage. Log of Total Debt is the natural logarithm
of Short term plus Long term debt plus one. Another outcome variable that is included
in the analysis is the Log CAPEX, where the Capital Expenditures (CAPEX) is estimated
as the difference in Fixed Assets plus depreciation. Moreover, as Profitability is defined
the ratio of Earning Before Interest and Taxes(EBIT) to Total Assets. Table 3.3 presents
the summary statistics of Leverage, Non Zero Leverage, Total Debt, Log of Total Debt,
Capital Expenditures, Log of Capital Expenditures, Total Assets, Log of Total Assets, EBIT,
Profitability, and Sales for separately the “efficient” court towns and the “inefficient” court
towns. The average leverage overall in Croatia is 19.5%, while in the “efficient” court
towns is 19.9% and in the “inefficient” court towns is 19.1%. The fraction of Non Zero
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Leverage is also higher by 1.4% in the “efficient” court towns and it is equal to 50.2%,
while in the “inefficient” court towns is equal to 48.8%. On the contrary, the Log of Total
Assets, the EBIT and the Log of Sales are higher in the “inefficient” court towns. For
example, the average EBIT of the firms in the “efficient” court towns is 2.3% lower than
the average EBIT in the “inefficient” court towns.
Identification Strategy
In an attempt to identify the effect of an enforcement reform on leverage, I take advantage
of an important characteristic of the institutional setting to define the treatment and control
group and subsequently apply the Difference-in-Differences method.
The enforcement reform provided more security on the collection of cash assets after
the debtor had defaulted on a liability. The creditor still has to go through the court system
in order to receive the writ of execution and then request a money transfer from the debtor’s
bank accounts. Since the enforcement reform did not affect the way that courts operate, I
am going to use the measure of courts efficiency as an indicator to define the treatment
and control group. In particular, the treatment group consists of the firms that operate in
“efficient” court towns while the control group consists of the firms that operate in “inef-
ficient” court towns. The fact that supports the identification strategy here is that judicial
proceedings in the “inefficient” court towns take a long period of time, which may be up to
3 years, while in the “efficient” court towns a case will be heard in less than a year from the
submission date. Because in the “inefficient” court towns the proceedings are long and the
creditors are aware of this, the enforcement reform has a much lower impact. The creditors
146
may have a stronger belief that they will be able to collect the assets but they know that
there will be a long waiting time until they get the court decision on hand. On the contrary,
the creditors in the more “efficient” court towns are more affected by the enforcement re-
form as they know that the justice system works relatively well, the procedures are not
that lengthy and so they have stronger trust that they are going to receive the cash amount
owned back. It is significant here to mention that both groups are affected by the reform as
the enforcement reform covered the whole country, but the treatment group is supposed to
be affected more than the control. For that reason, the estimated results could be seen as a
downward biased estimation of the true impact.
Another important feature of the institutional setting is that firms cannot choose neither
the jurisdiction that they operate nor the creditor can choose the jurisdiction where the case
is submitted. The jurisdiction is defined by the location that the debtor’s firm is registered.
A potential identification flow is that it could be argued that firms choose ex-ante their
location based on courts efficiency and that could be a selection bias problem that would
drive the estimated results. Even though I don’t have a formal evidence to support the
contrary, I believe that the main factors that affect the location decision when they establish
a new firm are the market environment, the social network, and possibly other weather and
location conditions. Since most of the firms in the sample are small firms that operate only
at a local level and they don’t have an incentive to move their headquarters in a different
city, I think that the above argument is valid but I acknowledge that further evidence should
be provided.
After the assignment of treatment and control group based on the firm’s location, I esti-
mate the effect of the enforcement reform on the firms leverage by comparing the difference
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between the treatment and control group prior the reform (2008-2010) and after the reform
(2011-2013).
The baseline Difference-in-Differences model that is used to estimate the effect of
stricter enforcement is the following:
yi jt = αi + αt + δ(Postt ∗ Treat j) + εi jt (3.1)
where yi jt stands for the outcome variable of interest (e.g.Leverage, NonZeroLeverage,
LogTotalDebt) for firm i that is located in town j in year t. Treat j is a dummy variable that
is equal to one if the firm is located in a city with an “efficient” court (treatment group) and
is equal to zero if the firm is located in a city with an “inefficient” court (control group).
Postt is a dummy variable that is equal to zero before the reform is implemented (from
2008 to 2010) and equal to one after the reform is implemented (from 2011 to 2013).
The baseline specification includes firm fixed effects (αi) to capture any time-invariant
firm characteristics as well as year fixed effects (αt) to capture any aggregate time varying
shocks. The term εi jt is the error term. The coefficient of interest is δ and it measures
the pre-post difference in the outcome variable for the firms operating in “efficient” court
towns relative to the pre-post difference for the firms operating in “inefficient” court towns.
For the Difference-in-Difference methodology to estimate correctly the effect of the
enforcement reform on firms leverage, it is necessary to check whether the parallel trends
assumption holds, in other words whether possible outcome variables followed parallel
trends for both groups prior to the reform. The assumption that follows is that the difference
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between the trends of the two groups prior the reform would continue to be the same in the
future if the reform was not implemented. In that case any possible change in the difference
of the two trends will be caused by the reform. Figure 3.1 show the trends of the two groups
for the Leverage Ratio, the Non-Zero Leverage Dummy, and the Log of Total Debt.
3.5 Results
Results on Leverage Ratio
Based on the identification strategy described in detail above, I compare the level of lever-
age held by firms located in towns with efficient courts (treatment group) with the level
of leverage held by firms located in towns with inefficient courts (control group). Table
3.4 presents the results based on three different identification strategies. The first column
reports the results based on the basic regression on the whole sample with firm and year
fixed effects and robust standard errors. It seems that the reform increased the leverage
level in firms operating in towns with efficient courts by 0.46 percentage points more than
in firms operating in towns with inefficient courts. Given that the average leverage level is
19.5 percentage points an increase by 0.46 percentage points is relatively small but could
be economically significant for the firm’s performance especially when the firm is small.
It is important that the results remain robust to alternative specifications. The second
column presents the results when firm and industry-year fixed effects are included. The
industry-year fixed effects capture any common variation that could occur at the industry
level across years. Even though all industries are similarly distributed in the two groups,
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the results could be biased if leverage was increasing in an industry that is dominant in
towns included in the treatment group. As it is shown in Table 3.4, the impact of the
reform remains almost at the same level and statistically significant when industry-year
fixed effects are included. The third column presents the results with firm, industry and
region-year fixed effects. The variation to identify the treatment and control group is at
the town level and for that reason I include in the analysis region-year fixed effects to
capture any variation across years that could affect the region level. The results increase in
level and remain statistically significant. In particular, the firms that operate in towns with
efficient courts increase their leverage level by 0.59 percentage points more than firms that
operate in towns with inefficient courts and this effect is not driven by firm characteristics,
by changes at the industry level, and by other reasons that may affect the aggregate region
level.
The next three columns of table 3.4 present the results for the same three different spec-
ifications but for only the “small” firms. As small firms I use the characterization provided
by the Amadeus dataset. They define as small the firms that are below the fifth decile based
on three variables (turnover, total assets ∗ median value of turnover per employee of the
industry, number of employees ∗ median value of turnover per employee of the industry).
A smaller sub-samlpe (177,935 observations) consists of small firms and shows that this
is the dominant category of firms. It is important to notice whether the reform affected
mostly the small firms as this is the category that is assumed to have biggest difficulties
to access external funds. As it is shown, the results remain positive and increase both in
magnitude and in statistical significance. In particular, it seems that firms that operate in
towns with efficient courts have 0.58 percentage points more leverage after the reform than
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firms operating in towns with less efficient courts when I control for firm characteristic. As
in the analysis for the whole sample, the results remain positive and statistically significant
when industry-year fixed effects are included. Moreover, the estimated impact of the re-
form for small firms increases further when firm, industry and region-year fixed effects are
included. Under this specification, small firms in the treatment group have 0.69 percentage
points more leverage after the reform than small firms in the control group.
Results on Access to Credit
The second variable that the impact of the reform is examined is the access to leverage.
One of the most important aspects of the reform is that it strengthens the possibility to
collect cash assets and for that reason it makes the repayment of an unsecured loan more
possible. Due to this fact firms that didn’t have access to loans, as they couldn’t pledge fixed
assets as collateral, face a higher probability to receive a loan approval after the reform. In
order to evaluate the access to leverage, a dummy variable, named Non Zero Leverage, is
constructed that is equal to one when leverage is positive and zero when leverage is equal
to zero. To evaluate the impact of the enforcement on cash assets on access to leverage,
the same baseline regression is used with dependent variable the NonZeroLeverage dummy
variable.
The results are presented in Table 3.5. The first column includes the results for the
whole sample with firm and year fixed effects and it shows that firms located in towns with
efficient courts have 0.85 percentage points higher probability to have positive leverage
after the reform than firms located in towns with inefficient courts. The result is statistically
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and economically significant as it shows that building trust in the economy that a loan is
going to be repaid promotes leverage and gives access to bank financing to more firms.
It is important to notice that the results are robust when firm and industry-year fixed
effects are included to capture any common variations across industries. On the other hand,
the regression coefficient decreases in statistical significance when both firm, industry and
region-year fixed effects are included. This could be driven by the fact that access to loans
is promoted more in some regions contrary to others.
As before, the results are consistent when I control only for small firms. It is impor-
tant to notice that the coefficient of interest increases both in magnitude and in statistical
significance when I restrict the analysis only to small firms. It seems that small firms that
are located in towns with efficient courts have 1.05 percentage points higher probability
to have access to leverage than small firms located in towns with inefficient courts. The
results are robust when firm and industry-year fixed effects are included but they loose the
statistical significance when region-year fixed effects are included.
Results on Total Debt
Another important variable for the analysis is the level of the total debt that a firm uses.
For that reason the analysis is repeated for the natural logarithm of the total debt (LogTo-
talDebt). As total debt is defined the sum of the short term debt and of the long term debt
as presented in the firm’s balance sheet.
The variable that is used in the analysis is the natural logarithm of the total debt. Table
3.6 shows the estimated results. The results for the log of total debt are in the same direction
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as before. Firms operating in towns with efficient courts have 0.102 basis points higher
loans than firms operating in towns with inefficient courts. Given that the average value of
the log of total debt is 6.367 the economic impact of the reform is relatively small. The
results are statistically significant when we include firm and year fixed effects as well as
when firm and industry year fixed effects are included. The coefficient of interest decreases
in significance though when region year fixed effects are included.
When I repeat the analysis for small firms the results under all specifications are con-
sistent and increase both in magnitude and in statistical significance. For small firms that
operate in towns with efficient courts the logarithm of total debt increases by 0.127 basis
points more after the reform relative to firms that operate in towns with inefficient courts.
The results in this case are robust to industry-year fixed effects but they decrease in statis-
tical significance with region-year fixed effects.
Results on Investment
The evidence provided above shows that the reform had a significant effect on promoting
leverage and on increasing the amount of loans that firms had access to. Another important
aspect that needs to be examined is where did the firms spent the extra funds they had
access to through loans. For that reason the same analysis was repeated to identify where
the funds were spend. As it was expected the main variable the showed up significant in
the analysis was the investment level.
In particular, the analysis was repeated for the capital expenditures logarithmic level.
As the level of CAPEX is not provided in the Amadeus dataset, it was estimated indirectly
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by the sum of the depreciation and the difference of the fixed assets. The main variable that
was used in the analysis is the logarithm of the CAPEX. The results are presented in Table
3.7.
It appears that firms that borrowed more, invested more. Firms located in towns with
efficient courts invested more and the level of log capital expenditures increased by 0.118
basis points more than firms located in towns with inefficient courts after the reform. The
results are statistically significant when firm and year fixed effects are included as well as
with firm and industry-year fixed effects. The coefficient of interest decreases in signifi-
cance though with region-year fixed effects, as in the previous parts of the analysis.
In the columns four to six, the analysis is repeated but only for small firms. The results
remain consistent with the previous part, they are positive and statistically significant when
we add firm and year fixed effects as well as when we add firm and industry-year fixed
effects. As before, the statistical significance weakens when we include region year fixed
effects. An important observation that needs to be made is that when we eliminate the
sample for small firms the magnitude of the coefficient weakens. This is in contrast with
the results observed for the loans level and it raises a question that remains to be answered
of where were the extra funds spent.
The intuition and the economic significance of the results on investment are relatively
large. It is obvious on the analysis that firms who borrowed more and gained access to bank
funds, invested the amount raised on fixed assets. Since investment is an important driver
of the firm’s performance and of the local economy in general, the fact that more firms had
access to bank financing and that loans were spent on investment could have other general
equilibrium effects that need to be estimated.
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Analysis based on Industries Tangibility Index
The reform on enforcement on cash assets is supposed to benefit mostly the industries that
didn’t have any assets to pledge as collateral in order to get approval for a loan. These
industries are usually characterized by a very low intensity of tangible assets. Firms that
belong to these industries have in most cases low or zero tangible assets and for that reason
they don’t have any credible assets to pledge as collateral for a business loan. As the reform
was supposed to increase the probability to collect an unsecured loan, banks are expected
to offer a unsecured loan more easily and firms with less tangible assets are expected to
benefit the most.
In order to test this hypothesis and identify the effect of the reform on the industries
that were expected to benefit the most, I take advantage of the fact that some industries are
more intensive than others in their use for tangible assets. To do so empirically, I construct
an index of industries based on the ratio of tangible fixed assets over total assets. The data
that are used for the index construction come from firms based in Croatia and cover the
period 2008-2010 (pre-reform period). Then, I assign the industries at the lower end of the
tangibility index as the ones that are affected the most by the reform (“treatment group”)
while those at the higher end of the tangibility index as those that are affected the least
(“control group”).
The empirical methodology that was selected to test this result was a Difference-in-
Difference-in-Differences Methodology, with the first difference to be a simple pre-post
the reform, the second to be based on the firm location, and the third to be based on the
tangibility ranking. The firms that are assumed to be affected the most are the firms that
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are located in a town with efficient courts and are at the lower end of the tangibility index.
The regression that was used to test this is the following:
yi jzt = αi + αt + δ1(Postt ∗ Treat j ∗ Rankz) + δ2(Postt ∗ Treat j) + δ3(Postt ∗ Rankz)
+δ4(Treat j ∗ Rankz) + δ5 ∗ Postt + δ6 ∗ Treat j + δ7 ∗ Rankz + εi jzt
where yi jzt stands for the outcome variable of interest (e.g.Leverage, NonZeroLeverage,
LogTotalDebt, LogCAPEX) for firm i that is located in town j in year t and belongs in in-
dustry z. Treat j is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm is located in a town with
an “efficient” court and is equal to zero if the firm is located in a town with an “inefficient”
court. Rankz is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm belongs to an industry that
is at the lower end of the tangibility index and is equal to zero id the firm belongs to an
industry that is at the higher end of the tangibility index. Postt is a dummy variable that
is equal to zero before the reform is implemented (from 2008 to 2010) and equal to one
after the reform is implemented (from 2011 to 2013). The baseline specification includes
firm fixed effects (αi) to capture any time-invariant firm characteristics as well as year fixed
effects (αt) to capture any aggregate time varying shocks. The term εi jzt is the error term.
The coefficient of interest is δ1 and it measures the pre-post difference in the outcome vari-
able for the firms operating in “efficient” court towns and with low tangible assets relative
to the other firms that are affected less by the reform.
Table 3.8 presents the results from the above regression for variables of interest. It
seems that the estimation for Leverage did not survive this robustness check and the impact
of the reform is not statistically significant when I control for the tangibility index. On the
other hand, the results for the other variables remain statistically significant. In particular,
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from the estimated effect on NonZeroLeverage it appears that the probability to have access
to bank financing for firms operating in towns with more efficient courts and the lower end
of the tangibility index increased more by 2.25 percentage points relative to other firms that
were not affected that much by the reform. Moreover, the LogTotalDebt seems to be higher
by 0.259 basis points for firms operating in towns with efficient courts and in industries
with less tangible assets compared to the other. These effects are both statistically and
economically significant. The access to credit especially for small firms that operate in
towns outside the capital of the country is one of the most important issues that affects the
firms’ performance and growth opportunities. To that direction evidence is also provided
that the funds raised from increase to credit were invested. The fourth column of Table 3.8
presents the results on LogCAPEX which is used as a measure to estimate the impact of
the reform on investment. From this estimation, it appears that firms affected more by the
reform based on the criteria discussed above increased investment relative to the others, in
particular the LogCAPEX seems to be higher by 0.218 basis points for firms affected more
relative to the others.
Control for Unemployment
One important concern that needs to be addressed in order to strengthen the validity of
the results is a possible macroeconomic effect that may drive the results. Croatia was one
of the countries that suffered a lot from the 2009 crisis and entered a prolonged period of
recession until early 2015. Since the effect of the crisis was so significant, it is necessary
to control for the case that areas with more inefficient courts are the ones that suffered
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mostly from the crisis and for that reason the leverage level was lower. Even though a
possible effect from the financial crisis would be captured by the region-year fixed effects,
an alternative way to control for this is by adding controls for the unemployment at region
level.
Table 3.9 presents the results for the three different variables of interest with unem-
ployment level as a control variable. In particular, as controls are used three years lagged
unemployment prior the reform multiplied with a year dummy to capture the continuous
time variation of unemployment during the years. The results are consistent with unem-
ployment levels as controls and this shows that the general economic conditions at the
region level do not drive the variation in the leverage level.
The impact of the reform on leverage weakens with unemployment controls both on
magnitude and on statistical significance. In particular, firms operating in towns with ef-
ficient courts have higher leverage by 0.24 than firms operating in towns with inefficient
courts after the reform. The estimated coefficient is smaller than what was estimated in
the previous part of the analysis and this happens because a macro level characteristic as is
unemployment prior the reform may be correlated with other factors that affect the firm’s
performance.
In contrast with the estimated effects on leverage, the impact of the reform on access to
bank financing as it is captured by the NonZeroLeverage variable seems to strengthen with
unemployment controls. More specifically, the estimated coefficient, with unemployment
controls, shows that firms operating in towns with efficient courts have 0.75 percentage
points higher probability to have positive leverage than firms operating in towns with ineffi-
cient courts. The result is slightly smaller in economic magnitude but stronger in statistical
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significance.
On the same direction as the impact on access to bank financing, the impact on total
volume of total debt is robust to unemployment controls. In particular, the effect of the
reform on the logarithm of the total debt is positive and statistically significant with regional
unemployment levels as control variables. As it is shown on Table 3.9 in the third column,
firms in towns with efficient courts have 8.84 basis points higher log of total debt than
firms in towns with inefficient courts when unemployment controls are added. As before,
the result weakens on economic level but its statistical significance strengthens.
Matching Regions on Unemployment
Another approach to control for the effect that the general economic conditions could have
on the estimated results is to match the towns where the firms are located based on the
unemployment level. For this part of the analysis it is important the fact that the variation
on court efficiency is on town level while the variation on unemployment is on region level.
For that reason, there are several regions where exact matching can be succeed with within
region variation on court efficiency, in other words there are several regions where towns
with both efficient and inefficient courts are located. Table 3.10 presents the results with
matched court locations. In this part firm and industry-year fixed effects are included.
The results with matched court locations for all variables of interest strengthen both on
economic and on statistical significance. In particular, the coefficient of interest for Lever-
age increases from 0.46 percent to 0.73 percent while the coefficient for NonZeroLeverage
increases from 0.85 percent to 1.03 percent and for LogTotalDebt increases from 0.102 to
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0.130. This fact is very important as it shows that it is not the general economic conditions
or other location wise characteristics that bias upwards the estimated results and for that
reason the validity of the estimated results is stronger.
Analysis based on Firms’ Size
The analysis above shows that firms operating in tows with more efficient courts have more
debt and easier access to credit after the reform. But a question that remains to be answered
though is what type of firms are those that influence mostly the results. Unfortunately, the
characterization of size provided by the Amadeus dataset doesn’t distribute firms equally
and the majority of the firms included in the sample are characterized as small. In an
attempt to deal with this issue, I rank the firms based on their total assets and create an
alternative measure of size. Based on a ranking on firms’ pre-reform average of total assets,
I define as small the firms that belong in the first three deciles of the distribution, as medium
the firms in the fourth until the eighth decile, and as large the firms that belong in a decile
higher than the eighth.
Table 3.11 presents the results for the three different categories of sizes for the variables
of interest. The results in Table 3.11 are estimated with firm and industry∗year fixed effects.
It is a very interesting conclusion to observe that the main results of the analysis are driven
from the medium size firms. For all the different dependent variables of interest that the
analysis was repeated (Leverage, NonZeroLeverage, LogTotalDebt) the main coefficient of
interest shows up as statistically significant only for medium sized firms. Moreover, the
economic magnitude of the coefficient is almost double the size of the estimated coefficient
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for the whole sample. This is an expected result as the significance comes only from one
of the three categories of sizes that the whole sample includes.
More specifically, it seems that a medium size firm that operates in a town with efficient
courts has by 1.01 percentage points higher leverage after the reform compared to a medium
size firm that operates in a town with inefficient courts. The results for small and for large
firms are not even close to statistically significant. Regarding the access to credit, a medium
sized firm that operates in a town with efficient courts has an 1.80 percentage points higher
probability to get access to bank financing after the reform than a firm that operates in a
town with inefficient courts.
3.6 Conclusion
Croatia in January 2011 passed an Act on Execution of Cash Assets that affected signifi-
cantly the way that judicial decisions of unsecured loans were enforced. Before the passage
of the reform, a creditor received a writ of execution on cash assets from the courts that
was linked on a specific bank account of the debtor. After the reform, the creditor has to
request from a Financial Agency (FINA) to electronically transfer the amount owed from
the debtor’s bank account. FINA holds a unified database of all the banks accounts that
are under the debtors identification number and has the authority to transfer the necessary
funds from any of the debtor’s account that includes the necessary amount. The importance
of the reform is that it applies to only unsecured debts, in other words this mechanism could
not be used to to collect any debt that has a fixed asset as collateral.
To identify the impact of the reform, I use a novel dataset on courts performance in 2010
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based on the specific type of cases that was related to the new enforcement mechanism. As
treated I define the firms that are located in towns with more efficient courts as these are the
ones that receive the writ of execution from the courts within a very short period of time
and can take better advantage of the new mechanism. As control I define the firms that are
located in towns with less efficient courts as they will have to wait a long period of time
until they receive the writ of execution from the courts. The main result of the paper is
that firms that operate in an environment that was affected more by the reform had higher
leverage after the reform was passed. Additionally, these firms that were located in towns
with efficient courts had easier access to credit after the reform compared to those located
in towns with inefficient courts. Firms that borrowed more, ended up investing more. After
examining the impact of the reform on the investment level, it appears that the funds raised
as debt after the reform were invested on fixed assets. Lastly, the firms that are affected the
most are the medium sized firms and the firms with less tangible fixed assets. This finding
provides evidence that firms with bigger difficulties to gain access to credit are benefited the
most by a reform that made more secure the collection of unsecured debt and strengthened
creditors’ rights.
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3.7 Figures and Tables
Table 3.1: Court Locations
Municipal Court Town Number of Firms Number of Observations
Beli Manastir 110 634
Benkovac 177 1,006
Bjelovar 601 3,462
Buje 918 5,298
Cakovec 1,460 8,434
Crikvenica 252 1,453
Dakovo 294 1,702
Daruvar 265 1,533
Delnice 283 1,642
Dubrovnik 1,600 9,275
Glina 35 197
Gospic 372 2,136
Hrvatska Kostajnica 36 207
Imotski 248 1,433
Ivanic-grad 538 3,105
Jastrebarsko 215 1,246
Karlovac 1,014 5,865
Knin 133 760
Koprivnica 430 2,473
Korcula 269 1,554
Krapina 400 2,322
Krizevci 285 1,639
Krk 489 2,853
Kutina 361 2,098
Labin 428 2,483
Makarska 491 2,850
Mali Losinj 165 952
Metkovic 378 2,181
Nasice 144 835
Nova Gradiska 188 1,068
Ogulin 133 774
Opatija 1,116 6,437
Osijek 1,530 8,810
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Court Locations (continue)
Municipal Court Town Number of Firms Number of Observations
Pag 51 297
Pazin 560 3,264
Porec 1,434 8,242
Pozega 371 2,114
Pula 2,225 12,812
Rab 143 835
Rijeka 3,452 20,006
Rovinj 639 3,667
Samobor 876 5,060
Sesvete 944 5,427
Sibenik 1,111 6,412
Sinj 239 1,382
Sisak 571 3,288
Slatina 223 1,289
Slavonski Brod 653 3,759
Split 5,199 30,049
Stari Grad 190 1,099
Supetar 399 2,316
Trogir 796 4,594
Valpovo 174 1,005
Varazdin 1,785 10,364
Velika Gorica 857 4,945
Vinkovci 401 2,277
Virovitica 238 1,356
Vrbovec 501 2,888
Vukovar 294 1,693
Zabok 451 2,608
Zadar 1,651 9,539
Zagreb 21,096 121,574
Zapresic 594 3,416
Zlatar 230 1,336
Zupanja 138 800
Total 63,844 368,430
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Table 3.2: Industries
Number of Firms Observations
Efficient Inefficient
Industry Name Courts Courts Total Total
Agriculture,Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 517 526 1,043 5,968
Mining, Quarrying, Oil & Gas Extraction 51 76 127 733
Utilities 66 62 128 729
Construction 1,997 2,780 4,777 27,451
Manufacturing 491 606 1,097 6,322
(Food & Beverage, Textiles & Apparel)
Manufacturing 659 747 1,406 8,158
(Wood, Paper, Coal, Plastic Products)
Manufacturing 910 1,173 2,083 12,112
(Metal, Machinery,Furniture)
Wholesale Trade 2,777 3,379 6,156 35,696
Retail Trade 845 1,212 2,057 11,896
(Automobile, Furniture, Electronics,
Food and Beverage, Health, Clothing)
Retail Trade 559 836 1,395 8,093
(Sports, Book, Music, General Stores)
Transportation and Warehousing 571 855 1,426 8,245
(Air, Rail, Water, Truck, Pipeline)
Transportation and Warehousing 21 15 36 204
(Postal Service, Couriers, Warehouse)
Information 238 276 514 2,963
Finance and Insurance 52 91 143 826
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 1,063 1,299 2,362 13,466
Professional, Scientific, Technical Services 2,223 2,845 5,068 29,362
Management of Companies and Enterprises 6 10 16 91
Administrative, Waste Management 555 700 1,255 7,248
Educational Services 137 193 330 1,935
Health Care and Social Assistance 110 167 277 1,587
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation 175 250 425 2,438
Accomodations and Food Services 847 1,347 2,194 12,602
Other Services 534 723 1,257 7,263
Public Administration 5 8 13 74
Total 15,409 20,176 35,585 205,462
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics
Variables All firms Efficient Courts Inefficient Courts
Leverage 0.195 0.199 0.191
(0.301) (0.304) (0.299)
Non Zero Leverage 0.494 0.502 0.488
(0.500) (0.500) (0.500)
Total Debt 1,083,546.5 1,045,419.6 1,112,640.9
(3,771,309.6) (3,604,122.2) (3,893,827.7)
Log(Total Debt) 6.367 6.454 6.302
(6.613) (6.599) (6.623)
Capital Expenditures 419,471.8 413,377.5 424,213.6
(1,904,415.2) (1,850,830.9) (1,945,085.7)
Log(Capital Expenditures) 8.551 8.548 8.554
(4.763) (4.759) (4.766)
Total Assets 3,807,154.7 3,757,796.4 3,844,819.7
(10,394,800.8) (10,410,141.5) (10,382,966.0)
Log(Total Assets) 13.42 13.40 13.44
(1.957) (1.959) (1.955)
EBIT 113,163.2 110,899.8 114,890.4
(1,097,113.9) (976,180.6) (1,181,097.9)
Profitability -0.0688 -0.0631 -0.0731
(3.339) (2.845) (3.672)
Sales 3,134,625.9 3,183,321.6 3,097,466.5
(11,311,598.9) (11,398,933.6) (11,244,405.3)
Number of Firms 35,585 15,409 20,176
Number of Obs. 205,462 88,927 116,535
166
Figure 3.1: Access to Credit and Enforcement Reform - Average Effect
(a) Leverage Ratio
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